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ABSTRACT
The central question which will be considered in this thesis is 
how Mao Zedong formulated a concept of imperialism and
resistance to it, to enable and continue the socialist
revolution in China. The specific focus in this thesis is an 
explanation of how Mao understood imperialism in order to use 
it and to turn it into anti-imperialism, the origins of his 
ideas, his theoretical development of it and his application of 
this idea in practice. At the same time, it will be examined 
how other aspects of Mao's thinking were linked to this
central, strategic concept.
The thesis begins by examining Mao's connection and
indebtedness to Marx and Lenin: this has not yet been done with 
regard to his use of the concept of 'imperialism'. This thesis, 
besides being a contribution to the history of Marxism 
therefore, aims to fill a gap in research on Mao. It will help 
to establish how Mao used the concepts of imperialism and anti­
imperialism. In addition, my research is part of the discussion 
as to what degree Marxism has been revised in the process.
The argument essentially will be that Mao, basing himself 
on Marx and Lenin, used their concepts to adapt Marxism- 
Leninism in a novel manner in Chinese circumstances, first to 
win the revolution, and then to construct what he regarded as 
socialism. Thus the thesis will do two things: a) it will
clarify Mao's relationship to Marx and Lenin: Why did Mao's
Marxism-Leninism take the form it did? Did Mao stand on Lenin's 
shoulders?; and b) it will contribute to understanding why the 
Chinese Communist Party won the revolution.
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'IMPERIALISM* AND 'ANTI-IMPERIALISM' IN MAO ZEDONG:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of 'imperialism', seen as an exploitative 
international system, has been perhaps the most widely used of 
all Marxist-Leninist categories, influencing not only all 
sections of the communist movement, but much third world 
nationalism as well. Little present in Marx, it was given 
codification in the writings of Lenin around the time of the 
First World War: its function was not only to explain how and 
why more developed capitalist countries dominated the colonial 
world, but also to provide an explanation for conflict in the 
international system as a whole and, through that explanation, 
to suggest a strategy for challenging capitalist rule on a 
global scale. It therefore became an organizing principle for
communist revolutionary strategy in the first half of the
twentieth century: analysis of 'imperialism' provided not only 
an explanation for the dynamics of international relations and 
for the impact of the advanced capitalist states on the third 
world, but also a means for opposing this system within 
specific countries and on the international plane. The most 
important of all this opposition was, of course, that of China, 
a country containing a quarter of the human race and where, 
from the 1920s onwards, a revolutionary communist movement
challenged and eventually overcame its domestic and 
international opponents. Central to that challenge was the
conception of 'imperialism' and 'anti-imperialism' developed by 
the leader of that revolution, Mao Zedong. It is not so much
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any theoretical or analytical originality that justifies its 
examination in the pages which follow, but rather the means by 
which this concept was applied to China and the importance 
which it occupied in the Chinese Communist Party's 
revolutionary strategy. The interrelationship of national and 
class oppression and exploitation and the forces this dialectic 
generates was understood by Mao and became part of his thinking 
and action.
Mao and the Marxist Tradition
The central question which will be considered is how Mao 
Zedong formulated a concept of imperialism and resistance to it 
to enable and continue the socialist revolution in China. The 
specific focus in this thesis is an explanation of how Mao 
understood imperialism in order to use it and to turn it into 
anti-imperialism, the origins of his ideas, his theoretical 
development of it and his application of this idea into 
practice. At the same time, it will be examined how other 
aspects of Mao's thinking were linked to this central, 
strategic concept.
I will begin by examining Mao's connection and 
indebtedness to Marx and Lenin: this has not yet been done with 
regard to his use of the concept 'imperialism'. The second and 
third chapters therefore lay out the antecedents and 
theoretical framework within which Mao operated. This thesis, 
besides being a contribution to the history of Marxism 
therefore, aims to fill a gap in research on Mao. It will help
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to establish how Mao used the concepts of imperialism and anti­
imperialism. In addition, my research is part of the discussion 
as to what degree Marxism has been revised in the process.
This thesis will make clear what Mao meant by the term 
imperialism and how he used it. The central goal of the thesis 
is, therefore after providing the background in Marx and 
Engels, to analyze Mao's view on imperialism as manifested in 
his writings. While the historical context of Mao's thinking 
will be provided, this is not the main focus of the chapters. 
Imperialism is the pivotal concept, which properly understood 
can give a key to understanding his policies. This will then 
enable me to examine how other aspects (United Front, class 
etc.) of Mao's thinking were linked to this central, strategic 
concept.
This touches on the much debated issue of Mao's use of 
Marxism itself. Mao used - perhaps invented - the concept of 
'sinification of Marxism' as any effective Marxism required 
national forms. Mao's idea of the 'sinification of Marxism' has 
been used as evidence that he subsumed Marxism within his 
nationalism and Chinese culture. However, the way he 
'nationalized' Marxism was fashioned by Marxism, and its tasks 
were defined by revolutionary considerations of class and 
class-consciousness. Mao and his dealings with imperialism are 
an example of this sinification and actualization of Marxism. 
My argument is that, despite this sinification, Mao stands in a 
broad sense within a Marxist-Leninist tradition. He did not 
break from orthodox Marxism through his emphasis on 
developments within the superstructure. There are elements of
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voluntarism in Mao - but, does not all actual revolutionary 
politics involve voluntarism? There is also at times an 
uncertain grasp of Marxist-Leninist theory and a lack of rigour 
in his analysis. But there are also significant elements of an 
orthodox Marxism. In addition, anybody using the concepts of 
class analysis in terms of a social and national revolution, 
discussing alliances with different groups, using the concept 
of relations of production, operates largely in a Marxist- 
Leninist paradigm.
The argument is essentially that Mao, basing himself on 
Marx and Lenin, used their concepts to adapt Marxism-Leninism 
in a novel manner in Chinese circumstances, first to win the 
revolution, and then to construct what he regarded as 
socialism. Thus this thesis will do two things: (a) it will
clarify Mao's relationship to Marx and Lenin: Why did Mao's
Marxism-Leninism take the form it did? Did Mao stand on Lenin's 
shoulders?; and (b) it will contribute to understanding why the 
Chinese Communist Party won the revolution. Mao agreed with 
Lenin's idea of political action in the interest of certain 
classes. He was a Bolshevik, not a Menshevik, i.e. not someone 
who wanted to wait until the time and production forces were 
'ripe' and history had developed appropriately.
There are however, two obvious problems with this 
approach. First there is the problem of language. Mao wrote in 
Chinese but his major writings and actions are accessible. Not 
only do I have Mao's works, five volumes of his Selected Works 
in mind but also Kau's and Martin's complete works.1 
Additionally, numerous secondary works are available for a
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serious study of Mao and his thought. I do not want to claim 
that there are no problems with translating a foreign language, 
but, at least for my purpose, it is not an insuperable problem.
If translation is no insuperable problem, then Mao's 
fragmentary literary output is, which is also the case with 
Lenin and Marx. Mao's writings can be divided by their length. 
He wrote numerous letters, directives, editorials, public 
addresses and lectures, intra-party memoranda, poems, polemical 
rejoinders against adversaries, and interviews with domestic 
and foreign correspondents; and these were often quite short. 
His longer writings deal with a variety of topics, but nowhere 
did he leave behind one detailed, comprehensive, and closely- 
argued document setting out in its entirety his understanding 
and analysis of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Mao is a 
political writer in the first place, he is a political figure 
like Lenin. "Politics", Mao asserted, " [is] the concentrated 
expression of economics."2 This definition had been coined by 
Lenin, though in a different context of a polemic with Bukharin 
and Trotsky.3 It is clear from the official version of On New 
Democracy that Mao used Lenin's definition of politics as 'the 
concentrated expression of economics', but there is no citation 
in the original text. He is not a theoretician such as Marx, or 
even Lenin, but acts of course on the basis of a certain 
theory.
Many of Mao's writings were produced in direct response to 
the ever-changing socio-economic environment. On the one hand, 
one should expect in these responses to the political scene, 
disunity and discontinuity. There cannot be unity in the sense
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of an 'essential1 Mao, one who would have the same assessment 
on different issues during the fifty years and more he wrote 
and was politically active. The development of Mao's thought is 
a response to the changing political and economic domestic and 
international context. Taking this into consideration, one 
should not be surprised to find differences and changes, even 
silences in his thought. On the other hand, there is of course 
continuity. The same can be said of many influential thinkers: 
discussing their work now involves reassembling it. In fact, 
Mao's views on imperialism and anti-imperialism are scattered 
throughout his writings. As a result, an exercise in exegetical 
interpretation is the obvious methodology. We aim to identify 
references to imperialism and anti-imperialism, piece them 
together, and analyze the picture that emerges. In so doing, I 
will reconstruct Mao's thoughts on imperialism and anti­
imperialism and trace these to the thought of Lenin and Marx. 
The key point of this thesis is to elucidate the use of this 
concept by Mao, Lenin and Marx. The thesis is about the use of 
a concept, it is a thesis on political thought and it is a 
contribution to the history of Marxism. We will make clear the 
shifting meaning of the concept imperialism and its meaning in 
the context of Mao's thought, that is the response to 
imperialism, that is anti-imperialism, becomes the priority.
After a statement like this, are there any pretensions to 
objectivity left? The erkenntnisleitende Interesse (Habermas) 
could not be expressed more clearly! To avoid this subjectivity 
as much as possible, I have tried to let the texts speak for 
themselves, sometimes at great length, in the hope of making
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Mao's original intention clear. Of course, an interpreter of 
the text is needed and this must mean an anticipatory 
framework. However, I have added to the exegetical methodology 
an openness of my theoretical premises for my interpretation. 
Naturally, Foucault would have never accepted that texts speak 
for themselves. But I would deny that any interpretation can 
only be the interpretation of the interpreter, not that of the 
authors (in this case Marx, Lenin and Mao) under investigation. 
One will, of course, never be able to get into the mind of Mao, 
but one can make an effort to get as close as possible to these 
authors' intent.
This does not deny the possibility that other writers, 
even with the same perspective, might come to a different 
interpretation of Mao's use of the concept of imperialism and 
anti-imperialism. But up to now, no one has written a detailed 
work on the development of the concept of imperialism from Marx 
to Lenin to Mao. There are writings on nationalism in all of 
these writers. But these works do not take the concept of 
imperialism as their central focus. The issue here is, how does 
one trace the concept of imperialism and its emphasis on anti­
imperialism in Mao and Lenin and Marx? How does one understand 
and locate Mao, as he is not just part of a general discourse 
on nationalism, but derives from Marxism-Leninism? This 
argument might not be new, but there is no systematic and 
logical prosecution of this key concept in Lenin, as prepared 
by Marx and the development of it by Mao. In the following 
pages a picture of consistency and difference, contradictions 
and silences, and similarities and connections will be
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developed. Mao's anti-imperialism is not just a product of a 
national response to imperialism, but is inspired by earlier 
concepts of imperialism in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. It 
is part of the discussion in Marxist theories of imperialism of 
the interrelationship of national and class oppression and 
exploitation. There is no uniform Marxist body of thought 
spanning continents and more than a century dealing with these 
issues. For this reason alone there are contradictions and 
silences. Marxism is an evolving body of theory and practice. 
Mao's conception of imperialism and anti-imperialism was part 
of this evolving and dynamic political and theoretical 
tradition.
It is a Marxist axiom that changed historical 
circumstances necessitate new analysis and strategies. This is 
exactly what Mao attempted, a logical and systematical 
reconstruction of this attempt will be provided.
I come to Mao's theory of imperialism by tracing it back 
to Marx and Lenin. Marx and Lenin are the stepping stones Mao 
uses to comprehend Chinese realities, or as Isaac Deutscher put 
it: "... Chinese communism descends straight from Bolshevism.
Mao stands on Lenin's shoulders."4 In this process of using Marx 
and Lenin the similarities and differences between these 
thinkers and practitioners will become obvious. Mao used, but 
also adapted, Marxist-Leninist concepts, and one key concept 
among these is imperialism. The centrality of imperialism was 
beyond doubt for Mao and, therefore, a proper understanding of 
it is central to assessing the Chinese revolution, as it was 
for the Bolsheviks. This centrality of imperialism was
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recognized for the first time by Lenin. His model is organized 
around the concepts of capital accumulation, imperial 
expansion, interstate conflict, violence, national differences, 
national oppression and the national struggle; but still it is 
concerned to maintain the orthodox Marxist importance of class. 
For example, one of Lenin's adjustments to Marx's and Engels' 
concepts of class is the invention of the labour aristocracy. 
Taken together, these provided the elements for a general 
theory of the international system and the place of 
revolutionary politics within it.
Although the concept of imperialism was little used in 
Marx's time - he only employed it himself with reference to 
Napoleon III - he did address certain themes which Lenin would 
later take up in his characterization of the international 
system through a definition of imperialism. These themes are: 
the process of accumulation, crises of accumulation, and the 
geographical spread of capitalist relations of production. Marx 
analyzed the nature of exploitative capitalism. A crucial 
element in Marxist understanding of capitalism is the need to 
constantly accumulate and to expand to avoid a ' tendential fall 
of the rate of profit' . That is why, Marx believed, industrial 
capitalists are in favour of free trade rather than 
protectionism. The world market needs to be opened up to serve 
as a temporary safety valve to avoid crisis in the domestic- 
capitalist economy. Marx's and Engel's model is one of a world 
capitalist system divided into social classes, particularly 
workers and capitalists. Nations were to them, in general, 
obstacles to the actual realization of this model.
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Lenin was very much aware of this development of 
capitalism on a global level. He saw the concentration and 
centralization of capitalism developing before his eyes, 
something Marx observed only in its beginnings. Capitalism was 
in this process changing its nature from competitive to 
monopoly capitalism. Despite his emphasis on monopoly 
capitalism and the economic side of imperialism, Lenin never 
neglected its military or political facets. Inter-capitalist 
conflict led to the First World War. With the spread of 
imperialism on a world scale, Lenin, contrary to Marx and 
Engels, emphasized national differences, national oppression 
and the national struggle; but he also still emphasized the 
importance of class.
Mao did not provide a theoretical analysis of the inherent 
economic laws of imperialism, but took over a Marxist-Leninist 
vocabulary. He tried to understand how to resist further 
occupation and exploitation, and to develop from this a non- 
dogmatic use of Marxist-Leninist principles for China. What is 
interesting about Mao is what implicit theories of the 
interrelation of class and nation lie behind his analytical 
writings and his tactical positions.
Marx and Lenin: Capitalism and its Contradiction
This introduction will establish the intellectual legacy with 
which Mao operated in China. The argument is that Mao used, and 
in some respects developed, concepts which were earlier 
addressed by Marx and Lenin. Mao's formulation of imperialism
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and resistance to it grew out of a substantial body of debate 
within the Marxist tradition on the question of how capitalism 
became a global phenomenon and how it generated resistance to 
itself. Marx believed that this global development of 
capitalism could not substantially avoid crisis and revolution, 
and the eventual socialist revolution in European 
industrialized countries would bring with it an end to war. 
This development of capitalism to a new stage of monopoly 
capitalism, according to Lenin, had the effect of saving 
capitalism from revolution longer than expected by Marx. But 
within it, monopoly capitalism still carried the seeds of its 
own destruction. Domestic competition was transferred onto the 
global level. All advanced capitalist countries wanted to
benefit from profits in outer-European regions. A desperate 
struggle was under way in Lenin's time to secure these safety 
valves. Heightened tensions and wars were the inevitable
result. The socialist revolution in Europe in the meantime was 
postponed and capitalist nationalisms opposed each other in 
their attempt to occupy colonies, but colonial nationalism was 
also awakened to oppose the exploitation in the colonies. Lenin 
conceptualized these diverse developments in Europe and the 
colonies in his concept of 'uneven and combined development'. 
In Europe, some profited more than others from exploitation, 
e.g. the labour aristocracy, something Marx and Engels had
already become aware of. In addition certain industries 
profited more than others: uneven growth took place in
capitalist countries. In their move to the colonies capitalists 
were, Lenin believed, not interested in a planned
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industrialization of colonies. Lenin saw clearly that there was 
uneven growth in the colonies. Compared to Marx this was a new 
element; for him, conceptualized in his 'Double Mission of 
Capitalism' , capitalism was essentially acting positively in 
the colonies. It was the material preparation for socialism. On 
the one hand, capitalism destroyed the old traditional, feudal 
mode of production; on the other, capitalism would build 
societies in its own image. Insofar as it produced 
industrialization and also created the bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, Marx regarded it positively in the hope for an 
eventual transition to socialism.
Lenin observed at close quarters the uneven impact of 
capitalism in Russia where the unevenness of growth led to an 
uneven development of capitalism. It resulted in deep tensions, 
which he saw replicated in the colonies. This heterogeneity 
meant that new options for the revolution were opened. The new 
bourgeoisie gained from intervention; old feudal elements 
suffered; a working class was generated, if only in its 
infancy. Social tensions rose to boiling point, as the 
peasantry was, of course, also shaken by these developments.
Developments which occurred one after the other over time 
in Europe, feudalism to capitalism to potentially socialism 
would be combined in one phase in Russia and in the colonies, 
too. There was simultaneously in the colonies a struggle 
against feudalism and against capitalism. In Russia the divided 
bourgeoisie was not able to conduct a proper bourgeois- 
capitalist revolution. The Communist Party took over this task 
by leading Russia into socialism. The Communist Party was born
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in the special conditions of uneven development and even though 
it might not consist of numerous workers, the consciousness of 
the people who joined was particularly high and sharpened. In 
these circumstances Russia could skip the distinct capitalist 
phase and proceed into socialism. Yet this Russian opportunity 
was unsustainable on its own: for Lenin the revolution in
Russia was exceptional and could really only survive if 
virtually simultaneous socialist revolutions occurred in the 
heartland of capitalism - Europe.
Marx also addressed the issue of skipping capitalism to go 
forward to socialism. He was asked for advice by narodniks who 
believed that the traditional village community in Russia still 
contained all the elements necessary for an unalienated mode of 
production. Even though Marx was to a certain extent ambiguous 
in his reply, the following analysis will show that on balance, 
whilst there are no blueprints and iron laws in socio-economic 
development, avoiding the capitalist phase in Russia was out of 
the question.
Even though Lenin concurred with Marx concerning Russia, 
he believed that in the colonies the situation would be 
different if certain conditions were observed. Anti-imperialist 
struggles in the colonies were not only in the short run useful 
for Lenin in that they weakened imperialism, but there was now 
the realistic chance of national liberation leading to 
socialism. It was necessary for the local communist party to 
guide the struggle in the colonies to be allied to local 
bourgeois anti-imperialist forces, but without being sucked in 
by them. The task for the local communist party, he argued was
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to continue this anti-imperialist liberation into socialism. 
This view of national liberation is completely contradictory to 
the one held by Marx and Engels. For them the European and 
local nationalist bourgeoisie had to destroy fully the feudal 
elements, build up industrialization and not be weakened in 
this by a local liberation movement. They feared that a 
liberation movement would lead to an exchange of feudal elites 
rather than a breakthrough towards capitalism, and thus later 
on socialism. They hoped for a socialist revolution in the most 
developed countries, not only in one, and with highly developed 
commodity economies. If, however, nationalist forces were led 
by the most conscious vanguard of the working class, one could 
not but grasp the opportunity to end foreign and domestic 
capitalist exploitation, Lenin argued. It will be demonstrated 
that Marx and Lenin considered capitalism to be a dynamic 
system continually seeking to accumulate and inevitably 
expanding beyond national boundaries to create an international 
division of labour, linking capitalist countries to the 
colonies. Marx developed a general conception of the inner 
logic of capital, and Lenin derived from it a more historically 
specific analysis of the operation of late nineteenth-early 
twentieth century capitalism and its political and military 
outcomes.
'Imperialism' and 'Anti-Imperialism' in the Chinese Revolution
Despite the many theoretical problems with Lenin's theory of 
imperialism, Lenin gave Mao a framework for understanding and
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responding to imperialism; it gave him an understanding of the 
potential for socialist revolution in the colonies. After all, 
it is not so much the fact of the crucifixion of Jesus which is 
of interest, but that people two thousand years later still 
believe in it. In the same way it is of significant theoretical 
and political interest to understand why Mao used Lenin's 
concept of imperialism. That imperialism was central to China 
was not doubted by Sun Yatsen, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong 
alike - the question was how to assess it and respond to it.
Mao recognized the uneven impact of imperialism on China 
and with it the potential for a combined development of anti- 
feudal, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist struggle in China 
leading to socialism. It had not created capitalist 
industrialization in depth, however, even though, in Mao's 
opinion, the sprouts of capitalism had already existed. But 
imperialism had accelerated this process and had brought 
forward the question of the national-democratic revolution 
which was to be followed later by the socialist revolution on 
the political agenda.
As Lenin had already postulated, the socialist revolution 
could only be successful if certain conditions were observed. 
Mao is the person who, using Marxist-Leninist concepts, played 
a key role in bringing about a successful anti-imperialist 
revolution in China. In the process, he changed this Marxist- 
Leninist framework, adapting it to a new context and a 
different time. As the proletariat was numerically very weak, 
even weaker than in Russia, and too weak for Mao to begin 
thinking about the early achievement of socialism, one of the
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key questions for Mao was to identify the forces who would 
support - or not - an anti-imperialist struggle. This was the 
question he also addressed to international forces, in terms of 
the new world order offered by Lenin and the Soviet Union, by 
President Wilson and the United States after the First World 
War, and of course by Japan’s co-prosperity sphere in Asia. 
Thus Mao was able to use imperialist countries in his
resistance to Japanese imperialism in particular and 
imperialism in China in general. This did not mean an automatic 
alliance with the Soviet Union to the exclusion of imperialist 
countries, but at the time of Japanese aggression it involved 
the possibility of cooperation with less aggressive imperialist 
governments, e.g. the United States and Great Britain, making 
use of differences between imperialist countries to his
advantage. This international strategy was matched by one of
domestic alliances, an equally important part of the 'anti- 
imperialist' strategy. Here, the opportunity to make mistakes 
and to ally oneself in the wrong way had already been pointed 
out by Lenin. The Chinese Communist Party made exactly this 
mistake in the 1920s acting on Comintern advice not to take the 
leadership in the alliance with the national bourgeoisie; it 
needed to take this line due to its weakness, but the result 
was disaster. In 1927 Chiang Kaishek virtually smashed the 
Chinese Communist Party: the cities were occupied by the KMT, 
the proletariat crushed. The only practical solution was, after 
1927, to take refuge in the countryside among the peasants. 
This move to the countryside, however, was not merely a 
desperate attempt to escape but a logical move in a country
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where the socio-economic problems of the peasantry were 
massive. Mao advocated very early a re-orientation of the 
tactics and strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to 
accomodate the political and economic demands of the peasantry.
Accordingly, the peasants and the countryside became the 
heartland for a socialist revolution. Marx would have been 
utterly astonished to hear a self-declared Marxist-Leninist 
propose such a strategy. But, Mao argued, if this struggle in 
the countryside was guided by the most conscious vanguard of 
the revolution, the workers, or at least by peasants and 
intellectuals with a worker's consciousness, a socialist 
revolution would still be an ultimate possibility. This is made 
clear in many of Mao's writings from the 1927-30 period, when 
he was developing a strategy for rural revolution. This could 
only succeed, according to Mao, with working class leadership. 
Lenin could have only but agreed.
Through endless meanders of compromise Mao, charming 
and bullying, according to the audience he was addressing, led 
the Chinese Communist Party after 1935 (the Zunyi Conference) 
through what are termed the twin dangers of putschism and 
accommodation. It was the anti-imperialist nationalism of the 
Chinese Communist Party which gave it access to the broad 
masses of people from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Even 
Chiang was obliged to join a Second United Front. This very 
close relationship between Marxism-Leninism and national 
struggle does not mean, in Mao's view, that Marxism is used as 
a convenient cover for nationalist goals, but signifies an 
active inter-connection between Marxism and nationalism. Marx
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and Engels did not condemn all occurrences of nationalism, 
particularly after studying Irish and Polish nationalism. The 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in Marx and Lenin concerning 
the nationalist question opened the way for Mao to connect 
nationalism and the social revolution within a Marxist-Leninist 
framework. This interrelation of national and class oppression 
and exploitation is one of the main questions at issue in 
Marxist theories of imperialism, and will be a major pre­
occupation for this thesis.
This interaction narrowed the gap between Marxist-Leninist 
principles and the practice of revolution in China. The 
struggle against Japan was not in the first place a struggle 
for socialism, but for nationalist independence in the 
bourgeois-democratic phase. This remained the case even after 
the defeat of Japan. To eliminate the danger of another 
imperialist country taking control of China, this bourgeois- 
democratic revolution had to be continued, but now against 
Chiang and the feudal elements in the KMT. Mao's view of how to 
accomplish the socialist revolution meant that he eventually 
realized that socialism was not on the agenda for decades, as 
he put it. What was to be done and implemented was the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution of the four classes under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. For him one could 
work together with bourgeois nationalist elements - something 
which led to noticeable socio-economic successes after 194 9. 
Mao extended cooperation with the national bourgeoisie beyond 
anything Lenin had ever envisaged, challenging in the process 
Moscow's ideological monopoly. The Chinese Communist Party's
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victory reinforced the belief in different conceptions of the 
road to socialism. One example had been the victory of the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 which had been an economic and 
political struggle culminating in an armed uprising in the 
cities. The other was the Chinese road, using the countryside 
to surround the cities in a long-drawn out struggle.
Summary of Chapters
Mao's concept of imperialism was a crucial part of his 
strategy for the success of the revolution in China. It will be 
retraced how he came to his concept through Marx and Lenin. Mao 
developed a specific way of understanding imperialism and 
applying it to the conditions in China. In this process he 
adapted the Marxist-Leninist framework by subtracting from, and 
adding to, it. It is these changes which enabled the continued 
attempts to achieve the nationalist and socialist revolutions 
in China.
This thesis will examine the origins of the Marxist theory 
of imperialism, how Mao understood the concept, how he used it, 
and the relationship in which he stands to Marx and Lenin. Mao 
attempted to restate Marxism-Leninism in China in meaningful, 
indigenous terms, but he did so in a way which is recognizably 
Marxist-Leninist. It is this purpose which the thesis will 
pursue, and it will do so by examining the issues covered in 
the following chapters.
The thesis's significance lies not only in the fact that 
little attention has been devoted to Mao's theory of
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imperialism, but also in the fact that it provides a genealogy 
of the concept of imperialism in Mao's thought and it addresses 
the way he operationalized the concept to pursue the anti­
imperialist revolutionary struggle in China.
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2. MARX AND ENGELS ON IMPERIALISM
(i) Definition of Imperialism. The Lack of Use of the Concept
by Marx and Engels.
This chapter will establish the intellectual framework
within which Mao operated in China, arguing that he used
concepts which had been addressed earlier by Marx and Lenin. 
Although he did not define imperialism as Lenin understood it, 
Marx laid the foundation for Lenin* s use of the concept by 
analyzing the crises inherent in capitalism which led it to 
expand globally. He discussed the issues of concentration and 
centralization of capitalism and how this led to free trade, a
policy which was demanded by the most advanced groups in
England in the mid-nineteenth century. The effect of capitalism 
on the colonies was considered by Marx to be essentially 
positive in that it destroyed the old feudal or Asiatic mode of 
production. For Lenin, however - and this is a significant
difference from Marx - this move to capitalism creates an
uneven development of old and new elements. Capitalism does not 
penetrate all layers of colonial societies, nor do people 
receive imperialism with open arms. Imperialism creates
resistance. The effect of imperialism is so uneven that the
result is a social formation with a mix of old and new, where 
in Russia and also in China, the possibility of a successful 
revolution is suddenly thrust upon the Communist Party. This 
situation does not reflect a textbook recipe for making
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revolution, as in China workers were thin on the ground and the 
revolution had to re-orientate itself to the countryside and
peasants which differed sharply from Marx's view of the main 
actor and area of revolution. Lenin realized the need for, and 
importance of, including peasants in the revolution, a
development which was pushed even further by Mao. The
resistance created by imperialism led to a fanning of
nationalism and a nationalist liberation struggle. Marx had
hoped that nationalism would be overcome by class-conscious
workers worldwide. Lenin acknowledged the positive power of
nationalism in colonialism and extended support for it. Anti­
imperialist nationalism however had stirred very diverse groups 
of people to fight for influence. This opened the way to
strengthen one's own forces - which were still quite weak in
China - if one could find the right allies; but it also
influenced the Communist Party away from an undiluted pursuit 
of social revolution. This issue was very important to Mao, and 
Lenin had discussed with M. N. Roy: what the role of the
Communist Party in an anti-imperialist alliance should be. 
Eventually Mao was able to develop a United Front concept which 
was a symbol for his acceptance of general Marxist-Leninist 
ideas adapted to a specific Chinese situation. He believed
strongly in the 'abstract' universal principles of Marxism- 
Leninism, and also that Marxism as a total ideology resulted 
from the union of these abstract principles and the 'laws' 
depicting the regularities of particular national contexts.
After establishing the basic principles of Marxism and 
Leninism in the treatment of capitalism and imperialism, it
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will become clear how Mao took these principles and used them 
in the particular context of defeating imperialism and
achieving the socialist revolution in China.
In commonly accepted definitions, imperialism is described 
as an expansionist policy of European powers to influence, 
exploit and dominate the people of non-European, usually weaker 
countries by overt or covert political military, economic and 
ideological means. Such an analysis distinguishes between 
earlier unilateral systems of market relations and today's 
vastly complex integrated capitalist mode of production. What 
is specific to the Marxist perspective, however, is that 
imperialism is seen not as the aggregation of an unequal flow 
of commodities and capital, but as the world-scale process of 
the extension of capitalism that has been taking place since 
the middle of the eighteenth century. As Krippendorff has 
pointed out:
The qualitative new element, which begins with 
imperialism which takes over from crude colonialism, 
is therefore not the creation of an internationally 
communicative unit; however it is the beginning of 
the creation of an interdependent social system, 
whose individual parts are not able anymore to
develop autonomously nor according to their own laws, 
but on the contrary develop in the interest of some 
societies - the capitalist industrialist nation­
states of Europe and North America - and they will be 
subjected to a radical social and economic 
transformation.1
Unlike the Roman, Oriental, Arab, or other earlier forms of 
imperial domination and colonialism, modern imperialism, 
Krippendorff continues, is defined as "the active economic 
integration of pre-industrial societies into the capitalist 
mode of production". In this way the system of capitalist 
production with its specific exchange and production relations
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has become an international mode of production. A multitude of 
factors - non-economic as well as economic - caused this 
particular development in response to structural socioeconomic 
needs.
In order to gauge the distinctiveness of this approach,
let us consider the contrary definition of Hans Kohn:
Western imperialism has had only a brief day in 
history. Its sun is now setting and though this sun 
has been shining over many injustices and cruelties, 
in no way worse than the normal cruelties in Asia and 
Africa, it has brought lasting benefits to Asia and 
Africa, as the imperialism of Alexander the Great and 
of the Romans did for their empires, and has awakened 
and revitalised lethargic civilisations.2
According to the Marxist view, such an indiscriminate 
definition empties the concept of any useful and distinct 
content and makes it impossible to employ in concrete analysis. 
Benjamin J. Cohen's characterization of imperialism as "any 
relationship of effective domination or control, political or 
economic, . direct or indirect, of one nation over another", or
George Lichtheim's similar definition are both examples of this
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widespread understanding of the concept.3 The problem with these 
writers is not that they equate imperialism with formal 
political conquest, but that they fail to explain why those 
conquests occurred, and to understand the territorial 
imperatives of capitalist expansion in the era of finance 
capital.
When it is not regarded as an age-old phenomenon having no 
specific application to capitalism, imperialism is interpreted 
as being simultaneously new and old. Schumpeter, for example, 
believed that imperialism was not a result of capitalism, but 
on the contrary a preceding stage which would naturally
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disappear with capitalism’s full development.
The history of the concept of imperialism is a relatively 
brief one, for even as recently as the eighteenth century the 
term was unknown; only the adjective 'imperialist', used to 
describe a supporter of the Imperial and Catholic Majesty, 
Emperor of the Romans might have been known to a few learned 
scholars. The French word 1'imperialisme first appeared with the 
Bonapartist revival under Louis-Philippe's monarchy (1830-48), 
and later came to represent the form of rule adopted by 
Napoleon III after he seized power in December 1852 - that is, 
a rule based upon military pomp, appeals to the mob and the 
influence of the stock exchange.4
When we come to Marx himself, his use of the term 
'imperialism* was identical to that of the Bonapartist revival 
period. One of the best-known examples is * in The Eighteenth 
Bfumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), where he referred to 'the 
hidden imperialism of Le National. (Le National was the journal 
of the republican bourgeoisie.)5 Further on in the same article 
he used the term in connection with the role of the French 
peasantry in the transition from the Second Republic to the 
Bonapartist regime (1848-52). After accusing the bourgeoisie of 
hypocrisy for its allegations that the peasantry 'betrayed'— it 
to Bonaparte, he argued that in reality the bourgeoisie itself 
nurtured the imperialism of the peasant class.6
Such fleeting references might suggest that Marx himself 
contributed very little indeed to what has become known as the 
'Marxist concept of imperialism' . However, it will be shown 
that Marx's general theory of capitalism, together with his own
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and Engels's writings on the expansion of capitalism in regions 
outside Europe, and their writings on the relations of nation 
are full of references to class and laid part of the crucial 
foundations on which Lenin and Mao Zedong were able to build 
their concept of imperialism. I shall return in detail to the 
question of whether the concept underwent any fundamental 
transformation in the hands of these later writers.
The writings of Marx and Engels directly concerned with 
the East and Far East - the principal area of capitalist 
expansion in their time - are scattered throughout their huge 
corpus of books, articles and letters. But as Kubalkova and 
Cruickshank have wryly remarked, they "were inconsiderate 
enough to fail to provide for their readers a neatly referenced 
synthesis of their work with the main ideas and theories 
carefully plotted".7 Marx and Engels were very interested in the 
development of capitalism in and outside Europe, but they were 
less concerned with Asia as such. "Marx concentrated his
energies on (the study of capitalism, and he dealt with the rest
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of history in varying degrees of detail, but mainly in so far 
as it bore on the origins and development of capitalism. "8 They 
saw Asia mainly in connection with the impact of European 
industrial capitalism, so that their interest in Asia developed 
as a result of the expansion of capitalism. Moreover, their 
major works on the rise and consolidation of capitalist society 
naturally focused on its core country, England, and their 
interest in Asia only developed after 1848 from their analyses 
of European industrial capitalism.9 The principal sources are 
the articles that Marx and Engels wrote for the New York Daily
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Tribune between 1851 and 1862. When reading these articles it 
is necessary to bear in mind that they were running 
commentaries and reports on contemporary, often military, 
events - quite a different 'genre from their theoretical 
writings proper - with a relative lack of economic or class 
analysis.10
In this material Marx and Engels were concerned mostly 
with India, but also China. This is partly because they 
happened to be living in England at the time when it was trying 
to enforce the conditions for free trade. If they had been 
living in Holland, for example, they would quite probably have 
written more about Java. More importantly, however, they 
regarded England as the pivot of the capitalist world, whose 
inherent mechanisms and expansionist tendencies indicated the 
direction in which capitalism itself would develop. They 
believed that England could not be treated simply as a country 
along with other countries. England was the metropolis of 
capital. England was "the representative of European industry 
in the world market".11 For this reason it is sometimes 
appropriate for the reader mentally to replace the word 
’England' with the more general term 'capitalist country' or 
even 'capitalism'. Similarly, in the nature of its 
exploitation, India came to be seen by Marx and Engels as 
typifying a process whose significance transcended its own 
particularities. And what happened to China was not peculiar to 
China, but represented what was to happen to all other such 
countries, to a greater or lesser degree.
Thus, although Marx and Engels did not directly analyze
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imperialism, they did lay the foundation for Lenin to construct 
his theory. The advantage of starting with Marx is that he 
alone has developed a general theory of the dynamic of the 
capitalist mode of production as a totality. At the heart of 
his theory is the process of capital accumulation. This general 
theory allows specific historical applications and models to be 
developed - as Lenin later did to account for imperialism.
(ii) Capitalism’s Double Mission
Marx and Engels understood that while it was transforming 
them, capitalism was bringing unprecedented misery to the 
colonies.12 One might assume that their use of the term 'misery* 
entailed a moral evaluation of such phenomena as civil wars, 
invasions, famines, conquests or European despotism grafted 
upon Oriental despotism. In reality, however, they perceived 
misery as ( a necessary consequence of the complete 
disintegration of the existing social framework in colonial 
societies. As they said of China, the death-hour of the old 
society was "rapidly drawing nigh".13 Marx described how England 
had destroyed the village-community system in India, which had 
remained self-sufficient for centuries.14 This work of 
destruction was not caused primarily by the British army or the 
British taxman, but by the imposition of free trade and steam 
machines. "It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian 
hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel."15 Later in the same 
article Marx wrote: "British steam power and science destroyed,
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over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between 
agriculture and manufacturing industry.”16 It was this union 
that Marx described in a letter as the "solid foundation for 
stagnant Asiatic despotism".17 This process of disintegration 
revealed the "real history of British rule".18 Marx and Engels 
condemned the British capitalists for their plunder, violence, 
torture; in a word, for their barbarism. Indeed, they compared 
them unfavourably with "the Calmuck hordes of Genghis Khan and 
Timur".19
However significant and impressive this emotional 
condemnation may be, Marx and Engels never unconditionally 
damned colonialism. This is regretted by some writers: "It
would be a pleasure to report that Marx opposed the British 
occupation of India from the beginning, and that he welcomed 
the uprising of 1857 ...".20 Others, in an attempt to overcome 
the implicit ideological embarrassment, have argued that there 
was a fundamental shift in Marx's position. Mohiri, for 
example, is ( of the opinion that in the 1850s, Marx assessed 
colonialism as a progressive force, but that from the 1860s 
onwards his view had changed to one of hostility and contempt.21 
Nevertheless, one should not minimize the importance that Marx 
and Engels consistently attached to the growth of the 
productive forces made possible by the introduction of 
capitalism in the colonies. Authors like Davis, who are eager 
to discover a shift from acceptance of colonialism to active 
opposition,22 do not seem to understand this basic point. It 
appears likely that Marx and Engels exaggerated the depth and 
effect of capitalist penetration in the colonies, but as Mandel
has explained, this is quite a different matter:
But unlike many of those who call themselves his 
disciples, Marx sees no contradiction between
acknowledging and emphasizing this 'historically 
necessary mission' of capitalism and constantly
pillorying whatever is exploitative, inhuman and 
oppressive in it. Marx keeps in view all the time the 
two contradictory aspects (emphasis in the original) 
of the historical reality he has experienced, and 
steadily steers clear of both reefs, that of
subjectivism and that of objectivism.23
In the article on 'The British Rule in India', there is
already an eloquent expression of that ambivalence which is the
key to Marx's analysis of colonialism in India:
Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to 
witness these myriads of industrious, patriarchal, 
and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and 
dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes 
and their individual members losing at the same time 
their ancient form of civilization and their 
hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget 
that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive 
though they may appear, had always been the solid 
foundation of Oriental despotism, that they 
restrained the human mind within the smallest 
possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of 
superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, 
depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.
We must not forget that these little communities ... 
subjugated man to external circumstances instead of 
elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, 
that they transformed a self-developing social state 
into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought 
about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its 
degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of 
nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of 
Hanuman, the monkey and Sabbala, the cow.24
Perhaps we can understand this attitude better if we 
remember that, in general, although Marx was a bitter political 
enemy of the bourgeoisie, he had the profoundest respect for 
the material and technical accomplishments of bourgeois 
society. Questions of morals or justice were of secondary 
importance beside the progressive mission of capitalism. Thus, 
in the Communist Manifesto Marx said of the bourgeoisie: "It
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has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, 
Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals".25 These wonders 
essentially came down to the many-sided, highly developed 
organization of production in capitalism.
In the historical development of humankind, with all its 
socio-economic conflicts, Marx identified progress as the 
increasing independence from or even domination of human beings 
over nature - the extent to which this was achieved being 
reflected in, among other things, the level of development of 
the forces of production and the corresponding social 
relations, i.e. the division of labour, private property, 
commodity production and the necessity to sell labour power. 
The bourgeoisie1s technical development of the forces of 
production was thus highly appreciated by Marx and Engels, for 
it was necessarily a levelling process and an identification of 
the interests of workers of all nations.
When they turned their attention to regions outside 
Europe, Marx' and Engels had little positive to say. During the
tf.
Indian mutiny in 1857 Marx called the Asian nations "great",26 
but their basic judgement was nevertheless that such societies 
were devoid of history, as history was for them the history of 
class struggles. The state in these countries confronted simple 
public slavery. And the absence of class conflict meant that 
these 'rotting semi-civilizations' had no internal dynamic for 
change. "Indian society has no history at all, at least no 
known history. What we call its history, is but the history of 
the successive intruders who founded their empires on the 
passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society."27
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This idea seems to have been taken straight from Voltaire and 
Hegel.
These communities had no intercourse with the outside 
world, no commodity production, no Burgher, no cities or 
conflicts between aristocracy and monarchy, church and state, 
and so on. In the article The Future Results of British Rule in 
India, Marx added: "The question, therefore, is not whether the 
English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to 
prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the 
Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.”28 It was therefore 
obvious to Marx, that "the breaking-up of these stereo-typed 
primitive forms was the conditio sine qua non of 
Europeanization".29
We have now come to the core of Marx’s and Engels's theory 
of colonialism. Marx wrote: "England has to fulfil a double
mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating - the 
annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the 
material foundations of Western society in Asia".30 The 
destruction of the old society, which Marx called 
"revolutionary",31 could only mean the introduction of 
capitalism to all these regions outside Western Europe. "It was 
to Europe's credit that this was done since ... for all its 
cruelties, it is better that [the modern world] was born than 
it had not been".32
Capitalism arises and persists because it alone is able to 
carry productive power from the level of pre-capitalist class 
society to that of post-class society. In the first volume of 
Capital Marx had this to say: "Development of the productive
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forces of social labour is the historical task and 
justification of capital. This is the way it unconsciously 
creates the requirements of a higher mode of production.1,33
One of the major preconditions of capitalism is private 
property. The purpose of Capital had been to establish that the 
metamorphosis of feudal production into capitalist production 
had its point of departure in the expropriation of the 
producer, and in particular the peasantry. The basis for 
defining the capitalist mode of production was not the pursuit 
of profits, nor the production of goods for sale, nor a certain 
spirit of rationality, nor the organization of production for 
distant markets. Rather, and as Miller wrote, "the capitalist 
mode of production ... is dominated by a particular kind of 
commodity market ... namely the labour market”.34
A related precondition of capitalism is the twofold 
freedom of labourers; first, to be available and mobile, not 
bound to pieces of land; second, to have been set free from
feudal bonds. In the words of Engels: "Modern Society is the
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society in which capital rules and labourers are used as 
instruments. It was absurd to imagine that the slaves of Cuba 
and Brazil, or the population of China and India, could be at 
once developed into associative labourers, they must first be 
made free labourers before they could be emancipated."35
Clearly Marx was intrigued by the apparent absence of 
private property in the East. An explanation of this would 
provide "the real key even to the Oriental heaven".36 If the old 
communities - "this living fossil" as Marx called China37 - 
could not be preserved, this was not only because of what they
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were but also because of what they hindered, namely, the world-
embracing movement of capitalism. The point comes across
clearly in the Communist Manifesto, where Marx and Engels 
wrote:
The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole 
surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, 
settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere 
... In place of the old and national seclusion and 
self-sufficiency we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal interdependency of nations .. .
The bourgeoisie embodies the rapid improvement of all 
instruments of communication, draws all, even the 
most barbarian nations, into civilization. The cheap 
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery
with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with 
which it forces the barbarian's intensely obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all 
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the 
bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to
introduce what it calls civilization into their 
midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one 
word, it creates a world after its own image.38
Marx viewed Britain - with her most highly developed
^system of alienated human activity"(emphasis in the original)39
entailed by commodity production and mechanization - as having
assumed the^ role of revolutionizing social relations in the
colonies, preparing the ground for capitalism. "Whatever may
have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool
of history in bringing about the revolution [in Asia]."40
A proletariat resulted from the internal division__of
labour, thus paving, the way for a future world-wide social
revolution. In California, to take an example from the other
side of the world, Marx and Engels argued that the more
progressive North Americans were justified in taking the
territory away from the "lazy Mexicans".41 The British, at their
higher economic level, had the capability that no earlier
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invaders had possessed; they could change the social relations
in the colonial countries, because they were the first
conquerors superior. In India, Marx believed, it was already
possible to see signs of the second, regenerative aspect of
capitalism’s double mission, with the political unification of
the country, the formation of a native army, the development of
a free press, and the introduction of private property, "the
great desideratum of Asiatic society".42 As a new class of
English-educated administrators took over, the steam engine,
the electric telegraph and international shipping were putting
an end to the isolationism in and of India, "which was the
prime reason of its stagnation".43
All this laid the foundation for a new India. Marx and
Engels admittedly did not fully recognize that inequalities and
contradictions would develop not only between classes
domestically but also between nation-states. They expected, put
simply, that the socialist resolution of the contradiction
between the (the forces and relations of production would result
in the transcendence of war among states:
To the degree that exploitation is transcended of one 
individual by the other, exploitation of one nation 
by the other is transcended. With the suppression of 
class-contradiction domestically, the hostile 
position of nations against each other will be 
abolished as well.44
In a letter, some time before this, Marx had written that 
the whole internal organization of nations, all their 
international relations were nothing but the expression of a 
certain division of labour which would have to change with a 
change in social relations.45
It is now obvious that Marx and Engels miscalculated the
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lasting importance of nationalism. In the Communist Manifesto 
they had declared: "The workers have no fatherland .. . With the 
world market ... national separations from and contradictions 
of the people disappear more and more".46 Marx and Engels 
believed that conflict would evolve along class lines on a 
world scale and not along nationalist lines. Their vision was
one of a world capitalist system divided into social classes
rather than nations.
In summary, it can be said that Marx and Engels located
the superiority of capitalism over its predecessors in its
control over nature, and its development of the productive 
forces of society. This, together with the breaking up of 
earlier, stagnant social relations, was its civilizing mission. 
Although Marx and Engels neither understood nor employed the 
concept 'imperialism* as it is used today, we will demonstrate 
in what follows that there is a powerful connection between 
their analysis of capitalism in the nineteenth century and 
Lenin's fully-fledged theory of imperialism. Given that they 
were mainly interested in socio-economic developments in 
Britain, France and Germany as well as Russia in later years* 
all their work on extra-European regions has to be understood 
as a means for them to understand capitalism at home. While 
condemning the barbaric treatment of the colonies, they saw 
this as necessary to break up stagnating societies - something 
which Hegel had already considered to be the inevitable fate of 
these countries. Since the colonies had no dialectical internal 
mechanism for change, it was the mission of European capitalism 
to destroy their stagnant, despotic societies, and thereby lay
the objective foundations for a development of their own 
productive forces on a capitalist basis. Once this was 
achieved, all these countries could pass into a still higher 
stage of human history.
In judging positively the capacity of the capitalist mode 
of production to spread into the colonies and to generate a 
balanced industrialization, Marx and Engels differ sharply from 
Mao and to a considerable degree from Lenin. They also differ 
fundamentally from the partisans of dependency theory. Indeed, 
one might argue that their view of world economic development 
brought them close in some respects to modern neo-evolutionist 
theories of modernization.
^iii) Crises and the Need to Expand: Underconsumption or the
Tendential Rate of Profit to Fall
i
A*
This section concentrates first on the inter-relationship 
between colonies and capitalist countries, and considers 
whether there is an inherent necessity in the capitalist mode 
of production to expand to colonies all over the globe.
The main reason why capitalist countries acquired colonies 
after the phase of primitive accumulation was to tackle the 
problems of capitalist production as such, i.e. to counter the 
tendential fall of the rate of profit by moderating the rise in 
the composition of capital between constant capital (the 
machinery and raw materials used in production) and variable
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capital (labour used, i.e. wages) . This could be done by 
opening up new regions with a supply of mobile cheap labour, 
inexpensive resources and cheap food imports, thus lowering the 
share of variable capital in the composition of capital. On one 
side, investments in the colonies were often highly profitable; 
on the other, trade, seen from the 'unequal exchange angle', 
was also very profitable, even though the dangers to ships and 
cargo were a factor to be reckoned with.
According to Marx, one of the basic laws of motion in 
capitalism is a continuous revolution of the methods of 
production. This leads to a devaluation of existing capital, 
accumulated in the technical side of the forces of production, 
for example machinery. To improve production and expand its 
scale is a necessity to be obeyed 'on pain of extinction'. A 
capitalist is only too well aware of the urge to accumulate, to 
increase capital and to produce surplus through quantitative 
and qualitative expansion of the scale of production. For this 
reason the market has to be expanded continuously. As Warren
4;
noted: Under capitalism, to stand still is to perish; to fail
to reinvest profit, or to do so at a rate of interest less than 
the average, is likewise to court disaster. Success is an even 
greater stimulus to renewed effort than failure, since it 
demands greater efforts to invest the greater surplus 
profitably.47
Marx, then, did not attach prime explanatory weight to 
under-consumption by the labouring classes. A move towards 
foreign markets was fundamentally intended to lower the organic 
composition of capital and only secondarily to solve a crisis
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of internal under-consumption by providing new markets for 
commodities.
The necessities of capitalist competition would bring 
greater and greater concentration of production (largely 
promoted by technical progress and its accompanying economies 
of scale) and centralization of capital (the expropriation of 
many capitalists by few). This would lead finally to 
qualitative change in the relations of production, as the 
existing social relations of production become ‘fetters* on the 
mode of production.
Here we should note in passing that before 1848 Marx and 
Engels predicted an impending crisis that would bring about the 
collapse of the capitalist mode of production. Only with their 
studies on the structure of bourgeois society - the Grundrisse 
(1862-3), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(1859), Theories of Surplus Value (1861-3) (and of course 
Capital vol. 1, 1863) - did they recognize the extraordinary
capacity of ^capitalism to survive crises and to restructure and 
adjust by, among other things, changing the forms of political 
representation and state intervention. From then on they drew 
attention to the problems of false consciousness and ideology.
Marx and Engels attempted, by laying bare the (economic) 
law of motion of capitalism, to show tendencies and fixed 
points of other social phenomena, earlier modes of production 
and the development of capitalism in general. Underlying this 
was the assumption of a capitalist system which had an in-built 
tendency to crisis because of the necessity to produce ever 
increasing profits and its corollary, the tendential law of the
rate of profit to fall, which was for Marx "in all respects the 
most important law of modern political economy and the most 
essential one in order to understand the most difficult 
relations ... It is a law which has never been grasped up to 
now despite its simplicity and it has even less been expressed 
consciously. "48
This tendency to crisis stems from the impossibility of 
producing ever-increasing surplus to secure average profits and 
thus to ensure future accumulation, future expansion of 
capital. Marx and Engels ascertained that the necessity of 
profit-yielding employment lies in the very concept of 
capital.49 If capitalism as a system is to survive, profits must 
be enhanced, business cycle troughs must become crests, and 
recessions must become booms. In short, new conditions for 
expanded capital accumulation must be created. Historically, 
the capitalist class has achieved this objective by the spatial 
expansion of capitalist relations of production. Expansion as a
means of overcoming crises in accumulation involved the
<
creation of what Marx called the * world market* by means of 
foreign investment, foreign trade promotion, development of 
needs, overcoming of national barriers and prejudice and the 
incorporation of new regions into the capitalist commodity 
market.50
According to Marx, trade became with mercantilism the 
servant of industrial production, which was the moving force of 
the time. Marx tried to prove that all over the world 
capitalism enforced the conditions for the satisfaction of its 
structural needs. Only with production based on capital was
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universal industry created. "The tendency to create the world 
market is given directly in the concept of capital itself 
(emphasis in original).”51 However, industrial production turned 
out more than the existing markets could absorb, and thus 
capital was forced to look constantly for larger markets in 
order to avoid collapse. In Britain the free trade market 
(which since 1707 had included Scotland) was then the biggest 
of its kind in Europe. At the same time, the high cost and 
complexity of the newly developed means of production compelled 
the industrialists 'to chase all over the world* in search of 
buyers, not only to pay off earlier investments, but also to 
keep abreast of their competitors.
This unlocking of new markets seemed to solve the problem 
of the organic composition of capital and of the relationship 
between production and consumption. Yet Marx and Engels 
maintained that cyclical crises of overproduction, followed by 
expansion of production on a higher level of development and 
with a stronger concentration of the forces of production, were 
an. inherent law of capitalism. This process in turn increased 
the share of constant capital, as against variable capital, in 
production. And since surplus value could only arise from 
variable capital - only human labour creates value according to 
Marx - the crisis tendencies of capitalism were reinforced.
Let us now look a little more closely at the ways in which 
the bourgeoisie, for Marx and Engels, attempts to overcome the 
crises which regularly arise from the structure of capitalism. 
One possibility is to engage in more thorough exploitation of 
old markets; another is to gain access by different means - the
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final one being colonialism - to new markets. As we have seen
in the previous section, according to Marx such expansion of
markets has a positive effect on the colonial country. For the 
already industrialized country, however, the positive effect is 
only transitory and will result in an even more wide-ranging 
crisis. Marx believed that the last safety-valve of this kind 
had been used up with the opening of China and Japan and the 
incorporation of Australia and California into the world 
market. In a letter to Nikolai Franzevich Danielson, Engels 
wrote:
In crisis capitalist countries try to open up new 
markets. But here as well one is confronted with a 
cul-de-sac. Take England! The latest new market whose 
opening up could bring a temporary revival to English
commerce is China. That is the reason why English
capital insists on building Chinese railways. But 
Chinese railways mean the destruction of the whole 
basis of the Chinese small agriculture and home 
manufacture, and as there is no * grande Industrie* as 
a counterweight, millions of people will be placed in 
the impossibility of living. The consequence will be 
mass-emigration on a scale the world has never seen 
before, a flooding of the Americas, Asia, and Europe 
by the hated Chinese, who will be in competition for 
work on the basis of the lowest standard of living, 
the Chihese standard to the American, Australian and 
European worker - and if the system of production 
still has not been changed until then in Europe, then 
it will have to be changed then. The capitalist 
production creates its own doom ...52
It should be noted here that the Marxist theory of crisis 
has given rise to two misunderstandings. On one hand, 
theoreticians of the Second International interpreted it as 
implying the inevitability of a final breakdown or 'collapse* 
of capitalism - a conception which, as is well-known, bred a 
fatalistic attitude in politics. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that capitalism ultimately has no 'laws' or "no 
evolutionary tendencies in general".53
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Fine and Harris, for their part, have successfully avoided 
the fatalist-evolutionist-positivist implications of a law of 
the falling rate of profit by defining it as "the law of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall”.54 In fact, they pointed 
out that in Chapter 14 of the third volume of Capital, entitled 
"Counteracting Causes", Marx wrote: "There have to be counter­
acting influences which cross out and transcend the effect of 
the general law, giving merely the character of a tendency. 
This is the reason why we have called the fall of the general 
rate of profit a tendential fall.”55 Another reason for the 
European bourgeoisie's interest in the colonies was the supply 
of various natural resources that they could provide. Marx saw 
that in times of crisis industrial capitalists might agree to 
control and regulate the production of resources - but one 
looks in vain for any belief on his part that this would become 
a- permanent tendency. He did mention the formation of national 
trusts or international cartels, but the normal course of 
capitalism I remained dominated by competition. Even 
protectionism and cartels introduced after 1865 did not suggest 
to him that a new stage of capitalism was making its 
appearance. Rather, they were a fair weather phenomenon that 
would disappear with the next storm, as Engels added in a note 
to the second volume of Capital (1894) ,56 What Marx does however 
mention is that these relations are in no way a simple one-way 
street from East to West, however much this may appear to be 
the case. Marx wrote about the sixty million agricultural and 
industrial labourers of India, sending over to Britain the 
total sum of their incomes,57 and added, in the third volume of
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Capital: "India alone has to pay five millions as tribute, for 
'good government', interest and dividends of British capital, 
etc., whereby the sums have not been counted, which are sent 
home yearly, partly by civil servants as savings from their 
wages, partly by English merchants as part of their profits, to 
be invested in Britain.”58
(iv) World Market: Safety Valve or cul-de-sac?
The world market which developed in the context of 
overcoming crises, enabled Engels, after Marx's death, to 
assess new developments in international capitalism and to 
adjust accordingly the relative emphasis of certain elements 
within their theory. Although neither Marx nor Engels wrote 
much that is concrete about the future communist mode of 
production - they rejected detailed blue-prints as an idealist
enterprise -f they did clearly maintain that communism was only
$
possible as a mode of production that was dominant all over the 
world. It presupposed a universally high level of development 
of the forces of production and easy access to all parts of the 
globe.59
For this reason, they usually regarded protectionism as an 
atavistic phenomenon, and free trade as the "normal state of 
affairs of modern capitalist production”.60 In the Grundrisse 
Marx had written as mentioned above that capital would create 
the world-market.61 This would lead to a new and international 
division of labour, a division which suited the requirements of
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the chief centres of modern industry, as capitalism must invest 
in colonies to maintain the system. In due course, Lenin and 
Mao would have to cope with the penetration of their countries 
by this globalization of capitalism.
The ideas of Marx and Engels about the world market 
conflicted with the growing force of nationalism in the 
nineteenth century. Refusing to categorize nationalism as 
invariably progressive, they looked at each case 'on its 
merits', according to whether it would assist the course of 
'progress'. Nevertheless, it might be considered a failure on 
their part not to have adequately assessed post-1789 
nationalism. Not only did they fail to provide a sociological 
analysis of this cross-class phenomenon; they did not foresee 
the wide currency that it would gain in the future. Since they 
believed that the rise of free trade and the world-market would 
diminish national differences, the proletariat would know only 
one common enemy and one common goal: the bourgeoisie would
have to be ffought and communism realized.£
At the same time, however, the bourgeoisie retained 
separate national interests.
while the bourgeoisie of each nation still 
maintained separate national interests, big industry 
created a class, which has in all nations the same 
interest and whose nationality is already destroyed; 
a class which really got rid of the old and which 
confronted it simultaneously.62
The bourgeoisie was automatically creating national 
conflicts by pursuing new markets and attempting to control 
them exclusively for one state. Furthermore, the exploitation 
of one nation by another produced national hostility, and 
chauvinism was one of the ideological tools which enabled the
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bourgeoisie to maintain its domination over the proletariat and
to reduce class conflicts at home.
Despite these important insights, Marx and Engels
principally analyzed divergences along class lines rather than
in national terms. The world-market was accordingly a place to
settle antagonistic class contradictions.
The mass of 'mere' workers - the utterly precarious 
position of labour-power on a mass scale cut off from 
capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, 
therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of 
work itself as a secure source of life - presupposes 
the world-market with its competition. The 
proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, 
just as communism, its activity, can only have a 
'world-historical' existence.63
Later, Engels toned down this conception of the world- 
market as diffuse world-historical movement towards progress,
where actors are neither obvious nor determined in an 
evolutionary way. In particular, he came to see the world-
market as a site of harsh economic competition among nation
states rather than classes, a competition which resulted from 
the fallings rate of profit,64 and the competition between
t;
nations became much fiercer, much more decisive.
Marx had already stated that if the bourgeoisie did not 
establish a world-market - at least in outline - then this 
would deepen the crisis in capitalist countries.65 A failure of 
that kind, or the contraction of one of the great colonial 
markets, could accelerate the crisis at home. Marx once thought 
that this could "throw the spark into the overloaded mine of 
the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the 
long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be 
closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent.”66
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In support of this thesis, he pointed out that no serious 
revolution since the beginning of the eighteenth century "had 
not been preceded by a commercial and financial crisis”.67
(v) Crisis in the Colonies and Repercussions for Europe
The role of colonialism, then, was seen by Marx and Engels 
as a temporary safety-valve in the context of domestic crises - 
and nothing more. The effects of a crisis in an exploited 
country seemed quite evident to them. Marx, it is true, thought 
that "... the next uprising of the people of Europe and their 
next movement for republican freedom and economy of Government 
may depend more probably on what is now passing in the 
Celestial Empire ... than on any other political cause".68 
However, he came to this conclusion because of the economic 
situation in China where, as a result of the Taiping rebellion, 
a decline of imports had occurred and was aggravating the 
crisis in Europe. At the same time, Marx expected that 
upheavals in the colonies would divert the colonialists* 
attention from internal problems and from checking the 
approaching revolution. In the same way, he argued that the 
'India Question' was a problem not only for India but for 
English capitalism as well.69 Apart from the question of a 
market safety-valve, India brought out the struggle that was 
taking place within the capitalist class in England, between a 
declining mercantile, among them landlords, fraction and an 
ascending industrial capitalism or feudal landlords versus
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bourgeois capitalists.70
In 1773 merchants from London, Liverpool and Bristol broke 
the monopoly of the East India Company for the first time. A 
further law in 1814 opened the Indian market to all manner of 
English commodities. The China monopoly was then lifted in 1833 
and in 1858 the East India Company was dissolved. It was
manufacturing industry that had pressured parliament into this 
legislation, for the East India Company charter no longer
corresponded with the development of industrial capitalism.
"Free trade became the watchword of the day."71
In 1846 free trade won a major victory in Britain, then 
the dominant world power, with the abolition of the Corn Laws. 
But this suffered reverses with the coming of the Great 
Depression in the 1870s and was superseded by the neo—  
mercantilist and imperialist policies adopted by the major
continental powers and the USA. "The interests of the 
plutocracy which had converted India into its landed estates, 
of the oligarchy who had conquered it by their armies, and of 
the millocracy who had inundated it with their fabrics had gone 
hand in hand up to then".72 By moneycracy Marx seemed to have 
had in mind the merchants, the financiers and the aristocracy. 
This is not to say, however, that there was a clear-cut 
contradiction between landed gentry and industrial bourgeoisie: 
"On the one hand, the landed proprietors placed at the disposal 
of the industrial bourgeoisie the people necessary to operate 
its manufacturing and, on the other, were in a position to 
develop agriculture in accordance with the state of industry 
and trade. Hence their common interests with the bourgeoisie;
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hence their alliance with it."73
After the destruction of nearly all the Indian native 
forces of production, British industrial capitalists began to 
notice a decline in their exports to India. Consequently, they 
attempted to build up a market for their products in China. In 
order to achieve this, they had to overcome and break down the 
thrifty habits of the Chinese, who had no inborn need for
commodities from Manchester. "Absence of wants, and 
predilection for hereditary modes of dress, are obstacles which 
civilized commerce has to encounter in all new markets."74 The 
breakdown of this traditional society would of course be the 
task of the double mission of capitalism discussed earlier. If 
a change could be accomplished, the outlook for profits was
very promising indeed. Marx quoted John Bright*s statement that 
in India twelve days labour could be paid for with the same 




(vi) Who Makes the Profits?
The dissolution of the East India Company was made easier 
by its unsound economic position. In its later years it had
accumulated a debt of millions of pounds, only to balance it 
out by gambling on opium sales to China.76 As already mentioned, 
Marx quoted John Bright's statement on the subject to support 
his point: "The Indian government had cost more to govern India
than it was possible to extort from the population of India".77
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In another article Marx stated that the "annual revenue has 
never sufficed to defray the annual expenses";78 and, in a 
letter to Engels: "The joke is that John Bull will now have to 
pay 4 to 5 millions in cash in India year after year to keep
the machine going."79 In the article, British Income in India,
he was even more forceful: "What is the real value of their
Indian dominion to the British nation and people? Directly, 
that is in the shape of tribute, or surplus of Indian income 
over Indian expenditures, nothing whatever reaches the British 
Treasury. On the contrary, the annual outgo is very large."80
It would be strange if capitalists had engaged in an 
enterprise that contradicted the reason and leitmotif of their 
existence, i.e. profit - and indeed Marx himself referred to 
the profits made in India. However, this apparent contradiction 
disappeared as Marx developed his argument. The crucial 
distinction is between the society and the economy as a whole, 
and individuals and classes within that, society. Marx 
explained: 'fit is evident that the advantage to Great Britain
from her Indian Empire must be limited to the profits and 
benefits which accrue to individual British subjects. These 
profits and benefits, it must be confessed, are very
considerable."81 Writing in 1857, Marx reported that 
approximately ten thousand British subjects held lucrative 
positions in India, drawing their pay from the Indian service. 
In addition, there were the bondholders, creditors of Indian
loans in the City of London and pensioners living off their 
pensions in England. He added: "It is thus evident that
individuals gain largely by the English connection with India,
and of course, their gain goes to increase the sum of national 
wealth.1,82
However, these profits were offset by the expenses of the 
military and naval enterprises undertaken on Indian account - 
expenses that were "paid out of the pockets of the people of 
England".83 Marx included in these expenses not only the sums 
paid for the quelling of disobedient natives, but also the 
investment in the Persian War (1856-57), the Afghan War (1839- 
42), the Chinese and Burmese Wars (1856-58 and 1860 and 1852 
respectively). "In fact, the whole cost of the late Russian War 
[1853-56] may fairly be charged to the Indian account, since 
the fear and dread of Russia, which lead to that war, grew 
entirely out of jealousy as to her designs on India."84
British rule in India - and of course elsewhere - might
thus be seen as an indirect way,.of transferring tax revenue 
from parts of the British people to the upper classes in Great 
Britain. As Shlomo Avineri puts it: "Marx arrives at an even
more profound indictment of British imperialism in class terms 
than is usually attributed to Marxism: ultimately it was
Britain, and not only India, that was being exploited for the
benefit of the British ruling class through British rule in 
India."85
(vii) Protectionism or Free Trade?
Marx and Engels witnessed the growing competition between 
nation-states, Bismarck's Germany and America being the latest
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newcomers to the capitalist fold. By that time, that is post- 
1871, capitalists were seeking to avoid the demise of 
capitalist production by protectionism and the formation of 
cartels and trusts to regulate production and fix prices. This 
was a new kind of protectionism whose purpose was not to foster 
capitalism at home as in earlier years, but to support and 
protect certain commodities intended for export in the harshly 
competitive conditions of the world market. This would lead to 
an accelerated centralization of capital - as Marx had noted in 
additions to the third and fourth editions of the first volume 
of Capital.86
Engels lived to see even more clearly that the formation
of domestic trusts and monopolies might transcend competition
and avert cyclical crises, although only on a temporary basis.
In general, both he and Marx condemned protectionism and were
on the side of the free traders - if only because it would take
capitalism to the furthest corners of the globe. They
considered that protectionism had been useful in the past, as a
means of fostering domestic industry in the face of
international competition, but that it had outlived its purpose
now that France and Germany had reached the economic level of
Britain. However, their support for free trade should not be
confused with that of middle-class advocates. Marx wrote:
We are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all 
economic laws with their most astonishing 
contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon a 
greater extent of territory, upon the territory of 
the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all 
these contradictions into a single group, where they 
stand face to face, will result the struggle which 
will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the 
proletarians.87
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Marx and Engels believed that free trade was dissolving 
nationalities, pushing the contradiction between bourgeoisie 
and proletariat to a point of no return. It was creating one 
big market and objectively preparing the ground for proletarian 
internationalism. Furthermore, the forces of production would 
develop faster in a climate of free trade.88 This point is 
important to understand Marx's positive view of the impact of 
capitalism in the colonies referred to earlier, for as he said, 
"only in this revolutionary sense, gentlemen, do I vote for 
Free Trade".89
(viii) Concentration and Centralization
With regard to the questions of concentration and 
centralization, which were to play such a key role in Lenin's 
analysis of imperialism, we should first note Marx's brief 
mention of a 'plethora of money-capital'. This capital is 
available for borrowing at a time when industrial capital is 
still blocked by a crisis that has only just been overcome, and 
when production or trade cannot absorb all capital. At a later 
stage, when production is approaching the zenith of the cycle 
of crisis, there is no longer any question of a plethora of 
money-capital. Capital, which is still available for lending, 
begins to separate from industrial capital but only as part of 
a normal cycle of recurrent crisis, seeking 'employment* 
wherever possible.
Concerning concentration, monopoly and oligopoly, Kuhne 
mentions three different elements in Marx's theory and makes
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the following observations:
One ... Marx recognizes that monopoly price, or 
rather, oligopoly price contains an element of 
indeterminacy. Secondly, he touches on the problem of 
the 'transfer of surplus value' from non-monopolistic 
to monopolistic lines of activity, and he thus 
recognizes that the former may 'exploit* the latter. 
Thirdly, he admits that the worker may be exploited 
as a consumer by monopolistic tendencies... 
Nevertheless he still thinks that the influence 
exercised on market price by monopolistic forces can 
be calculated.90
As we have already seen, Marx and Engels differentiated 
between industrial and money capitalists and noted a change in 
the system of credits and the banking system in general. Having 
written before of the necessity of capital to concentrate, Marx 
indicated that the new system of credit - for the time being - 
would become a new and terrible weapon in competition and it 
would lead to the centralization of capital.91
The system of credit not only created money capitalists in 
the domestic economy: it also had consequences beyond national 
borders. When money was not being employed in Britain, it was
given as credit to other countries. There it helped to create
c
indigenous industry which would compete with England for
resources, pushing up their prices and so reducing the margin
of profit. This development was the "natural price England pays
for her commercial and industrial superiority".92 In Capital
Marx added to this point:
The system of credit accelerates the material 
development of productive forces and the creation of 
the world-market. It is the historical task of the 
capitalist mode of production to create the material 
fundament for the new form of production up to a 
certain high level. At the same time the credit 
accelerates violent outbreaks of this contradiction, 
the crises, and thus it creates the elements of the 
dissolution of the old mode of production.93
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Engels elaborated on this in his notes for the completion of
the third volume of Capital. As that volume had been written by
Marx before 1865, Engels analyzed the growing importance of the
banking-system after that date. The stock-exchange, he noted,
had become the most outstanding representative of capitalist
production, for it concentrated all production, traffic, and
means of communication, etc., in the hands of stockbrokers.
Engels's own death in 1895 makes it impossible for us to know
how he would have further elaborated on this issue.
Equally, Engels never completed his thoughts on the
relationship between the stock-exchange and colonialism.
Colonialism had gained in importance since the late 1870s and
early 1880s, when an upsurge in competition began to give rise
to organized Colonialism. Engels wrote in his last letter to
Kautsky (21 May 1895) :
In the meantime I am about to write an essay for you 
for the Neue Zeit, which will give you great 
pleasure. Complementation and supplement to the third 
volume of Capital, No 1: Law of value and rate of
profit.(. . Later follows No 2: The very importantly
changedrole of the stock-exchange since Marx wrote 
about it in 1863 ... The first article would have
been ready, if my head had been clear.94
The first article was in fact written and the second is also
available, but ends at point number 7 in draft form:
Then colonization. This is today purely a branch of 
the stock-exchange, in whose interest the European 
powers divided up Africa a couple of years ago, and 
the French have conquered Tunis and Tonkin. Africa is 
let directly to the companies (Niger, South Africa, 
German Southwest Africa and East Africa) and 
Mashonaland and Natal has been taken into possession 
by Rhodes for the stock-exchange.95
Although Engels here plunged directly into colonialism, he
remains open to the criticism of Hans-Holger Paul (among
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others) that he was interested in colonialism not as part and 
parcel of the activities of individual nation-states, but for 
its influence on the revolutionary conditions of the European 
working class.96
Nevertheless there are considerable differences in the way 
Marx and the later Engels perceived the stock-exchange. For 
Marx it was more a kind of toy for capitalists, whereas Engels 
realized its changing importance as an institution which could 
control and direct production and which was related to 
colonialism. Evidently, given the embryonic character of 
Engels's thoughts on the subject, it would be unwise to attach 
too much importance to them in connection with the concept or 
theory of imperialism.
(ix) The Russian Village Commune and the Skipping of Stages
A major thread in the writings of Marx and Engels is the
<:
idea that the development of non-European countries had to 
follow that of Western Europe. In The Communist Manifesto, for 
instance, they wrote that the development of capitalism in 
Europe "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt 
the bourgeois mode of production ... In one word, it creates a 
world after its own image".97 And this was necessary, they 
argued, because capitalist societies would break the stagnation 
of Asiatic despotism and enable European and non-European 
nations to progress to socialism and communism.
Some critics have set against this a number of other
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statements from Marx’s and Engels's discussion with the Russian 
narodniks. It is suggested that there was a definite break 
between the 'young' Marx and Engels, who envisaged a unilinear 
historical development of all countries, and the 'old' Marx and 
Engels, who saw that particular conditions in a society might 
lead to a development towards communism without the necessity 
of passing through the stage of capitalism. In a letter to the 
editor's office of the Russian periodical Otechestvennye 
Zapiski a letter which he never actually sent - Marx wrote: "If 
Russia keeps on following the path which it has been on since 
1861, then she will lose the best possibility which history has 
ever offered a people, and will instead go through all the 
disastrous vicissitudes of the capitalist system."98
Generally speaking, in the opinion of Marx and Engels it 
was the property of the tribe or commune which was the starting 
point of all progressive development. These original 
communities survived in later social formations. One such 
survivor was; the Russian village community, the obshchina. Marx 
and Engels were in agreement with Maurer, Morgan and von 
Haxthausen that "village communities were found to be or to 
have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India 
to Ireland".99 They did not believe, therefore, that primitive 
communal property was an exclusively Russian or even 
distinctively Slav, phenomenon. The primitive commune had 
developed - for different reasons - into the Slav commune, 
Asiatic commune, classical commune and Germanic commune."100 
This was in sharp disagreement with Bakunin and Herzen who 
believed in the unique nature of the Russian commune.
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Nevertheless, in Marx's view Russia was the only European 
country where the village community had survived on a large 
scale into the nineteenth century. This original form of
commune was a "contemporary of a higher culture and connected
with the world-market, where capitalist production was pre­
dominant".101 Dutschke considers it remarkable that Marx could 
imagine a transition from a pre-capitalist village community to 
collective communism at a time when these communities were in 
transition and private ownership of land was increasing.102 
Indeed, at one point Marx had written: "The village community
is the stronghold of the social rebirth of Russia."103 For the 
commune to have such an effect, however, it first had to remove 
disastrous external influences and secure the conditions for a 
normal development.
Even though communal property had disappeared throughout 
Western Europe, this did not necessarily preclude a different 
development in a different historical context. The uniqueness 
of the situation in Russia was that the commune had survived in 
a world economy dominated by a more progressive mode of
production: capitalism. But, "Russia does not live isolated in
the modern world",104 nor had communal property - which had 
existed - survived anywhere in Western Europe, why should it in 
Russia? However, since capitalist society was in a deep crisis, 
the Russian commune possessed the historical possibility of 
bypassing capitalism.105 This might seem to clash with Marx's 
famous and rather categorical assertion in the 1859 Preface to 
a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:
No social order ever perishes before all the 
productive forces for which it is sufficient have 
developed, and new, superior relations of production
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never replace older ones before the material 
conditions of their existence have matured in the 
womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind 
always sets itself only such tasks it is able to 
solve, since, closer examination will always show 
that the problem itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution already present or are at 
least in the process of formation. 6
In reality, however, Marx's view of historical development 
was far from the kind of dogmatic conception of universal 
'laws' that some of his later followers attributed to him. This 
point is well made by Paul Thomas: "Marx's scientific work, or 
the work and procedures that Marx regarded as scientific, did 
not according to Marx's own admission aim at the discovery of 
universal laws (or, as he would say, of 'eternal laws')
regulating political economy or governing human behaviour 
. . . "107 Thus, when Marx entered into contact with the Russian 
population - and many of them strongly believed that the 
obshchina might provide the basis for a new form of society and 
the avoidance of capitalism - he scrupulously avoided 
diminishing them out of hand. He was prepared to organize 
alliances with any groups and individuals if it served
revolution in the long run - a point later developed by Lenin 
and Mao (see Chapter Six) . And as the political situation in 
Russia was reactionary, any revolution there would have 
positive repercussions on the international scene. It would 
relieve the Tsarist pressure on Poland, Hungary and Germany, 
and thus make socialism rather more likely in those countries. 
A Russian revolution, he wrote (and Engels repeated it later) 
would be of the utmost importance for all of Europe, simply
because it would destroy with one blow the last intact reserve
of European reaction.108
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In the same text, written in 1855 Marx stressed that it 
was not of primary importance whether or not a revolution in 
Russia was communist. And twenty-two years later, he stated in 
a letter that even though the revolutionary movement in Russia 
was in confusion, its mere existence indicated a "full 
decomposition of Russian society ... This time," he stated, 
"the revolution begins in the East, hitherto the unbroken 
bulwark and reserve army of counter-revolution.1,109 Some members 
of the Social Democratic movement found this hard to accept, as 
Engels*s letter to Marx made clear: "It is strange that people 
can't get used to the idea that there could be an impulse from 
over there [Russia] . And I have explained it to him [A. Bebel] 
more than once."110
The discussion of revolution in Russia and paths to 
communism must be understood in the wider context of European 
politics. In Western European countries the revolutionary 
upsurge of 1848 had long since abated. Although Marx and Engels
were only top keen to see anything as a sign of the long hoped-
<
for crisis which would lead to revolution in the West, they 
could not fail to appreciate that a communist revolution was 
for the time being not on the agenda. Emerging unrest in Russia 
seemed to promise a helping hand to European revolution through 
the demise of the arch-reactionary Tsar.
But as we have seen, this was not the only aspect that 
concerned Marx and Engels. One would be justified in saying 
that they saw a direct transition to communism as a real 
possibility in Russia, but it had to happen before the commune 
was eroded by the rapidly growing impact of the capitalist mode
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of production. As this impact increased still further in 
subsequent years, a * great leap' of the kind that Marx had 
considered in his letter to Zasulich came to be increasingly 
improbable.
In a sense, the advance of the capitalist social formation 
in Western Europe, with a surprising capacity to survive 
crisis, gave it new prospects in other regions. The possibility 
of a direct transition to communism in Russia remained 
theoretical - not only because the interconnection and cross­
fertilization of revolution in the West and East did not occur, 
but also because capitalism had spoiled the original commune. 
To accomplish a communist revolution, Engels noted in direct 
reference to Russia:
We need not only the proletariat, which carries out 
the revolution, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands 
the productive forces of society have developed to 
such a stage that they permit the final elimination 
of all class distinctions.111
By 1893 Engels seemed to be drawing a final curtain over the
possibility (of a peculiar Russian path:
And as Russia had no choice but this: either to
develop the commune into a form of production from 
which it was separated by a number of historical 
stages, and for which not even in the West the 
conditions were then ripe - evidently an impossible 
task - or else to develop into capitalism, what 
remained to her but the latter choice?1
In this context the "Preface” by Marx and Engels to the
Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto is interesting. The
last two paragraphs run as follows:
Is the Russian obshchinaf as severely undermined as this 
ancient form of communal property already may be, able to 
change directly into the higher form of communist 
property? Or does it on the contrary first have to go 
through the same process of disintegration, which 
constitutes the historical development of the West? The 
only answer which is possible at present [1882] is this:
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if the Russian revolution becomes the signal of the 
proletarian revolution in the West, so that both 
complement each other, the existing Russian communal 
property might serve as a starting point for communist 
development. 13
This statement (more in the form of a question, heavily 
qualified by the political condition of revolution in the 
West), the ambiguous letter to Zasulich (of which only the 
fourth and most general draft was eventually sent off), and the 
un-despatched letter to Otechestvennye Zapiski should not be 
understood as indicating a disjuncture between the 'young' and 
the 'old' Marx. Rather, we should read them in the light of a 
basic tension in his work. On the one side there is the 
rigorous, general logico-deductive, holistic and theoretical 
Capital, which is an analysis of the laws of motion of laissez- 
faire capitalism. On the other hand, and by no means separate 
from it, there is the methodo-logically empirical approach to 
concrete historical situations. The fusion of these two aspects 
of Marx's life work avoids a crude separation of science and 
politics. (
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By way of conclusion, one does sometimes have the
impression that Marx emphasized the open-endedness of
development rather more than Engels ("Either the existing
element of private property in the obshchina will win over the
collective element, or the other way round. Everything depends
on the historical 'milieu' ...")114 However, it can safely be
assumed that the following passage from Engels could also be
taken as Marx's last word on the matter:
It is not only possible, but certain, after the 
victory of the proletariat and after the transfer of 
the means of production into communal property among 
the West European peoples, that in the countries 
which have only just become capitalist and still have
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gentile institutions or some remains of them, that in 
these remains of communal property and the respective 
popular customs, there is a powerful means to shorten 
significantly the process of development to the 
socialist society and to spare themselves to a very 
large part the sufferings and struggles, through 
which we in Western Europe have to work our way. But 
for this the example and the active assistance of the 
hitherto capitalist West is an indispensable 
condition ... Only if the regressed countries observe 
through this example, 'How it is to be done', how one 
puts the modern industrial forces of production into 
the service of the community as communal property, 
only then can these countries take up this shortened 
process of development.115
(x) The Labour Aristocracy
In 1852 Marx noted that English workers were not "a very
malleable material for political agitation” and he detected the
reason for this in the "political flaccidity and indifference
consequent upon a period of material prosperity”.116 Six years
later Engel^ was unable to report anything more positive:
The English proletariat is actually becoming more and 
more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all 
nations is apparently aiming ultimately to possess a 
bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat 
alongside the bourgeoisie.117
English workers regarded themselves and enjoyed being part of a
ruling nation over colonies. "They gaily share”, as Engels
wrote in a letter to Kautsky, "the feast of England's monopoly
of the world market and the colonies.”118
Not only had the minds of the colonial people been
awakened,119 but those of the proletariat at home as well, they
had been seduced by the material benefits of exploitation, as
Lenin would later (see Chapter Three) argue. Participation in
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colonial domination had stifled resistance against the
originators of capitalist exploitation. In a passage written in
1885 and reprinted in the introduction to the 1892 edition of
The Condition of the Working Class in England, Engels referred
to the English trade unions as forming an aristocracy among the
working class.120 Later, however, he modified this
generalization. In the nineteenth century, the only country
where the proletariat profited from colonialism was England.
Engels had pointed to this in his writings in the 1880s. In
1885 he wrote that
As long as England*s industrial monopoly continued,
the English working class took part to a certain
degree in the advantages of this monopoly. These 
benefits were divided very unevenly; the privileged
minority pocketed the major part, but even the masses
benefited at least off and on.121
While Marx and Engels noticed the corrupting influence in 
Britain of the fruits of colonialism, it does not seem to have 
concerned them too much. It is likely that they assumed that 
this negative influence would not stand in the way of social 
revolution in the long run.
(xi) Revolution in the West and its Interconnections with 
Colonies
Faced with the practical problem of what to do with 
colonies after a revolution, Engels maintained that with the 
exception of those with a large European population like Canada 
and Australia, they "must be taken over for the time being by
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the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards
independence". The idea of the proletariat as a ‘benevolent
dictator' is a controversial one and Engels recognized this. He
added cautiously: "One thing alone is certain: the victorious
proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign
nation without undermining its own victory by so doing."122 In
one of his speeches about Poland, Engels asserted that a people
which repressed another people could never emancipate
itself."123 In the case of India, Marx argued that it would
eventually be capable of carrying out its own revolution. It
was only necessary for it to become as thoroughly capitalist as
possible, for with capitalist penetration the revolutionary
proletariat would develop alongside the bourgeoisie.1,124
In some writings Marx can be seen to be sketching a vision
of the complete interdependence of revolutionary prospects in
Europe and in the colonies. Thus, in October 1858 he wrote:
On the continent the revolution is imminent and will 
immediately assume a socialist character. Is it not 
bound to be crushed in this little corner [i.e 
Europe] considering that in a far greater territory 
the movement of bourgeois society is still in the 
ascendant?125
On the other hand in 1853 he had stated:
The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new 
elements of society scattered among them by the 
British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the 
now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the 
industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves 
shall have grown strong enough to throw off the 
English yoke altogether.1 6
As the century progressed, however, the time when the colonies
would gather sufficient strength through capitalist development
to shake off this yoke seemed to recede into the distance. Not
only was the regenerative influence of British capitalism far
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from obvious, but Marx and Engels had noticed that the British 
were actually placing very little investment capital in the 
colonies.127
(xii) Nationalism and National Liberation Struggles
When we read Marx and Engels today, what is most striking 
is the fact that the possibility of national liberation 
struggles did not really occur to them. Although they referred 
fairly frequently to national revolts, national wars, guerrilla 
and popular wars,128 and appeared to have some admiration for 
the resistance against the Europeans,129 they also tended to 
underestimate its strength and considered that defeat in such 
national revolts (in this case Persia) would do the natives 
"the more good the more signal it was".130
Similarly, in articles about the Taiping rebellion and the
French conquest of Algeria, it is obvious that Marx and Engels
<
did not feel much sympathy for the rebels. Marx judged the 
Taiping rebels to be an even greater scourge of the population 
than the old rulers and accused the leaders of the rebellion of 
not being "conscious of any task except the change of 
dynasty".131 Engels added in another article: "The conquest of
Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of 
civilization."132 In fact, both Marx and Engels considered such 
national revolts to be aimless movements on the political 
surface typical of the "eternal story of peasant countries",133 
standing not for 'progress* but for * regress* since they
71
supported the old structure of society. Even though "great 
national states in Europe", Engels wrote, were "the unavoidable 
precondition for the harmonious international co-operation of 
the peoples",134 such cooperation would become possible only 
after a socialist revolution. Marx and Engels saw the 
development of capitalism leading finally to a confrontation 
with, on the one side, the bourgeoisie and, on the other side, 
the proletariat. On a global level - that of the world market - 
this antagonistic contradiction would be solved only by a
victorious proletariat. Class relations - the horizontal line - 
took precedence over national aspirations - the vertical line.
If Marx and Engels did not support national movements per 
se, and often regarded them with suspicion or even outright 
hostility, this was because they believed that nationalism 
tended to cover up internal class contradictions and deflected
attention from the real problem at hand: social revolution. The
scathing attacks on 'little nations' or 'small pigheaded
nations'135 are perhaps surprising given that during Marx's and 
Engels's lifetime nationalism was an ever growing force.
Anticipating the slogan of the world as a 'global village', 
however, they hoped in the Communist Manifesto that national 
differences and antagonisms were "vanishing daily more and more 
owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to free trade, to 
the world-market, to conformity of the mode of production and 
in the conditions of life corresponding thereto".136 And they 
concluded: "As in material so also in mental, spiritual
production ... national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness
will become more and more impossible."137
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Both Marx and Engels noted the conjunction of the rise of 
capitalism with a growing number of nation-states. The rule of 
the bourgeoisie in any country was even considered to be 
"impossible without national independence."138 However, they 
regarded this as positive only when it fulfilled its historical 
mission, that of breaking up the old stagnant societies. A 
national state ruled by the wrong class - India by the Mutiny 
forces, China by the Taiping - would only delay the 
accomplishment of this mission. If it seemed likely that a 
national movement would endanger a revolutionary situation, 
then Engels contemptuously advocated that - as in the case of 
the Serbs in the 1880s - "their right to cattle-rustling has to 
be sacrificed without mercy to the interests of the European 
proletariat".139
The attitude of Marx and Engels was similar when it came 
to the question of national movements and war. Gallie wrote: 
"Marxism does not reject war in general as inherently evil or 
irrational: fit approves of some wars, e.g. those fought to
if
liberate oppressed classes and races, while disapproving of 
others that have an opposite purpose."140 Thus, if they 
supported the initial Prussian war effort against France in 
1870-71, this was not for patriotic reasons on their part but 
because of what they saw as the relationship between the war 
and European revolution. German unity, overcoming the division 
of the country into 39 parts, was necessary to the development 
of a modern economy without which socialism was unthinkable. 
And in the early stages of the war Prussia was, in their view, 
essentially defending itself (and this economic potential)
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against the policy of Napoleon III. Only with the Prussian 
conquest of Alsace did they change their position, for they 
considered that this expansionist move would pit France and 
Germany against each other for a long time to come, giving 
reactionary Russia more room for manoeuvre - thus hindering the 
development of revolution in Europe.141 Condemning the German 
claims to Alsace Lorraine they affirmed: "What is being
proclaimed is Pan-Germanism and 'secure' frontiers, and this is 
going to have fine consequences for Germany and Europe - from 
the East!"142
The question of the rights of nations, then, was not an 
isolated, self-sufficient question; it was part of the general 
problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the 
whole, and had to be considered from the point of view of the 
whole. Connor's view that "nationalism and Marx are 
philosophically incompatible”, is therefore exaggerated.143 
Marxism is not merely a philosophy. Nationalism is related to 
socio-economic change. Mexico was taken over by the Yankees 
"for civilization"144 and "by the same right under which France 
took over Flanders, Lorraine and Alsace ... by the same right 
Germany has taken over Schleswig - it is the right of 
civilization against barbarism, of progress as against 
stagnation".145 If the driving back of reaction in Europe meant 
supporting the Polish national movement, then Marx and Engels 
were quite prepared to take this step - but not out of support 
for nationalism as such. Indeed they roundly condemned national 
movements which assisted reaction and denied their right to 
self-determination. When the come out in favour of the Irish
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independence struggle it is usually only because it needs to be 
settled so as not to continue to divide the English working 
class. It is thus too abstract and incorrect to state, as Davis 
did, that "just as they opposed oppression of one class by 
another, so they opposed oppression of one people or nation by 
another. ”146
In Poland - the cause celebre for many of Europe's liberals 
- Marx and Engels saw a budding working class that gave them 
reason to believe in a flow of revolution from East to West, a 
revolution which would weaken the Tsar's influence on 
developments in Western Europe and thus encourage socialist 
forces in these countries. Moreover, the Polish movement seemed 
to have all the necessary elements for the future: numbers,
territory, vitality, working-class development. On the other 
hand, both Marx and Engels, though Marx perhaps less radically 
So, condemned the national aspirations of most of the Eastern 
peoples who were not of great number, did not live in a large 
territory of. possess the necessary minimum of vitality.147 On 
this subject Marx and Engels could appear utterly ruthless:
We have to work for the liberation of the Western 
European proletariat and we have to subordinate 
everything else to this aim. And even if the Slavs 
from the Balkans, etc., were really interesting, you 
could forget about them, the moment their urge for 
liberation clashed with the interest of the 
proletariat.148
On various occasions they talked mockingly about the 
bothersome and unwanted hive of peoples (Volkerbienenschwarm);
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Eastern confusion of peoples {Volkerverwirrung) ; Austrian tin—  
kettle serenade of peoples (Volkerkatzenmusik); Serbs, 
Bulgarians, and Greeks are called 'head-hunters' 
(Kopfabschneider) ; Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Slovaks,
Ukrainians, Romanians are termed 'rubble of peoples' 
(Volkertrimmer) .149 Moreover, although what we know of their 
analysis of 'non-historic nations' is written about Slavs, 
there is no reason to doubt that they would have applied it to 
nations of other continents. At one point, indeed, Engels burst 
out:
The next world war will make disappear not only
reactionary classes and dynasties, it will also make 
disappear whole reactionary peoples from the face of 
the earth . . . Then struggle, relentless struggle for 
life or death with Slavs who betray the revolution; 
war of extermination and reckless terrorism - and not 
in the interest of Germany but in the interest of
revolution.150
Such concepts as compactness of territory, size or
vitality of a people, readiness to take an active part in 
history are' a far cry from class analysis. However certain 
parallels with Hegel's thoughts on extra-European peoples can 
be detected. For Hegel, the practical construction of a state 
was fundamental, and only if they had formed a state could they 
be called proper people. Nations which had not been capable of 
implementing the Zeitgeist were superfluous on the world stage. 
They were without history - and future.
When trying to analyze why the revolution of 1848-4 9 had 
not succeeded, Engels eventually came to the Southern Slavs and 
their role in the events in Central Europe. He noted that 
peasants and workers had joined the Tsar's and the Habsburg
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monarchy’s armies against the bourgeois flickering of 
revolution. What he did not comprehend, however, was that the 
revolution of the bourgeoisie was not far reaching enough in 
that it did not offer the peasants or the national minorities 
satisfaction of their needs and grievances. He explained the 
failure of revolution not in socio-economic class terms but by 
the "theory of inherently counter-revolutionary 1non-historic 
nations' - a category in which he include[d], pell-mell, 
Southern Slavs, Bretons, Scots and Basques."151 Similarly, one 
looks in vain in the Neue Rheinische Zeitunq, whose editor was 
Marx, for an analysis of Austrian agrarian problems, for a 
concrete programme on the Austrian peasant question.152
The categorization of a national movement as progressive 
or reactionary, then, depended not so much on the degree of its 
suffering at the hands of its oppressor, or on its past 
historical deeds and future aspirations, as on its overall role
in respect to social revolution. The transcendence of any kind
of particularism towards ever larger political and economic 
units was regarded as progressive, while anything blocking
development in this direction was deemed reactionary and anti- 
historic .153
This section has demonstrated that Marx and Engels did not 
realize the full importance of nationalism, and that their 
prognoses concerning disappearing peoples have not been
vindicated in the course of the past century.
(xiii) Conclusion
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Let us now sum up the analysis of the preceding sections 
ind draw some tentative conclusions for the general subject of 
^his thesis.
In the twelve years after Marx's death in 1883, Engels 
tried to employ the methodological tools that he and Marx had 
fashioned, to take account of the changes that were occurring 
in capitalism. It was a movement from practice to theory to 
practice to theory. The principal elements in the modified 
cycle of crisis were: the rise of colonialism and neo­
protectionism; the new forms of interaction by capitals on the 
world market; and the formation of monopolistic trusts and 
cartels. Even for Engels these new tendencies were only just 
becoming discernible - although it is true there was a long 
tradition, going back to Sismondi, Wakefield, Owen or 
Rodbertus, that had considered the economic reasons for 
capitalism's expansion into regions beyond Europe. However, the
development ,'of capitalism up to 1895 did not allow Engels to
£
work out a full-fledged theory of imperialism. Yet it seems 
clear that Marx and Engels touched upon most of the important 
elements of such a theory, without actually anticipating the 
results of Lenin's work written in 1916.154
Nor did Marx or Engels make the decisive breakthrough in 
analysing the ever closer relationship between state and 
economy. The reason for this is that they did not lay as much 
stress as others did later on the necessary connection between 
domination of the colonies and measures to solve the crisis in 
the industrialized capitalist countries. Although their
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writings display a consistent interest in theoretical analysis 
of the 'pure* capitalist mode of production, in its classic 
country Great Britain, neither Capital nor any other work 
contains a substantive and coherent analysis of the colonies as 
such, which must evidently be at the centre of any theory of 
imperialism.
Indeed, we can say that to refer to 'Marx's theory of 
imperialism' is incorrect, since the theory derives from the 
later theoretical analysis by Lenin. I would even reject a 
formulation like Warren's: "Imperialism, conceived by Marx and
Engels as the historical process of capitalist expansion into 
the non-capitalist world."155 This applies also to Davis, who 
wrote: "Imperialism as a system (emphasis in the original),
identical with colonialism ..." or to Kiernan's "Marx's 
doctrine of imperialism . .. "156
The essential contribution of Marx and Engels, then, was 
at a methodological and historical level. They grasped the 
interrelationship between colonies and capitalist countries and 
the potential influence of the former on revolution in Europe. 
This point gained in importance after the heyday of 1848, when 
Marx and Engels thought that crisis in the colonies might 
actually precipitate revolution in Europe. In their work they 
described an inherent necessity for the capitalist mode of 
production to expand into colonies after it had established 
itself at home.
This movement served to counter a crisis at home whose 
roots lay in the tendential fall of the rate of profit. Since 
capitalists were forced by competition continually to increase
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the productive forces and to increase the mass of production, 
they were also compelled to expand the market. The resulting 
creation of a world-market prepared the conditions for world­
wide industrial production. This was the historical ’mission' 
or 'obligation' of the bourgeoisie, although ultimately the 
movement contained an inner contradiction by approaching the 
limits of the capitalist mode of production. Marx and Engels 
perceived colonialism as positive insofar as it disrupted the 
stagnation of the Asiatic mode of production.
Well before the 1848 revolutions, they clearly understood 
that the world-market, with its high level of communication 
between countries, was necessary as a foundation of communism. 
Conflicts on the world-market were seen as an extension of 
class-struggles at home, nationalist aspirations and hopes 
being subordinated to the general movement of socialism. In the 
post-Marx Engels, however, one can detect a shift as the world- 
market became an arena of struggle between nation-states.
Marx arid Engels considered the 'India question* not only 
as a symbol for various rising and declining fractions of the 
ruling class in Britain; it also reacted on the domestic scene 
by serving as a safety-valve in recurrent crises. Concerning 
the profitability of colonies, they went beyond superficial 
arguments to distinguish between, on the one hand, small 
fractions of the ruling class in Great Britain who made 
excessive profits from the over-whelming majority of the people 
in India and other colonies, and on the other hand the 
exploited mass of the working-class in Britain.
The question of how Russia would pass to communism -
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whether the capitalist mode of production and the resulting 
social formation was a must for all societies in the world - 
was of great interest to Marx and Engels in the wider context 
of European politics. They spoke about capitalism bringing its 
influence to bear on all countries. Thus, as the commune had 
survived in Russia, there seemed to exist a possibility of 
building on it (in conjunction with progressive elements of the 
more modern capitalist mode of production in Western Europe), 
and establishing a new radically different mode of production: 
communism. The vicissitudes of the capitalist stage seemed to 
be avoidable in this case.
This issue was very problematic, both because of the 
theoretical problems involved and because of the historical
context in which it erupted. The question concerned whether the 
skipping of stages was possible in general and, secondly, 
whether it was a practical possibility for Russia, where the 
archaic formation in the form of the obshchina was dissolved to 
a great extent already. In addition, there was the question of 
alliance with groups like the narodniks, who pursued - in 
Marx's and Engels's view - certain ambiguous policies. 
Revolutionary hopes had faded in Europe after 1848, but when
unrest erupted again it was in the fortress of reaction:
Russia. The people through whom this social upheaval was 
expressed were the narodniks, who believed in the theory of
peasant revolution, the uniqueness of the obshchina, and its 
ability to avoid the capitalist stage. An avoidance of 
capitalism in Russia, or for that matter, any revolution 
weakening the dreaded Tsar, could ignite revolution in Western
Europe.
Clearly, outer-European regions were of interest to Marx 
and Engels for only two reasons. First, they were the object of 
theoretical interest - for example, to what extent had 
capitalist social formations survived in China? Secondly, there 
was the question of whether they had a positive or negative 
influence on revolution in Western Europe. Marx and Engels 
believed that the contradiction laboured out in Western Europe 
between the proletariat and bourgeoisie was the crucial one for 
the future of the world. Theoretically it would have been 
possible to use the co-operative and egalitarian peasant 
commune as a base for communism. Historical developments had
eventually rendered this possibility impossible.
To understand Marx's and Engels's apparently contradictory 
remarks concerning the uniqueness of the Western capitalist
example, one has to properly comprehend their mode of
procedure. They analyze an established mode of production 
differently \from a social formation which is in the process of
t;
disintegration. In an evolved social formation the structural- 
systematical tendencies of the mode of production are dominant; 
in a transitory social formation the room for manoeuvre for
collective actors is greater. This reconciles, I believe, their 
statements on the possibility of skipping a specific stage.
Another point of inquiry for Marx and Engels was the 
feedback of colonial enterprises on the proletariat in Western 
Europe. They recognized a corrupting influence from the 
proceeds of colonialism, but this was not of primary importance 
to them as they believed that the battle between bourgeoisie
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and proletariat would soon be decided. They anticipated a 
struggle along class lines expanding to a world-wide class 
struggle, and nationalism was considered to be of minor 
importance and a vanishing phenomenon.
Accordingly they supported not nationalist movements but 
peoples who were situated in great numbers in vast territories 
and who possessed the vitality to take an active part in their 
history. All others were considered history-less and inherently 
beyond hope. Here Engels should have remembered his own phrase: 
"The eternal changes in human destiny . .. where nothing is 
stable except instability, nothing is unchanging, except change
..157
Marx and Engels did not hesitate to ally themselves with 
theoretically dubious groups if they believed that this would 
serve the aim of revolution. For the same reason they did not 
hesitate to change their thinking when necessary. Thus, there 
are a number of ambiguities and complexities in the work of 
Marx which enable different interpretations to be made. Lenin 
and Mao, living in the time of practical revolutions, used Marx 
to understand their own particular situation.
ENDNOTES
1. Ekkehart Krippendorff (ed.), Probleme der internationalen 
Beziehunqen (Suhrkamp Verlag:Frankfurt) 1975, 2nd ed., p. 
188; see also: Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds), Studies 
in the Theory of Imperialism (Longman:London), 1980, 6th
ed. p. 3, and Michael Barrett-Brown, The Economics of 
Imperialism (Penguin Books:Harmondsworth) , 1974, p. 97 and 
p. 255. And see for discussion of Roman imperialism Dieter 
Flach, Der sogenannte romische Imperialismus, Historische 
Zeitschrift, 222. Band, 1976, pp. 1-42.
83
2. Hans Kohn, Some Reflections on Colonialism, The Review of 
Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, July 1956, p. 263.
3. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism (The 
Macmillan Press:London) 1974, pp. 16, 20. George 
Lichtheim, Imperialism (Penguin Books:Harmondsworth) 1977, 
especially chapters 2 and 3.
4. For the origins and applications of the term imperialism 
see H. D. Schmidt and W. J. Mommsen, Imperialism, in C. D. 
Kernig (ed.),Marxism, Communism and Western Society - A
Comparative Encyclopedia, vol. VI (Herder and Herder:New 
York), 1972, pp. 211-229; Hans Daalder, Imperialism, in
David L. Sills (ed.), Imperialism, in International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. VII (The 
Macmillan Company and the Free PressrNew York), 1968, pp. 
101-109; Richard Koebner and Helmut D. Schmidt, 
Imperialism - The Story and Significance of a Political 
Word, 1840-1960 (Cambridge University Press:Cambridge), 
1964; J. P. Halstead and S. Porcar, Modern European 
Imperialism. A Bibliography of Books and Articles, 1815- 
1972, (G. K. Hall:Boston, Mass.), 1974, 2 vols.
5. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in 
Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, Political Writings, vol. 2, 
edited and introduced by David Fernbach (Penguin
Books:Harmondsworth), 1973, p. 156-7 and footnote 32 how
Marx used the term imperialism. The German original can be 
found in, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels Werke, (MEW) 
Herausgegeben vom Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim 
ZK der SED, (Dietz-Verlag:Berlin) , 1956-1967, vol. 8, Der 
achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, pp. 111-208,
(from now on quoted as MEW, vol., title, p.).
\
6. MEW, vol. 8, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,
p. and Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire in Fernbach, vol. 2,
ibid; pp. 240-1.
7. V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and
Theory of international Relations (Routledge & Kegan
Paul:London), 1980, p. 13.
8. Karl Marx: Precapitalist Economic Formations. With an
introduction by Eric Hobsbawm (Lawrence and 
Wishart:London), 1964, p. 20.
9. Donald M. Lowe, The Function of 'China1 in Marx, Lenin and
Mao, (University of California Press:Berkeley), 1966, p.
15.
10. But this does not mean that we are talking of some kind of 
epistemological break that would exclude all their 
journalism from analysis of their views.
11. Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, edited with an
84
introduction by Shlomo Avineri (Anchor Books Doubleday and 
Co.:Garden City), 1969, p. 75, from now quoted as Marx- 
Avineri. The original can be found in MEW, vol. 9, Die 
Revolution in China und in Europa, p. 102. See also Shlomo 
Avineri, Marx and Modernization, The Review of Politics, 
vol. 31, April 1969, No. 2, pp. 172-188.
12. MEW, vol. 9, Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, p. 128,
and Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 89-90.
13. MEW, vol. 12, Persien-China, p. 215, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 189.
14. For the importance of these two factors see MEW, vol. 9,
Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, pp. 131-2, and Marx-
Avineri, ibid., pp. 91-2.
15. MEW, vol. 9, Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, p. 130,
and Marx-Avineri, p. 91.
16. ibid., Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, p. 130 , and
Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 91-2.
17. MEW, vol. 28, Marx an Engels, p. 268, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 456.
18. MEW, vol. 12, Cber die Folterungen in India, p. 272, and
Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 234; a game played on the Indians
"by John Bull with loaded dice", MEW, vol. 12, Der
britisch-chinesische Vertrag, p. 585, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 361.
19. MEW, vol. 12, Die englische Armee in Indien, p. 495, and
Marx-AVineri, ibid., p. 322. See also MEW, vol. 12, Der 
englisch-chinesische Konflikt, pp. 102-108; and Marx- 
Avineri, ibid., pp. 152-8; MEW, vol. 12, Einzelheiten uber 
die Ersturmung von Lakhnau, pp. 463-8, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., pp. 299-305; and MEW, vol. 12, Uber die Folterungen 
in Indien, pp. 268-73 and Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 228-34.
20. See for example Horace B. Davis, Capital and Imperialism: 
A Landmark in Marxist Theory, Monthly Review, vol. 19, -No. 
4, September 1967, p. 18, and the slightly ambiguous 
formulation by Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of 
Orientalism, (G. Allen and Unwin:London), 1978, p. 16.
21. Kenzo Mohiri, Marx and 'Underdevelopment', Monthly Review, 
vol. 30, April 1979, pp. 36ff.
22. Davis, Capital and Imperialism . . ., op.cit., p. 16. Nor
should the articles in the New York Daily Tribune be 
described as "anti-colonialist reportage", J.M. Blaut, 
Imperialism: The Marxist Theory and its Evolution,
Antipode, vol. 7, February 1975, No 1, p. 2.
85
23. Ernest Mandel: The Formation of the Economic Thought of 
Karl Marx (New Left Books:London), 1977, p. 110, and 
compare Tom Kemp, Theories of Imperialism, (Dobson Books 
Ltd:London), 1967, p. 17. See however Hobsbawm (in 
respect to Russia): "It seems probable that Marx, who had 
earlier welcomed the impact of Western capitalism as an 
inhuman but historically progressive force on the stagnant 
pre-capitalist economies, found himself increasingly 
appalled by its inhumanity". Marx-Hobsbawm, Pre-capitalist 
Economic Formations .. ., op. cit., p. 50; see as well V. 
G. Kiernan, Marx and India, in J. Saville and R. Milliband 
(eds.), The Socialist Register, 1967, p. 165; and Turner, 
Marx and Orientalism .. ., op. cit., p. 24, but Sutcliffe 
maintained that "it is quite clear that for most of the 
time Marx believed that capitalism would industrialize the 
world." Owen-Sutcliffe, Studies in Theory ..., op. cit.,
pp. 180-1. ,
24. MEW, vol. 9, Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, pp. 132- 
3, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 93-4. See also Kemp, 
Theories of Imperialism ..., ibid., p. 18 and seen also
Umberto Melotti, Marx and the Third World
(Macmillan:London), 1977, chapter 18.
25. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 465.
26. MEW, vol. 12, Der Aufstand in der Indischen Armee, p. 231, 
and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 192.
21. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse. der britischen
Herrschaft in Indien, p. 220, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 




28. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse der britischen
Herrschaft in Indien, p. 221, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., 
p. 132.
29. MEW, vol. 28, Marx an Engels, p. 268, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 456.
30. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse der britischen
Herrschaft in Indien, p. 221, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 
132-3, and quoted in Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 15; and Karl 
Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie,
(Dietz-Verlag:Berlin), 1974, p. 313.
31. MEW, Vol. 28, Marx an Engels, p. 266, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 455.
32. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 1,
(Academic Press:New York), 1974, p. 357.
33. MEW, Vol 25, Das Kapital, Dritter Band, p. 255 and quoted
86
in G. A. Cohen, Karl Marxfs Theory of History, A Defence, 
(Clarendon Press:Oxford), 1978, p. 201.
34. Richard W. Miller, The Consistency of Historical 
Materialism, Philosophy and Public.Affairs, vol. 4, Summer 
1975, No. 4, p. 402.
35. Quoted in Ian Cummins, Marx, Engels and National Movements 
(Croom Helm:London), 1980, p. 118.
36. MEW, vol. 28, Marx an Engels, p. 254, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., p. 451.
40. MEW, vol. 14, Chinesisches, p. 514, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 442.
38. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, pp. 465- 
6, and quoted in Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 2-3.
39. John M. Maguire, Marx's Theory of Politics, (Cambridge
University Press:Cambridge), 1978, p. 15.
40. MEW, vol. 9, Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, p. 133 
and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 94.
41. MEW, vol. 6, Der demokratische Panslawismus, p. 273.
42. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse der britischen
Herrschaft in Indien, p. 221, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 
133.
43. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse der britischen
Herrschaft in Indien, pp. 221-2, and Marx-Avineri, ibid.,
p. 133), and see also MEW, vol. 25, Das Kapital, Dritter
Band, p. 81.
44. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 479.
45. MEW, vol. 4, Karl Marx an P. W. Annenkow, p. 550.
46. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 479.
47. Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, edited by
John Sender, (New Left Book and Verso Editions:London) , 
1980, p. 14.
48. Marx, Grundrisse . . ., op. cit., p. 634; K. Marx,
Grundrisse, translated with a foreword by Martin Nicolaus, 
(Penguin Books:Harmondsworth), 1973, p. 748.
49. Marx, Grundrisse ..., ibid., pp. 177-84, see also pages 
266-73; Marx-Nicolaus, Grundrisse, op. cit.
50. Marx, Grundrisse . . ., ibid., p. 313, Marx-Nicolaus,
87
Grundrisse, pp. 409-10.
51. Marx, Grundrisse ..., ibid., p. 311; and see also Karl 
Marx, Das Kapital, Buch I, (Ullstein Verlag:Frankfurt), 
1971, pp. 706-715, chp. 25, The Modern Theory of 
Colonialism; Marx-Nicolaus, Grundrisse, ibid., p. 408.
52. MEW, vol. 38, Engels an Danielson, p. 470; MEW, vol. 36, 
similarly a letter to Bebel, p. 465, and MEW, vol. 39, 
Engels an Kautsky, p. 301; MEW, vol. 7, Die 
Zehnstundenfrage, p. 231, and MEW, vol. 6, Lohnarbeit und 
Kapital, p. 423; MEW, vol. 26.2, Theorien liber den 
Mehrwert, p. 525, and see also MEW, vol. 29, Marx an 
Engels, p. 360.
53. A. Cutler, B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain, Marx1s 
'Capital1 and Capitalism Today, (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul:London), 1978, vol. II, p. 263.
54. Ben Fine and Laurence Harris, Re-reading Capital, 
(Macmillan Press:London), 1979, p. 58.
55. Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Buch III, op. cit., p. 219 and 
MEW, vol. 25, Das Kapital, p. 242.
56. Marx, Das Kapital, Buch III, ibid., pp.416-7.
57. MEW, vol. 37, Marx an Danielson, p. 157, Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 471.
58. See MEW, vol. 29, Marx an Engels, p. 415.
59. MEW, vol. 3, Die deutsche Ideologie, pp. 36, 60; MEW, vol. 
29, Marx an Engels p. 360, and see David McLellan, The 
Thought of Karl Marx, (Macmillan:London) , 1982, chp. 9, 
Future Communist Society.
60. MEW, vol. 21, Schutzzoll und Freihandel ['Vorwort zur
amerikanischen Ausgabe von Karl Marx' 'Rede uber die Frage 
des Freihandels'], p. 362.
61. Marx, Grundrisse ..., op. cit., p. 311.
62. MEW, vol. 3, Die deutsche Ideologie, p. 60; and see as
well Michael Lowy, Marxists and the National Question, New 
Left Review, No. 96, 1976, p. 82.
63. MEW, vol. 3, Die deutsche Ideologie, pp. 35-6.
64. MEW, vol. 21, Schutzzoll und Freihandel ['Vorwort zur
amerikanischen Ausgabe von Karl Marx' 'Rede liber die Frage 
des Freihandels'], pp. 363-4 and p. 368.
65. MEW, vol. 9, Revolution in China and Europe, p. 99, Marx-
88
Avineri, ibid., pp. 67-75; see also MEW vol. 9, Die 
Ostindische Gesellschaft. Ihre Geschichte und die 
Resultate ihrens Wirkens, pp. 148-157, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., pp. 99-108.
66. MEW, vol 9, Die Revolution in China und in Europa, p. 100, 
and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 73.
67. ibid., p. 101, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 74.
68. MEW, vol. 9, Die Revolution in China und in Europa, p. 95, 
and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 67; see also MEW, vol. 13, 
Schwere Zerriittung der indischen Finanzen, pp. 292-99, and 
Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 366-75, and MEW, vol. 12, Die 
Geldkrise in Europa - Aus der Geschichte der 
Geldzirkulation, p. 70, MEW, vol. 12, Die Geschichte des 
Opiumhandels, p. 54 9.
69. MEW, vol. 12, Die politischen Parteien in England - Die 
Lage in Europa, p. 504.
70. MEW, vol. 4, Rede uber die Frage des Freihandels, p. 449 
and MEW, vol. 21, Schutzzoll und Freihandel [Vorwort zur 
amerikanischen Ausgabe von Karl Marx', 'Rede liber die 
Frage des Freihandels]', p. 362.
71. MEW, vol. 21, ibid.
72. MEW, vol. 9, Die Ostindische Kompanie, ihre Geschichte und 
die Resultate ihres Wirkens, p. 155, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., p. 107.
73. Quoted in Maguire, Marx's Theory ..., op. cit., p. 173.
74. MEW, vol. 13, Der Handel mit China, p. 542, and Marx-
Avineri, ibid., p. 396.
75. MEW, vol. 12, Die Steuern in Indien, p. 513; and Marx-
Avineri, ibid., p. 331.
76. MEW, vol. 12, Die Geschichte des Opiumhandels, p. 553, and 
Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 346; and also MEW, vol. 12, -Die 
bevorstehende Indienanleihe, pp. 378-81, here p. 379, and 
Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 266-69.
77. MEW, vol. 12, Die Steuern in Indien, p. 513, and Marx-
Avineri, ibid., p. 331.
78. MEW, vol. 13, Schwere Zerriittung der indischen Finanzen,
p. 297, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 371.
79. MEW, vol. 29, Marx an Engels, p. 415, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 4 65.
89
80. MEW, vol. 12, Die Einnahmen der Englander in Indien, p.
281 and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 235.
81. ibid., and ibid.
82. ibid., p. 284, and ibid., p. 238.
83. ibid., and ibid.
84. ibid., and ibid.
85. Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 19.
86. Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Buch I, op. cit., pp. 577-9.
87. MEW, vol. 4, Die Schutzzollner, die Freihandelsmanner und
die arbeitende Klasse, pp. 296-98, and see also MEW, vol. 
4, Rede uber die Frage des Freihandels, pp. 444-58.
88. MEW, vol. 4, Der Freihandelskongress in Brussel, p. 308.
89. MEW, vol. 4, Rede uber die Frage des Freihandels, p. 458; 
Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and 
Labour Theories of Nationalism to 1917, (Monthly Review 
Press:New York), 1967, p. 9 called this acceptance of free 
trade grudging.
90. Karl Kuhne, Economics and Marxism, (Macmillan:London), 
1979, vol. 1, p. 278.
91. Marx, Das Kapital, Buch III, op. cit., chp. 27, Die Rolle 
des Kredit in der kapitalistischen Produktion.
92. MEW, vol. 12, Der britische Handel, p. 364.
93. MEW, vol. 25, Das Kapital, vol. Ill, p. 457.
94. MEW, vol. 39, Engels an Karl Kautsky, p. 482.
95. Marx, Das Kapital, Buch III, op. cit., p. 846, and MEW, 
vol. 25, Das Kapital, p. 919.
96. Hans-Holger Paul, Marx,______Engels_____ und_____ die
Imperialismustheorie der II. Internationale, (VSA- 
Verlag:Hamburg), 1978, p. 77.
97. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 466.
98. MEW, vol. 19, Brief an die Redaktion der 
'Otetschestwennyje Sapiski1, p. 108.
99. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 462.
100. For further developments after this stage, see Melotti,
90
Marx and the Third World ..., op. cit., p. 26.
101. Quoted in Karl Marx, Die Geschichte der Geheimdiplomatie 
des 18. Jahrhunderts, mit Kommentaren von B. Rabehl und D. 
B. Rjasanov, (Verlag Olle & Wolter:Berlin), 1977, p. 124. 
And see MEW, vol. 19, Entwiirfe einer Antwort auf den Brief 
von V. I. Sassulitsch, pp. 384-406.
102. Rudi Dutschke, Versuch, Lenin auf die Fiisse zu stellen. 
Uber den halbasiatischen und den westeuropaischen ■ Weq zum 
Sozialismus. Lenin, Lukacs und die Dritte Internationale, 
(Verlag Klaus Wagenbach:Berlin), 1974, p. 62.
103. MEW, vol. 35, Marx an Vera Iwanowna Sassulitsch, p. 167.
104. MEW, vol. 19, Entwiirfe einer Antwort auf den Brief von V. 
I. Sassulitsch, p. 387 and MEW, vol 35, Marx an V. I.
Sassulitsch, pp. 166-67.
105. MEW, vol. 19, Entwiirfe einer Antwort auf den Brief von V. 
I. Sassulitsch, p.389 and note pp. 390-1.
106. MEW, vol. 13, Einleitung [zur Kritik der Politischen 
Okonomie], p. 615 and quoted in Lucio Colletti, Karl Marx, 
Early Writings, (Penguin:Harmondsworth), 1975, p. 426.
107. Paul Thomas, Marx and Science, Political Studies, vol. 24, 
March 1976, No. 1, p. 7; see also Alan Gilbert, Social
Theory and Revolutionary Activity in Marx, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 73, June 1979, No. 2, p. 
532-38; see also Roy Enfield, Marx and Historical Laws, 
History and Theory, vol. 15, No. 3, 1967, pp. 261-11.
\
108. Cummins’, Marx, Engels, ..., ibid., pp. 130-31 and p. 133; 
see also K. Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the 
Eighteenth Century and the Story of the Life of Lord
Palmerston, edited with an introduction and nptes by
Lester Hutchinson, (Lawrence & Wishart:London), 1969, p.
46, in MEW, vol. 9, Lord Palmerston, pp. 355-418; see also 
MEW, vol. 22, Die Auswartige Politik des russischen
Zarentums, p- 11.
109. MEW, vol. 34, Marx an F. A. Sorge, p. 296.
110. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Marx, p. 121.
111. MEW, vol. 18, Soziales aus Russland, p. 556.
112. MEW, vol. 39, Engels an Danielson, p. 150.






Vorrede zur zweiten russischen Ausgabe des 
Kommunistischen Partei', p. 296; see also 
Vorrede zur russischen Ausgabe von 1882, p.
91
576.
114. MEW, vol. 19, Entwiirfe einer Antwort auf den Brief von V. 
I. Sassulitsch, pp. 388-9 and 404; see also Paul, Marx, 
Engels, ..., op. cit., p. 15.
115. MEW, vol. 22, Nachwort (1894) [zu 'Sociales aus 
Russland'], P- 428.
116. MEW, vol. 8, [Uber Versuche, eine neue Oppositionspartei 
zu griinden] , p. 390.
117. MEW, vol. 29, Engels an Marx, p. 358.
118. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Kautsky, p. 357, and Marx-Avineri,
ibid., p. 473; see also MEW, vol. 29, Engels an Marx, p.
358, and MEW, vol. 36, Engels an Bebel, p. 58.
119. Marx-Avineri, ibid., p. 353, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p.
277.
120. MEW, vol. 21, England 1845 und 1885, p. 194.
121. MEW, vol. 21, England 1845 und 1885, p. 197; MEW, vol. 2,
[Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe von 1892 der 'Lage der
arbeitenden Klasse in England*], pp. 637-50, esp. 645 and
see also MEW, vol. 19, Der Handelsvertrag mit Frankreich, 
p. 265.
122. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Karl Kautsky, pp. 357-8.
123. MEW, vol. 4, Reden uber Polen, p. 417, see also MEW, vol. 
16, Kogfidentielle Mitteilung, p. 417: "Das Volk, das ein 
anderes<Volk unterjocht, schmiedet seine eigenen Ketten".
124. MEW, vol. 4, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, p. 468.
125. MEW, vol. 29, Marx an Engels, p. 360, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., p. 4 64.
126. MEW, vol. 9, Die kunftigen Ergebnisse der britischen 
Herrschaft in Indien, p. 224, and Marx-Avineri, ibid., p.
137.
127. MEW, vol. 9, Die Kriegsfrage-Parlamentsranke in Indien, 
pp. 212-219 and Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 128-31.
128. MEW, vol. 12, Die indische Frage, pp. 242-46 and Marx- 
Avineri, ibid., pp. 199-208; MEW, vol. 12, Die Einnahme 
von Lakhnau, pp. 439-444; Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 299- 
306; Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 349-54; MEW, vol. 12, 
Persien-China, pp. 213-4; MEW, vol. 12, Nachrichten aus 
Indien, p. 249 and MEW, vol. 12, Der Auf stand in Indien, 
pp. 490-2. MEW, vol. 12, Die englische Armee in Indien, p.
92
495.
129. Marx-Avineri, ibid., pp. 179-84, MEW, vol. 12, Der 
Auf stand in der indische Armee, pp. 230-33 and Marx- 
Avineri, pp. 191-95; MEW, vol. 12, Persien-China, p. 213.
130. MEW, vol 12, Persien-China, p. 212, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., p. 187; a book about this first Indian mutiny was
given the title: The First Indian War of Independence,
1857-59, (Foreign Languages Publishing House:Moscow), 1959 
r this title does not seem to agree with Marx's and 
Engels' assessment of this rebellion.
131. MEW, vol. 15, Chinesisches, p. 514, and Marx-Avineri, 
ibid., p. 442; see also Lowe, The Function of China . . .,
op. cit., p. 22; see also MEW, vol. 12, Die Erfolge
Russlands im Fernen Osten, p. 622; and also MEW, vol. 9, 
Die Revolution in China und in Europa, p. 96.
132. Marx-Avineri, ibid, p. 47; but see Davis, Nationalism and 
Socialism ..., op. cit., p. 64f.
133. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Bernstein, p. 349, and Marx- 
Avineri, ibid., p. 472.
134. Quoted in Davis, Nationalism and Socialism . . . , op. cit., 
p. .13, posthumously published in Neue Zeit, XIV, Book 1, 
February 1896, p. 679.
1-35. MEW, vol. 6, Der magyarische Kampf, p. 171, pp. 172, and 
176 and see footnote 156; and see MEW, vol. 35, Engels an 
Eduard Bernstein, p. 279.
136. MEW, vol. 4, Communist Manifesto, p. 479.
137. ibid., p. 466.
138. MEW, vol. 22, An den italienischen Leser, [Vorwort zur 
italienischen Ausgabe (1893) des 'Manifest der 
Kommunistischen Partei'] p. 366
139. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Eduard Bernstein, pp. 281-2; and 
also MEW, vol. 36, Engels an August Bebel, p. 390.
14 0. W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, (Cambridge 
University Press:London), 1972, p. 74.
141. MEW, vol. 17, Erste Adresse des Generalrats uber den 
Deutsch-Franzosischen Krieg, pp. 3-8 and see MEW, vol. 33, 
Engels an Marx, p. 40, see also MEW, vol. 36, Engels an 
August Bebel, p. 390.
142. MEW, vol. 17, Brief an den Ausschuss der 
Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei, p. 269; see also the
93
useful interpretation of events of that time, Dimitrio 
Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the Colonial Question, 1917- 
1928, (B. DrozrGeneva), 1957.
143. Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist
Theory_____ and_____ Strategy, (Princeton University
Press:Princeton), 1984, p. 5.
144. MEW, vol. 6, Der demokratische Panslawismus, p. 273.
145. MEW, vol. 5, Der danisch-preussische Waffenstillstand, p. 
395.
146. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism . .., op. cit., p. 18.
147. Boersner, The Bolsheviks .. ., op. cit., p. 20, took this 
to mean economic vitality. And see also MEW, vol. f>, Der 
demokratische Panslavismus, p. 275.
148. MEW, vol. 35, Engels an Eduard Bernstein, pp. 279-80.
149. Roman Rosdolsky, Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 
' geschichtslosen* Volker (Die Nationalitatenfrage in der 
Revolution 1848-1849 im Lichte der 1Neuen Rheinischen 
Zeitung), Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, Herausgegeben. von. 
der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, IV. Band, 1964, pp. 87-283, 
here p. 103 footnote’ 53, also pp. 244ff, p. 112f> p. 118, 
footnote 45 and . p.*' 107. Misunderstandings,
misinterpretations, misquotations are made by Carlos 
Moore, Were Marx and Engels White Racists: The Prole-Aryan 
Outlook of Marxism, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, vol. 
XIX, 1974-75, pp. 125-56. But see in the same issue the 
rebuttal by Jerome L. Himmelstein, Marx and Engels are 
Dead: An Editorial Reply to C. Moore, ibid., pp. 157-66; 
and Carl Mack, When is an Aryan not an Aryan? An Addendum 
to C. Moore, ibid., pp. 167-70.
150. Quoted in Rosdolsky, ibid., p. 106, footnote 73 and also 
p. 147.
151. Michael Lowy, Marxists and ..., New Left Review, op. cit., 
p . 8 4 .
152. Rosdolsky, Friedrich Engels . . ., op. cit., p. 139 and 
footnote 60.
153. Rosdolsky, ibid., p. 191.
154. Agreeing with this, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, (G. Allen & Unwin:London), 1976, 
5th edition, p. 49.
155. Warren, Imperialism .. ., op. cit., p. 4 6 and respective 
footnote.
94
156. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism . . . , op. cit., p. 186; 
see also B.‘ S. Turner, The Concept of , Social 
1Stationariness1, Utilitarianism and Marxism, Science and 
Society, Spring 1974, vol. 38, pp. 16-7; also Kiernan, 
Marx and India, Socialist Register 1967 ..., op. cit., p. 
183.




3. LENIN*S THEORY OF IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM
(i) The Nature of the Contribution
Lenin*s theory of imperialism is a vast subject which has 
already been the object of countless research projects and 
published works. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it will be 
clarified at the beginning what this chapter is not designed to 
do. First of all, the intention is not to prove or disprove the 
accuracy of Lenin's historical analysis, since others have
amply criticized his claims that the concentration and
centralization of production and capital leading to monopolies 
is decisive in economic life, or that the export of money 
capital as opposed to the export of commodities is central from 
the point of view of capital.1 Similarly, the division of the 
world by international monopolist capitalist combines has been 
much discussed, and thousands of pages have been devoted to 
discussion of Lenin's view that this process had been completed
among the major capitalist powers and that any further
development would centre on redivision and war.
Nor will I concern myself with Lenin's view in the early 
years of the century that capitalism was entering a final 
crisis from which no escape was possible. The First World War 
may have given this notion some plausibility at the time, but 
we can now see that it was so clearly wrong that little can be 
gained from its consideration.
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Another debate that would take us too far from the subject 
of this thesis concerns the argument that in the 1880s 
Britain’s move into Africa had no economic rationale and was 
conducted purely for foreign policy reasons - or the counter­
argument that strategy and imperial policy were functions of 
the protection of Britain’s position on the world market which 
was or could be threatened by other European competitors.2
Critics who try to invalidate Lenin's theory by denying 
that imperialism had any economic motivation, or who even 
maintain that economically the colonies were a loss-making 
operation, seem to forget that Lenin and other classical 
theorists of imperialism never employed such a vulgar 
definition. There is no reason to accept the economic 
reductionism of Fieldhouse's Hobson-Lenin Model.3 Lenin's as 
well as Marx's and Engels's concept of economics was. not that 
of the narrow discipline taught in universities today and 
separated off in our newspapers from home news/ foreign news/ 
arts/ sporti pages. Political economy rejects the compartment- 
alization of science or social science and avoids the isolation 
of facts, relationships or disciplines. The starting point of 
Marxism is that of a total society where economic and political 
processes are related as two parts of a more complex whole. -
Finally, I shall not be interested here in a termino­
logical dispute about whether Lenin wrote a theory of imperial­
ism, an ideological tract or a political pamphlet. It seems 
clear that it is the interrelationship of the five elements of 
Lenin's definition of imperialism that provides the ground for
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an all-encompassing theory - even though, as Brewer writes, - 
these interconnections "are only examined either in passing 
sentences or ... in the polemical sections directed against 
Kautsky".4 The question of whether the five points are joined by 
an essential relationship or just by historical contingency is 
of course important, and it is a common problem for Marxists 
and non-Marxists to develop a single theory which adequately 
explains the whole phenomenon of imperialism.
However, the purpose of this chapter is different: namely, 
to uncover the nature of Lenin's theory, to discuss whether it 
is internally coherent and where the ties are with Marx, which 
will in turn provide a basis for the judgement about Mao's 
indebtedness to Lenin. Three further points should be borne in 
mind. When interpreting Lenin's Imperialism, one must not 
forget that his writings very often function as tactical moves 
in factional disputes, and that this book in particular was 
written with an eye to the Tsarist censorship.5 His focus was 
overwhelmingly upon European capitalism, its trends, its 
problems, the possibility of revolution against it. In the 
period when he was writing, there was no lack of ideas or 
literature on the changing nature and ultimate collapse of 
capitalism. Before Luxemburg's underconsumptionist theory, 
there had been various liberal analyses of imperialism; 
Kautsky's 'ultra-imperialism', Bernstein's reformism, and the 
rise of a chauvinist pro-imperialism within the Social 
Democratic Parties in Europe. Finally, Hobson - a major 
reference for Lenin - had developed a social-reformist approach
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to overcome the crisis of under-consumption.6
The reality of the economic and political changes since 
the Great Depression of the 1870s-90s had necessitated further 
analysis both of the capitalist economy and of the policies 
followed in capitalist states. Amongst the prominent trends 
were the development of monopolies and the rise of finance 
capital, the introduction of protectionism to replace free 
trade, the formation of cartels, syndicates and vast industrial 
empires owned and controlled by an oligarchy of bankers (a 
process of concentration which Marx forecast would inevitably 
accompany mature capitalism) , the re-division of the world, the 
existence of international tensions and the subsequent danger 
of war, and the unexpected emergence of reformism in the 
working-class movement.
It was against this background, then, that Lenin conceived 
his work Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism. A 
Popular Outline as the necessary theoretical underpinning for 
revolution %n capitalist countries and as a rebuttal of a 
number of wrong approaches to it. Whereas the writings of Marx 
and Engels were often at a high level of abstraction, pointing 
to future possibilities rather than actual trends in Europe or 
in the colonies, Lenin wrote from the perspective of what- he 
considered to be a fast-developing revolutionary situation, and 
soon indeed as the leader of the first successful socialist 
revolution in the world. He did not think that his conception 
of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism undermined 
Marx's and Engels's analysis: after allowing capitalism to gain
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some time in tackling its inner contradictions, imperialism
would lead to a further, more explosive crisis of essentially
the kind that Marx and Engels had predicted. Thus, Lenin 
believed that he was analysing a new historical trend on the 
basis of the general laws of capital uncovered by Marx, in
order to grasp how far capitalism had developed internally and 
internationally and, above all, to assess how this had affected 
the objective bases for socialist revolution. For him, as for 
other communists coming after Marx, the main problem in the end 
was to add a political theory, a theory of practice, to fill 
the blanks in the founding fathers* discourse. Besides the key 
theme of the dialectical question of class/nation, the other
key theme of this thesis is the relation of revolutionary
political tactics to theories about the relation of nations in 
Marx/Engels, Lenin and Mao. Here one needs to emphasize the 
tactical purpose of Lenin's Imperialism. It is not only real 
theory, but its purpose was also to justify the Bolshevik
internationalist, revolutionary line in the Socialist 
International during the First World War. It will be the aim of 
this chapter to assess the nature and success of his enterprise 
in this light.
Imperialism for Lenin was a particular development within 
world capitalism that began no earlier than 1898-1900.7 This is 
a point that should be remembered by those who reject Lenin's 
theory. In his view it does not make sense to say that
imperialism is as old as the world as this would lead to an
understanding of the concept as meaning neither more nor less
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than the phenomenon of empire building throughout history.8 
Similarly, the term has been used by Northedge as just one 
expression of the "propensity of states to expand", or "the 
state, as all history bears witness, is an expansionist or 
imperialist animal" and by Cohen as referring to "those 
particular relationships between inherently unequal nations 
. . . " . Sumerians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks and Romans, and 
even the ancient Chinese were already imperialist, some claim.9 
Nevertheless, it is clear that after 1900 people perceived a 
drastic change in capitalism's structure - a change that cannot 
be reduced to something shared with the Sumerians, Egyptians or 
Romans.10 Today the word imperialism is used to mean the 
domination of one nation by another - whether politically, 
economically or ideologically. Hans Morgenthau has stated: "... 
observers have used the term imperialistic (emphasis in 
original) not for the purpose of characterizing objectively a 
particular type of foreign policy, but a term of opprobrium by 
which a policy to which the observer is opposed can be 
discredited."n
However, this is not the way Lenin used the term. For him, 
the term imperialism denoted a specific stage in the history of 
advanced, West European, capitalism, and not a policy which 
could be introduced or withdrawn at will. It signified the 
internationalization of capitalist relations of production, as 
the whole world was incorporated into an international division 
of labour. This particular structure of capitalism with its 
characteristic monopolies, finance capital, re-division of the
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world was different from laissez-faire competitive capitalism. 
It differed from simple colonialism and its motivation and 
results were not- the same as those of previous struggles for 
imperial domination in the history of the world.
It has led to confusion that Lenin talked about 'Russian
imperialism' in the Middle Ages and that he mentioned Rome as 
an example of 'colonialism and imperialism'.12 And in another 
place he wrote:
Imperialist wars also occured in the period of
slavery (the war between Rome and Carthage was on 
both sides an imperialist war), as well as in the 
Middle Ages and in the epoch of mercantile
capitalism. A war is certainly imperialist, if both 
(emphasis in text) warring sides oppress foreign 
countries or nationalities, and are fighting for 
their share of the loot and for the right to 'oppress 
and rob' more than the others.13
At one point in Imperialism, Lenin even stated: "Colonial
pplicy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of
capitalism, and even before capitalism".14
These sentences show that Lenin, like Marx and Engels and
\
any number of other writers, was not always consistent in his 
use of a particular term. At times he does use 'imperialism* in 
such a way that differences in modes of production seem almost 
irrelevant. Very often he uses 'imperialism* to mean 
'capitalism'. In his major theoretical works, however - and we 
are, after all, concerned here with the distinctiveness of 
Lenin's theory - he saw imperialism as part and parcel of 
capitalism and of late capitalism only, related to the inner 
laws or tendencies of capitalism, not just to the criterion of 
conquest as in the case of Roman wars. Indeed, he often
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explicitly rejected general analyses of imperialism which 
ignore or push into the background the fundamental difference 
between modes of production. However interesting comparative 
historical analysis might be, such conflations became "most 
vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: 'Greater Rome
and Greater Britain'”.15
In the end, we simply have to accept that Lenin used the 
term 'imperialism' in a specific way. For our own purposes, the 
interesting comparative question is how he saw his own theory 
in relation to the Marxist tradition and to the orthodox 
pretensions in both politics and economics of the major 
theorist of European Social Democracy: Karl Kautsky. Lenin
believed that peaceful cooperation among capitalist powers 
could never endure, given the shifting fortunes of capitalist 
states and the changing pattern of opportunities for external 
investment. Consequently, he thought a socialist revolution was 
on the agenda around the time of the First World War and even 
suggested th'^ t without it the world would sink into barbarism. 
Evidently he regarded as a perversion of Marxism any talk of a 
peaceful agreement among imperialist partners, in the kind of 
ultra-imperialism theorized by Kautsky. Such a view, with its 
implication that the contradictions of capitalism could... be 
overcome, would strengthen the tendency of a stratum within the 
working class to avoid the risks of confrontation with the 
imperialist bourgeoisie in its own country. Thus, as was so 
often the case with Lenin's work, polemical needs were the 
immediate origin of a development of Marxist theory which
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transcended that immediate polemical focus.
Another influential account of Leninfs theory of 
imperialism argues that it served to mediate between Marxism 
(as originated in the West) and the non-European world.16 The 
impetus is supposed to have come from Russia*s location halfway 
between Europe and Asia, when viewed from the standpoint of 
economic and social development.17 Such an interpretation 
however, lays exaggerated emphasis on one aspect, and remains 
idealist in that it isolates the contribution of Lenin (and, 
mutatis mutandis, Marx and Mao) from the socio-economic context 
- here the change from laissez-faire, competitive capitalism to 
monopoly capitalism and the expansion into the colonies of 
European monopoly capital. Lenin saw himself as entering the 
debate on the economic and political changes in European 
capitalist countries since the deaths of Marx and Engels, and 
bn the impact of internal finance capital on international 
relations in the world. Similarly, his theory of imperialism is 
first and fpremost a theory for revolution in the advanced 
industrialized countries, not for colonies and semi-colonies. 
Only when the revolution failed to spread in the West did he 
look to the East for new sources of support.
Thus, despite any inconsistencies noted above, Lenin's 
major writings locate the period of imperialism after 1898. The 
expansion of capitalism on a world scale had been only a minor 
issue for Marx's research, since he took it to be an inherent 
outcome of the movement of capitalist forces in the world 
market.18 Nor did he or Engels apply themselves extensively to
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the implications of a developing world-market, such as the role 
of the state, or the competition of national capitalists. In 
fact, they had concentrated on working out the innermost 
organization of ’classic' capitalism in Great Britain.
On the basis of his own study of Marx's abstract analysis, 
Lenin came to the conclusion that all the fundamental laws were 
still valid - the law of surplus value, the law of the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall, the impoverishment of the 
proletariat, the theory of centralization and concentration of 
capital, and the theory of crisis. The exception was that 
laissez-faire competitive capitalism had changed into monopoly 
capitalism. This prompted him to introduce five complementary 
tendencies to the analysis of capitalism in general: (I) the
concentration and centralization of both production and 
capital, involving the creation of monopolies as a decisive 
feature of economic life; (2) the fusion of banking and 
industrial capital in finance capital, with the formation of a 
new finance'^oligarchy; (3) the growing importance of capital 
exports as opposed to commodity exports; (4) the formation of 
international monopolist capitalist combines dividing the world 
among themselves; (5) the territorial division of the world 
among great capitalist powers.19 At the heart of these processes 
- and here, perhaps, is the most original element in Lenin's 
analysis - is the newly increased weight of competition between 
countries, which now becomes the engine driving the bourgeois 
economy.
Interspersed throughout Imperialism: The Highest Stage of
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Capitalism are definitions in line with this analysis. Thus he
wrote of imperialism as "the domination of finance capital,20
"the" monopoly stage of capitalism",21 "the partitioning of the
world, and the exploitation of other countries",22 "an enormous
‘surplus of capital' has arisen in the advanced countries",23
"parasitic or decaying capitalism",24 "capitalism in transition,
or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism."25
For Lenin therefore capitalism had fulfilled its
historical task, it was now 'moribund'; capitalist competition
had played a progressive role but eventually created monopolies
and thus laid the basis for direct state intervention:
the capitalism of giant trusts, syndicates, and 
cartels . . . introduced the beginnings of state- 
controlled capitalist production, combining the 
colossal power of capitalism with the colossal power 
of the state into a single mechanism and bringing 
tens of millions of people within the single 
organization of state capitalism.26
However, this was now combined with a desperate 
reactionary attempt to avert a restructuring of the system. 
Production 'fwas becoming social, so to speak, whilst 
appropriation of profits remained private.27 Lenin argued that 
monopolies per se had a tendency to retard innovation, since 
monopoly profit thrives on restriction rather than expansion 
and on price maintenance rather than cost reduction.— He 
qualified this picture of 'stagnation and decay' by arguing 
that reductions in the cost of production could generate 
innovative change and that, although capitalism as a whole was 
decaying, this did not preclude periods of rapid growth.28
Nevertheless, he argued that as monopolies dominated the
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market and price-competition decreased internally, the home
market acted less and less as a stimulus to innovation and
accumulation. Yet monopolies were in competition with each
other and as they had to divide the world for a share of the
market to realize profits, any division at the turn of the
century would mean redivision and thus war.29 The lessons to be
drawn by the workers' movement were spelt out in the clearest
of terms. Thus in his 'Material on the Revision of the Party
Programme', Lenin wrote:
The extremely high level of development which world 
capitalism in general has attained, the replacement 
of free competition by monopoly capitalism, the fact 
that banks and the capitalist associations have 
prepared the machinery for the social regulation of 
the process of production and distribution of 
products, the rise in the cost of living and 
increased oppression of the working class by the 
syndicates, due to the growth of capitalist 
monopolies, the tremendous obstacles standing in the 
way of the proletariat's economic and political 
struggle, the horrors, misery, ruin, and 
brutalisation caused by imperialist war - all these 
factors transform the present stage of capitalist 
development into an era of proletarian socialist 
revolution.30 
(
Although Marx and Engels did not employ the concept of • 
'imperialism' as it was used by Lenin, we shall try to show in 
what follows that there is a powerful connection between their 
analysis of capitalism in the nineteenth century and Lenin's 
fully fledged theory of imperialism. Given that they were 
mainly interested in socioeconomic developments in Britain, 
France and Germany, as well as Russia in later years, all their 
work on extra-European regions has to be understood as a means 
for them to comprehend capitalism at home.
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(ii) Monopoly Capitalism - The Economic Aspect of Imperialism
(a) Structural Changes
In elucidating the shift from laissez-faire competitive 
capitalism to a capitalism characterized by monopolies, Lenin 
quoted extensively from 'non-suspect' bourgeois sources which 
showed that concentration had increased immensely since Marx 
and Engels had first taken up the subject. This was accompanied 
by increasingly direct intervention by the banks in the 
organization of economic life, and a parallel reduction in the 
importance of the stock exchange.31 The laws of capitalism led 
to concentration and centralization, a factor which Marx had 
discussed in Capital. Capital centralization (or oligopolic 
dominance of each market sector by a small number of firms) and 
concentration (mergers and amalgamation into larger capitalist 
firms) led to that structure of capitalism which Lenin called 
monopoly capitalism. This term denoted the dominance of larger 
capital units, cartels, trusts, etc. rather than monopoly in 
its literal sense.32
Owing to the rising organic composition of capital, with 
huge investment outlays in plant and machinery, production 
became profitable only for larger and larger amounts of 
capital, and the tendential fall in the rate of profit 
therefore strengthened the tendency towards concentration. The 
fusion of banking and industrial capital in 'finance capital' 
was symptomatic of the fact that capitalism had become
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'overripe'33 and could no longer find sufficient areas for 
profitable investment. The resulting change from the export of 
manufactured goods, asounder colonial capitalism, to the export 
of money capital was not a matter of choice but a deeply rooted 
structural necessity flowing from tendencies within the 
capitalist mode of production itself.
(b) Under-consumption or the Falling Rate of Profit
As we have seen, Marx and Engels were opposed to any 
underconsumptionist analysis of capitalist crisis, which they 
regarded as epiphenomenal, and referred instead to the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall as the underlying mechanism in 
this respect. This is therefore an important issue for an 
understanding of Lenin's approach. While Brewer34 is right in 
showing that Lenin introduced 'underconsumptionist' elements 
into his analysis, this was only intended to explain the export 
of capital at one level. Lenin was certainly aware that the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall acted to spur the export 
of capital even at the cost of the collapse of capitalism. 
Brewer goes on to recommend a fresh look at Lenin's earlier 
works, like The Development of Capitalism in Russia, in order 
to solve the problem. In his debates with the narodniks about 
the necessity of a capitalist stage in Russia, Lenin was of the 
opinion that "the question of a foreign market has absolutely 
nothing to do with the question of the realization (emphasis in 
the orginial)"35 of surplus value.
109
When transposed to 1916, this appears to address the 
accumulation problem within capitalism - the problem of 
investing surplus capital with the resulting concentration of 
production and centralization of capital - which had given rise 
to imperialism. If constant capital (c) and variable capital 
(v) can be kept low, then the rate of profit (surplus value 
divided by c and v) will in turn be high. But as the organic 
composition of capital rises with the proportion of constant 
capital, the quest for profits or super-profits constantly 
leads the capitalist to innovate in order to gain an advantage 
over other industrialists. When such innovations become common 
knowledge and the initial advantage is wiped out, the entire 
manoeuvre begins anew. It was from this rising organic 
composition of capital that Marx had identified the tendency of 
the rate of profit to fall as the fundamental cause of 
capitalist crisis. According to Lenin, the problem is not 
underconsumption, which might be countered with conquering a 
new (foreigh.) market. Underconsumption is only one element in 
the whole process of capitalism. "A foreign market is needed 
because it is inherent in capitalist production to strive for 
unlimited expansion - unlike the old modes of production, which
were limited to the village community, ..., to the tribe   or
state (emphasis in the original)”.36
Individual capitals, even when united in monopoly capital, 
seek to avoid the tendency of the rate of profit to fall by 
finding ways of reaping a surplus profit over and above the 
average profit. The routes to this super-profit are many and
110
various, including wage reductions, the introduction of new and 
more efficient machinery, or relocation where raw materials, 
wages or land are cheaper or where capital does not find a 
competitor of the same quality and there exists an opening for 
investment.37
Thus, capitalism in the form of imperialism attempts to 
avert crisis by expanding to regions where the organic 
composition of capital is lower. In the end, however, for Lenin 
as for Marx and Engels, super-profits were only temporary 
bonuses up to the moment when other capitalists eroded the 
competitive advantage on which they were based and gave a new 
twist to the profit spiral. Lenin’s analysis of imperialism 
rests on this anarchic character of capitalist production and, 
at the most general level, can be deduced from it.
Harry Magdoff objected to attempts to find one prime 
mover, whether ’’the drive to export pressured by a surplus of 
capital; or the declining rate of profit, or the inability to 
realize sufplus value within existing capital markets; or 
imperialist expansion as the way out of crises.*’38 Lenin, 
however, did not fall prey to such a mono-causal approach. In 
fact, the criticism that may be justly levelled at him is of 
another kind. Thus, we might agree with Schroeder that Lenin 
was not sufficiently rigorous in locating the necessity of 
monopolist-imperialist expansion.39 We should add that when he 
was writing Imperialism, Lenin was not in fact directly 
confronted with a crisis of realization, as an economic 
conjuncture, but with a crisis in the form of war between
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capitalist states. At the core of the dynamic was the passing 
of the earlier competitive and progressive phase of capitalism 
into a higher monopoly phase, marked by predatory warfare among 
the new magnets of capital, by restriction and probably by
stagnation.
On the vexed question of underconsumption, we may sum up
Lenin's argument as follows. Capitalism is an international
mode of production, determined not simply by the exchange of
surplus goods that individual producers do not need themselves, 
but by the domination of exchange at the very heart of the 
logic of production. As compulsive accumulation and the quest 
for profits constantly create more advanced means of 
production/ the need to find new areas of consumption becomes a 
vital necessity. These may appear in the national market itself 
- through, for example, the creation of new needs - or they may 
be developed externally. The necessary extension of the 'circle 
of production' and the 'circle of consumption', as Marx called 
it, would be carried out wherever the conditions for profit- 
making were most favourable. In the colonies, capitalism would 
avail itself of particular conditions for maintaining or, if 
possible, increasing the rate of profit. Thus, although 
underconsumption in the metropolis is an important element., in 
the development of imperialism, it cannot be regarded as the 
underlying cause. Underconsumption is ultimately an adjustable 
matter of low wages - as social reformers and far-sighted 
capitalist strategists came to understand in the course of the 
twentieth century. For Lenin, however, the cause of imperialism
112
lay in the very way in which production was organized under 
capitalism, and capitalist relations of production had to be 
transformed in a revolution to overcome the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall.
Consequently, capitalism could not be saved, as the 
contradiction between social production and the individual 
character of appropriation and the contradiction between 
constant and variable capital were part and parcel of 
capitalism. Only a drastic approach could prevent the ever 
recurring crises and misery they entailed for the vast majority 
of the population. No different was Lenin's final judgement 
about attempts to overcome imperialism on the basis of the 
existing social system: "Colonial policies and imperialism are 
not unsound but curable disorders of capitalism ... they are an 
inevitable consequence of the very foundations of capitalism."40
(c) State capitalism, Nation-states and Internationalization
of Capital
Lenin's definition of imperialism as a stage in the 
development of capitalism should not be taken to imply that the 
nation-state had become superfluous, but rather that it was the 
firm basis for movement towards the colonies.41
As we have seen, Marx and Engels supported free trade and 
the necessary expansion of capitalism but did not emphasize 
that this would lead to clashes between competing countries and 
thus to an increase in international conflict. By Lenin's time
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this expansionist drive had incorporated all parts of the 
world. The 'world economy', to use a fashionable phrase, had 
become fully interdependent, on the basis of an 
internationalization of capital made possible by the growing 
number of monopolies seeking higher profit margins in the 
colonies. Finance capital, in Lenin's view, was continually 
striving to extend the frontiers of its monopolistically 
dominated area. The accompanying national regulation and 
lessening of competition were complemented by international 
tension, leading inevitably to war between imperialist nations 
over the redivision of the colonies. A further reason for war 
was the sole support and connection between the state apparatus 
and the monopolies, so that neo-mercantilism was tending to 
shut out foreign goods through the erection of high tariff 
walls, customs duties and subsidies for home industries as 
described by Friedrich List, as well as introducing repressive 
'social-imperialist' legislation.42
However, Lenin not only emphasized the urgency of
K
revolution - to prevent barbarism and wars - but also pointed 
to the highly organized economic life that accompanied the rise 
of monopoly capital. World capitalism which in the 1860s and 
1870s was an advanced and progressive force of free competition 
and which at the beginning of the twentieth century grew into 
monopoly capitalism (i.e. imperialism), took a big step forward 
during the First World War, not only towards greater 
concentration under the aegis of finance capital and the state, 
but also towards strengthening the objective basis for
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socialism. Capitalism had exhausted its progressive potential, 
while the monopolies had made socialism feasible by simplifying 
the rationalization of production. Thus, monopoly capitalism 
was leading to a kind of 'organized' or 'state' capitalism 
which, to Lenin and others, extended and strengthened the 
objective basis for socialism by introducing an element of 
planning into the national economy.43 However, since this 
growing fusion of state and economy went together with a sharp 
intensification of competition and militarism on the 
international level, the proletariat had to push for a 
socialist revolution to avoid a barbaric war, the 
responsibility for which would be all too apparent.
The final stage of capitalism, then, most clearly to be 
observed in European countries, was a dialectical unity of 
destructive and potentially regenerative elements. As Marx and 
Engels had written in their own time, the bourgeoisie was 
creating its own grave-diggers in the shape of the proletariat.
Although Lenin's analysis centred on Europe, this contradictory
<
progression/regression held a special meaning for the colonies 
(and later for Mao), as became obvious after the revolution in 
Russia. We shall return to this point later, but it should be 
stressed here that the fierce intensification of international 
rivalry and conflict, which to some extent displaced 
competition from the now regulated arena of national 
capitalism, meant that whole nations were becoming competitors 
for profits on a world scale. As industrializing countries 
reached the monopoly stage of capitalism, they too would enter
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the world arena searching for the means to reverse the tendency
of the rate of profit to fall.
The growing importance of the banks in imperialist
capitalism came about as more and more countries in Europe (and
the United States) industrialized faster and faster. Through
this process industrial capitalists accumulated vast amounts of
money behind the national protectionist shields which they
could, had they wished, have handed out to the proletariat.
Evidently capitalism was about profits not about equitable
sharing, and so this surplus money found its way into the banks
to be invested, not in the home market but in the colonies.
The export of capital influences and greatly 
accelerates the development of capitalism in those
countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, 
the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to 
arrest development in the capital-exporting 
countries, it can only do so by expanding and 
deepening the further development of capitalism 
throughout the world.44
As capitalism incorporated all parts of the world, this
'safety-valve' against the fall of the rate of profit would
sooner or la'ter close. Capitalism needed constant extension of
production,45 a point made earlier by Marx and Engels, the new
type of capitalism, i.e. imperialism needed the export of
capital.
If capitalism could solve its problems of production, 
consumption and profitability in the home market, then 
imperialism would be an aberration, an atavism, a welcome but 
not necessary source of additional profits. This would mean 
that Kautsky's 'ultra-imperialist' thesis was right, and that 
socialist revolution was not a necessity for the workers'
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movement. Had underconsumption been the essential reason for 
capitalism's crisis, then Hobson's proposal for an all-round 
increase in wages would indeed have gone a long way to avoiding 
a revolution. Lenin tried to refute this thesis in his book.46 
He argued that the solution lay with the radical change of 
capitalism. Only a revolution could save people from war and 
exploitation. For this, however the working class had to be 
willing to change capitalism.
(iii) The Concept of Labour Aristocracy
The special profiteering by the English workers (or some 
of them) of colonial exploitation and the consequent 
opportunistic tendencies was generalized at first by Lenin at 
the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907. An 
increase in (wages, made possible by imperialism and fought for 
by trade unions, helped to overcome political crises and 
increased demand by the proletariat, which was important for 
production and profits. This idea was then further developed by 
Lenin, who felt that events at the outbreak of the war had 
proved him right, noting the tendency of imperialism "to split 
the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause 
temporary decay in the working-class movement ..."47 He observed 
that capitalists with profits squeezed from foreign labour 
purchased working-class reformism in Europe. In developing this
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concept, Lenin saw himself as defending the socialist movement 
against two influences: on the one side the Mensheviks, with 
their emphasis on trade-union work; and on the other, the 
German Social Democrats with their belief in reform and legal 
change within the system.
The era of monopoly capitalism was, according to Lenin, a 
time of immense change and contradiction but also of openings 
for socialist revolution. The nationalization of production in 
'organized capitalism', with an increased interventionist role 
for the state, indicated the 'technical' possibility for 
socialism. But this stage of capitalism was also characterized 
by stagnation, decadence, and violence. Revolution would not 
come about by reliance on 'historical laws'; rather, the 
vanguard party had a duty to intervene and mobilize the 
proletariat when economic conditions and preparations of the 
masses made a revolution possible.48
However, Lenin detected a stratum of the working class 
which was not prepared to risk the overthrow of the capitalist 
system. This stratum obviously had more to lose than just its
chains, and provided the basis for a tendency to reformism and
opportunism in the labour movement, which "does not exist by 
coincidence but is economically founded".49 This tendency found 
its highest expression, despite the resolutions of the Basle 
(1912) and Stuttgart (1907) Congress of the Second
International, in the 'Burgfriedenspolitik' or policy of civil 
peace which eventually led all the Social Democratic parties of 
Western Europe to vote for war credits in August 1914. For
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Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks, this was a logical outcome of
the effect of imperialist ideology and participation by parts
of the proletariat in the imperialist profits made in the
colonies. The integrative effect of social imperialism is shown
in the case of Bismarck's Germany by Hans-Ulrich Wehler.50
Thus, despite its thesis that national working classes
were merely units of a universal working class, the Second
International in practice became the defender of the national
interests of specific classes within particular nation-states.
Lenin tried to show that through an accumulation of colonial
super-profits, West European capital was able to bribe parts of
the proletariat and thereby lessen socio-economic conflict and
the danger of an overthrow of the system. This stratum of the
proletariat became the 'watchdogs' of capitalism, the corruptor
of the working-class movement.51 Indeed, in the 1920 German and
French preface to Imperialism, Lenin argued that the
bourgeoisie accumulates a double profit by exploiting its
proletariat (and the colonies, as shown in the previous chapter,
a point also made earlier by Marx and Engels:
... the labour aristocracy ... are the real agents of 
the bourgeoisie in the working class movement, the 
labour lieutenants of the capitalist class, real 
vehicles of reformism and chauvinism (emphasis in the 
original) .52
Exploitation was for Lenin not merely an internal affair. The 
labour aristocracy took part in exploiting the "hundreds of 
millions of non-civilized people".53 Exploitation thus became an 
issue of whole nations against whole nations, an issue to which 
I will return in detail later.
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With his concept of the labour aristocracy, Lenin was able 
after 1917 not only to give indications as to why the socialist 
revolution had occurred in backward Russia and to explain the 
opportunist social-chauvinist participation of sections of the 
working class in the war, but also to justify theoretically his 
support for anti-imperialist movements and revolutionary 
subjects in colonies and semi-colonies. Furthermore, it enabled 
him to explain that, because of increased exploitation in the 
colonies to bribe European workers, there would be anti­
imperialist sentiments and struggles in the colonies
themselves. Here again, we find the argument that capitalism 
creates its own contradictions. By generalizing the concept of 
labour aristocracy, Lenin advanced the case that imperialism 
creates the conditions for its own disappearance. His 
development of the concept of labour aristocracy is a 'better' 
solution for an understanding of the imperialist attitudes of 
the working class as he attributes its ideology to material 
interest (of the working class leadership) but it exonerates
t;
the majority of the proletariat from enjoying any objective
benefit from imperialism, something which Marx and Engels did 
not.
This is not to say that Lenin believed a proletarian
revolution in Western Europe was impossible. Indeed, he never 
abandoned his wartime position that imperialist barbarism would 
open the eyes of the European proletariat and draw a line 
between true Marxist revolutionaries and the opportunist social 
chauvinists and reformist social imperialists undermining the
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role of the labour aristocracy. Nevertheless, in the early 
1920s there was a clear shift in his thinking towards the 
colonies as socialist revolution failed to materialize in the 
West. Economic progress in the West would now be paralleled by 
progress in consciousness in the colonies, which was 
characterized by a three-sided class struggle between an 
autocracy, oligarchy or comprador bourgeoisie, and the national 
bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry.
(iv) Violence and War
As we have seen, there were various reasons why Lenin 
wrote his essay and other articles on imperialism. One was the 
economic form of capitalism at the turn of the century, another 
was the reformism of the Second International and labour 
aristocracy. A further obvious reason, to which we have alluded 
at various points, was the outbreak of the First World War, and 
the question of what attitude Social Democracy should take 
towards it.
The decadence of capitalism, caused by over-ripeness, and 
the violence generated through rivalry, uneven development and 
redivision of the world, were both effects of the monopolistic 
form of capitalism.54 Therefore, the war of 1914-18 was 
"imperialist ... on the part of both sides".55 If the war was 
the inevitable result of the clash of irreconcilable rival 
national bourgeoisies of the industrial countries, then this
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meant that the war could not be a war for the workers. Hence 
the obligation to turn the war between nations into a world war 
between classes.
Owing to the superabundance of capital in the advanced 
countries and the impediments to further investment in the 
protected and highly cartelized home sphere, such a system, 
according to Lenin, was characterized by expansionism - in 
particular by export of capital, which in turn became the basis 
for a division of the world between the great powers. Any 
division, however, was temporary; capitalism developed unevenly 
(see Section E on Uneven Development below) and as the relative 
parts grew at different rates, pressure mounted for a re­
division. Thus violence and the threat of war were built into 
the very structure of monopoly capitalism. Plainly, the 
imperialist war is symptomatic of contradictions between the 
great development of productive forces, the increasingly social 
character of production and the mode of production which
remains limited by the narrow limits of private ownership. In
<
The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels had already written 
that one of the bourgeoisie's principal means of overcoming 
commercial crises was by the conquest of new markets undertaken 
at the risk of provoking national wars of competition for the 
control of scarce overseas markets.56
Also in Imperialism, Lenin argued that imperialist wars, 
being an "absolutely inevitable" symptom of the "internal 
contradictions" of the world capitalist system in its final 
stage, would provide the necessary "objective" historical
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conditions for world revolution.57 By breaking up the old order, 
in a last-ditch attempt to arrest the progress of history and 
hold back socialist revolution, such wars would actually speed 
up history and facilitate the birth of a new social order.58
In pre-monopolistic times dominant classes led wars to 
conquer (and exclude trade competitors from) markets, colonies 
and sources of raw materials. During the imperialist stage of 
capitalism, war was used by the monopoly bourgeoisie to re­
divide the world from time to time, as a result of the shifting 
balance of power among imperialist countries. These wars were 
in Lenin’s view unjust and reactionary, and deserved no support 
whatever from the working-class movement. Wars were just only 
if they led to liberation from colonial or national oppression 
or to the emancipation of exploited and oppressed classes. The 
attitude of Marx and Engels concerning wars had been similar to 
their attitude towards nationalism. Anything that weakened 
reaction was welcomed, anything that helped the revolution was
to be supported.59 Lenin took a similar view at the time of the
<
Russian-Japanese war, but the only positive element he could 
find in the 1914-18 war was the possibility of transforming it 
from an imperialist war between peoples into a revolutionary 
civil war.60
Since cooperation among capitalist states (as envisaged by 
Kautsky and Hobson) could not last, imperialist war was 
inevitable as long as the capitalist system remained in place. 
Nevertheless, the question remained as to why internal 
competition between capitalists should not lead to civil armed
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conflict, while rivalry on an international level necessarily 
did so. Clearly this has much to do with the state-capitalist 
development at the heart of the imperialist stage of 
capitalism. In the new form of competition, nation-states were 
more and more directly pitted against each other on the world 
market, so that competition which had led on the home market to 
the economic elimination of individual capitalists now took the 
form of attempts to make whole national capitalist systems 'go 
to the wall'.
All imperialist countries were involved in this war to 
plunder foreign colonies, to subjugate new areas for exploit­
ation and to quash other imperialist rivals, because war was by 
then part of that stage of capitalist development. In Lenin's 
view, imperialist war would not only expose the reformists in 
the Social Democratic Parties but also heighten the 
consciousness of the European proletariat. For the barbarism of 
the war "... brought the whole of humanity to an impasse, that
placed it in a dilemma: either allow the destruction of more
<
millions of lives and utterly ruin European civilisation, or 
hand over power in all (emphasis in original) the civilised 
countries to the revolutionary proletariat to carry through the 
socialist revolution."61
Since war could only ever be overcome through socialism, 
Lenin demanded at the Zimmerwald conference in 1915 that the 
Social Democratic Parties should turn imperialist war between 
the peoples into a civil war between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie.66 This encouraged him to work actively for the
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founding of the Third International (1919) and to sign the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, even though not only his own comrades 
but others too complained about the harsh terms. In his 
opinion, the war had brought nearer the revolution in Europe, 
and especially Germany. After the successful Bolshevik 
revolution the issue of the 'inevitability of war* took a new 
turn, as it became possible for Lenin to argue with reference 
to a concrete state that the impetus to war came from 
imperialist capitalism and was alien to the new socialist 
order.62
(v) Uneven and Combined Development
As discussed above, capitalism developed unevenly, leading 
at times to the occupation of colonies and attempts by 
latecomers to re-divide the existing order. It is this uneven
development (which is central to Lenin's thinking about Russia
<
and later the colonies. His concept of uneven development 
leading to combined development later gave Mao a conceptual 
underpinning for his attempt to create the revolution in China. 
"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law 
of capitalism,"63 wrote Lenin in 1915. He seems to assign as 
much importance to his law of uneven development as does Marx 
to his general laws of capitalist accumulation. This law of 
uneven development, with its complementary 'combined 
development', was important for Lenin in several respects: it
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explained internally varying rates of growth and temporal 
incongruities among different elements of social life, as well 
as the social turmoil inherent in the competition of capitals. 
Internationally, it accounted for the different levels of 
development among capitalist countries such as Great Britain 
and Germany and the tension arising from this difference; and 
also for the way in which colonies were integrated into the 
imperialist economy and the impact of expanding capitals on the 
social formations in colonies. Uneven development was the root 
of the development of a comprador bourgeoisie and, as we shall 
see, it underlaid the question of anti-imperialist alliances in 
the colonies.
Combined development involved two different kinds of 
struggles in backward countries: on the one hand, the
proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and on the other the 
bourgeoisie against the feudal landlords, relics of pre­
capitalist relations and the comprador bourgeoisie. According
to this concept of combined development, these two class
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struggles existed simultaneously in the colonies, so that two 
revolutions had to be fought out at the same time. In his 
Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin showed that 
capitalism existed there and had created the proletariat as a 
revolutionary agent. The narodniks not only wanted to preserve 
the village community and pass directly into a socialist form 
of society based on the peasantry; they also believed that 
capitalism was not developing within Russia but moving across 
the frontiers into foreign countries. However, according to
126
Lenin:
In the face of uneven development particular to 
capitalism one branch of production surpasses another 
one and strives beyond the limits of the old area of 
economic relations. The manufacturers need the market 
at once and if backwardness narrows aspects of the 
market of the national economy of the old area then 
they will search for a market in another area or in 
another country or in colonies of the old areas.64
It is, in fact, this analysis of the uneven development of
capitalism as seen internally in Russia that is used by Lenin
for his analysis of the uneven development of monopoly
capitalism on an international level. So interdependent are
these two factors that it can be said that his unevenness
actually leads both to imperialist competition and to increased
state control and intervention. For Lenin this law connects the
reason for expansion with the inevitable danger of war and the
attitude towards the anti-imperialist alliance in colonies.
The general reasons for uneven development lay in the
anarchy of the market and the ultimately disorganized nature of
capitalism. But the precise way in which the productive forces
(
developed at“different speeds in different parts of the economy 
depended on certain physical and historical elements in the 
country in question. As capitalist accumulation accelerated and 
expanded in areas previously untouched by advanced features of 
capitalism - whether in England or Germany, Europe or the 
colonies - these new regions were rapidly integrated, taken 
over and adapted. This gave a new shape to the social 
formation, and on an international level it also generated new 
contradictions between the old and new features of capitalism.
This could be seen, for example, in the case of England.
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England possessed a monopoly in world trade and commodity 
production and colonies at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, but when capitalism expanded, at first in other 
European countries, this monopoly was undermined and tensions 
developed among capitalist countries. This repeated itself in 
the move to colonies. More countries searched for their 'place 
in the sun' and it came to conflicts with England and among 
other aspiring imperialist countries.
However, while 'uneven development* may be seen as the 
'world system' side of the coin, involving unevenness among 
social units within an international totality, the concept of 
'combined development' referred to the ways in which these 
international elements combined in the internal situation of a 
particular country. Combination in this context meant that 
backward and advanced elements were combined in- a single social 
formation, and that the eventual revolution there would be of 
an accordingly combined nature. In the colonies the bourgeoisie
was in constant struggle with feudal elements on the one side
<
and the proletariat on the other. Even though this struggle 
with the proletariat might be subdued for sometime - as was 
envisaged in the strategy of the Second Comintern Congress 
(1920) - the political situation in these societies was
nevertheless very volatile. As the bourgeoisie was too weak to 
assume even the tasks of the 'bourgeois revolution', leadership 
of the revolution in the colonies, as in Russia, would fall on 
the shoulders of the proletariat. We shall see in the next 
section what the implications were for the nature of that
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revolution.
In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that the concept 
of uneven and combined development explains the tension,
frequently leading to war between one or more dominant 
imperialist powers and the ascending imperialist countries. It 
is also relevant for analysis of the articulation of various 
modes of production within particular social formations created 
in the colonies, of the subsequent contradictions between
classes in that specific colony, and that of the bloc of anti­
imperialist forces that is historically feasible.
(vi) Skipping Historical Stages
It will be remembered from the last chapter that Marx did 
not foreclose the possibility of a direct transition to 
socialism in Russia, without the necessity of passing through a 
capitalist stage. By the end of the century, however, when 
Lenin was engaged in debate with the narodniks, capitalism was 
spreading throughout Russian society and tending to dissolve 
the village community that Marx had foreseen as a possible
basis for revolutionary change. Lenin however now emphasized 
the superiority of capitalist development, for all its manifest 
cruelties.65
Nevertheless, it was a peculiarly uneven kind of 
development that was taking place. The impact of capitalism 
both increased the process of industrialization in Russia and
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weakened the indigenous Russian bourgeoisie, which could not 
develop its own strength because of the weight of foreign 
capital within the economy. Moreover, capitalism in Russia was 
confronted with two problems: the traditional forces within
industry, and the greater efficiency of manufactured imports 
from advanced countries in the West.
Lenin came to the conclusion in his The Development of 
Capitalism in Russia that capitalism no longer played the 
clear-cut role of destruction and regeneration foreseen by Marx 
and Engels. Because of the added complications with the 
development of indigenous capitalism, the possibilities of 
intervening in this process had widened. Although Russia 
remained a mainly agricultural country, there was a small but 
strong and centralized proletariat which at a very early stage, 
had given rise to a well-organized Social Democratic Party. 
After 1905 Lenin's thinking on this question underwent a 
further evolution and, in his theory of the 'democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry', he emphasized<
much more strongly the incapacity of the Russian bourgeoisie to 
carry out the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and 
developed the concept of a vanguard party that would fulfil 
these tasks in its stead.
Nevertheless, in line with the thesis of Marx and Engels 
that no social order disappears before it has developed all the 
productive forces that it contains within it as a potentiality, 
he continued to believe that the political hegemony of the 
proletariat and peasantry within the national revolution would
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be accompanied by the growth of a capitalist bourgeoisie that 
had been held back by the Tsarist autocracy. After the February 
Revolution in 1917, the idea rapidly takes shape of skipping a 
stage and passing directly to the socialist revolution. Since 
the Russian bourgeoisie was incapable of acting as a 
revolutionary class and 'sweeping away' all the remnants of the 
past, the task of organizing the new order was passing to the 
proletariat, according to Lenin.66
Even then, however, Lenin followed Marx and Engels in 
arguing that an industrial base was necessary for the 
construction of a socialist society. His idea of a 'continuous 
revolution* which continued the bourgeois and socialist 
revolutions, was more of a political strategy concerned with 
classes and class alliances.67 Economic conditions in Russia 
were in no way ready for socialism, especially before.there had 
been a socialist revolution in Western Europe. Socialism could 
not triumph there directly and immediately.
While ''objective conditions created by the imperialist 
war" were leading to proletarian revolutions in "all the 
civilized countries", only accidental historical circumstances 
had placed the Russian proletariat in the vanguard "for a 
certain, perhaps very short, time (emphasis in original)".68
In the end however the revolution in Russia remained 
isolated; the expected revolutions in Europe did not happen. 
This had two consequences for Lenin's thinking. First, the 
Soviet Union came forward as a model for other backward nations 
of how to free oneself from imperialist relations and implement
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industrialization. As there was now a socialist country in the 
world - one, moreover, which included the form of peasant 
soviets - this country could help other backward peoples to 
profit from this development and to jump over the capitalist 
stage.
Jack Woddis, indeed, claims that one of Lenin's most 
creative changes was his concept of colonies by-passing the 
stage of capitalist development.69
This in my opinion must be understood in the context of 
(a) the 'Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial 
Questions' at the Second Comintern Congress (1920) and the 
famous debate between Lenin and the Indian Communist M. N. 
Roy;70 (b) the disappointments following the lack of revolution 
in the West; and (c) the attempt to find new hope and allies in 
colonies for the survival of the young socialist republic, 
issues which will be discussed later on.
There remained a second, thornier problem: was socialism
possible inf just one country? Lenin developed the idea of
<•
combined revolutions which, at different stages and in 
different forms, would have a cumulative effect at world level. 
Already in 1915, as mentioned above, in an article entitled The 
United States of Europe Slogan, he argued that uneven economic 
and political development "is an absolute law of capitalism. 
Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or 
even in one capitalist country alone."71
This victory was possible not just in a highly 
industrialized country, but in a country where the
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contradictions of capitalism reached their greatest tension.
For the reasons we have already discussed - feudal remnants of
Tsarism, weakness of the bourgeoisie, negative influence of
foreign capital on indigenous capitalism - the weakest link in
the capitalist chain could very well prove to be Russia.
Against the economic determinism of Western European Social
Democrats, he objected:
But what if the peculiar situation drew Russia into 
the world imperialist war in which every more or less 
influential West European country was involved; what 
if the peculiar situation brought her development to 
the verge of the revolutions that were maturing, and 
had partly already begun in the East at a time when 
conditions enabled us to combine 'the peasant war* 
with the working class movement, which no less a 
'Marxist' than Marx himself, in 1856, suggested a 
possible prospect for Prussia?72
Yet how could socialism survive in one country or even in 
a few countries? Internationally it needed a period of peaceful 
co-existence between the two different socio-economic systems. 
Internally, Lenin wrote in one of his last articles 'Better Few 
but Better':
(
If we see to it that the working class retains its 
leadership over the peasantry, we shall be able, by 
exercising the greatest possible thrift in the 
economic life of our state to use every saving we 
make to develop our large-scale machine industry, to 
develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of 
peat, to complete the Volkhov Power Project, etc. . . .
In this and in this alone lies our hope. Only when we 
have done this shall we, speaking figuratively, be 
able to change horses, to change from the peasant, 
muzhik horse of poverty, from the horse of an economy 
designed for a ruined peasant country, to the horse 
which the proletariat is seeking and must seek - the 
horse of large-scale machine industry, of 
electrification, of the Volkhov Power Station, etc.73
However, while Lenin emphasized that one country should
and could begin to build socialism, and he heartily supported
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attempts to create the conditions for building socialism in 
backward countries,74 he did not envisage that socialism could 
be completed in one country alone. The idea that 'the world 
socialist revolution is being delayed' remained the essential 
context of his thinking in Russia, and the most he would say 
was that the Russian revolution would create the most 
favourable conditions for a global socialist revolution, "and 
would, in a sense, start it (emphasis in original)",75 and it 
was not important which other proletariats completed the 
process. The ice had been broken, the road was open, the sparks 
had begun to fly, the way had been shown. Then, in December 
1921, "I do not know whether this is for long, and I do not 
think that anybody can know."76
As we shall see, this contradictory situation came to the 
surface in the Lenin-Roy debate over the interests of world 
revolution and the interest of the Soviet state in ensuring its 
survival. The exploitation of conflicts between capitalist 
countries and the Soviet Union and nationalist revolutions 
against imperialist countries was a tricky business for the 
Soviet leaders as they wanted a period of peaceful co-existence 
to stabilize relations between the Soviet Union and imperialist 
countries.
(vii) The Dialectical Role of the Colonial Areas
In considering the role of colonial areas in Lenin's
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theory of imperialism, we should bear in mind that he started 
by taking up and incorporating Marx's and Engels's old theme of 
the double mission of capitalism, at once destructive and 
regenerative. Although Lenin's main purpose in writing the 
Imperialism essay was to analyze trends in the advanced 
capitalist countries in order to ground an activist (or 
'voluntarist') strategy of socialist revolution in Europe, his 
development of the theory assigned a more creative role to the 
colonies within his general concept of 'combined revolutions', 
than Marx and Engels had ever envisaged. The role of the 
colonies is first and foremost of a dialectical nature. By 
providing new investment possibilities, and offering a cheap 
and abundant supply of labour, raw materials, land and open and 
receptive markets, they function as a safety-valve for a 
capitalism beset by severe crises. Although imperialism may 
stabilize the system for a certain time, ultimately the self­
destructive forces of this mode of production will assert
themselves. ( Imperialism thus points to the end of the
<
capitalist system and the transition to socialism. Lenin's 
conclusion was, as mentioned above, that imperialism would lead 
to "socialization of production."77
These self-destructive forces of capitalism will manifest 
themselves in the contradictions between different capitalist 
countries over the division or re-division of the world, and 
also in the forces released in the colonies that challenge 
capitalism.
Since capitalist imperialism penetrates all corners of the
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world, the question arises as to its precise impact on the 
traditional colonial societies. Essentially agreeing with Marx 
and Engels, though under the new conditions of the export of 
capital, Lenin was also aware of exported capital accelerating 
the development of capitalism in those countries to which it 
was exported. Similarly, Marx saw capitalism as encouraging the 
development of industry and technology, and increasing the 
productivity of labour. In breaking down the economic, social 
and cultural isolation of rural communities, it introduced more 
complex and less backward forms of social organization. In this 
regard, Lenin was again in broad agreement with Marx. It is 
true that Russia had never been colonized and was not in the 
strict sense an Eastern country. But in The Development of 
Capitalism in Russia, Lenin had already made a number of 
observations which are of value for an assessment of capitalism 
in colonies and semi-colonies. He certainly had no problems in 
recognizing the progressiveness of capitalism which is quite 
compatible with a full recognition of its negative and dark 
sides.
But he was also acutely aware of the complex problems 
introduced by the pressure of Western Europe on the bourgeoisie 
in Russia, and by the great and unexpected capacity for 
survival of the traditional structures of Russian society. 
Lenin was analysing a social formation in which he recognized a 
number of modes of production. In terms of scale, feudalism was 
the most important, but in terms of significance capitalism was 
becoming dominant. In The Development of Capitalism, of course,
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Lenin was analysing a country in a pre-monopoly capitalist 
stage. With the advent of monopolies, however, the concept of 
uneven and combined development came to the fore and the 
progressive impact of capitalism had to be seen in a more 
subtle way than the 'double mission' of capitalism.
Marx and Engels had argued that the industrialization 
process occurring under the socio-political relations of 
capitalism was the economic foundation for all revolution, in 
the East as in the West. But monopoly capitalism by its very 
nature was essentially interested in finding new areas for 
investment. This might involve a development of the productive 
forces and new industries, but generally speaking monopoly 
capitalism tended to restrict the colonies to the production of 
mineral and agricultural goods. By the time Lenin came to write 
Imperialism, capitalism was having an uneven and restrictive 
impact on the economies of these extra-European regions.
In his article, written in 1913, Backward Europe and 
Advanced Asia, despite its title, Lenin wrote that it was the 
victory of the European workers which would free both the 
peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia.78 The idea that the 
advanced productive forces of Europe and North America would 
decisively contribute to economic progress in the East remained 
with him throughout his life - either under the management of 
the capitalist corporations or, particularly after the October 
Revolution, through economic collaboration between the 
socialist proletariat of the West and the liberated peoples of 
the East. In other words, there is a tension in Lenin's
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position. Surely the important point is to accept this tension, 
and analyze it in terms of its implications for later 
theorists, in this case for Mao.
(viii) Nationalism and National Liberation Struggles
At more or less the same time that he was preparing and 
writing Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin was 
engaged in an important debate on national self-determination 
and socialist internationalism. However central the demands of 
immediate politics remained for him, Lenin differed from Marx 
and Engels in accepting the right of nations to self- 
determination as a universal historical principle. (This holds 
true even though, in the case of the Soviet Communists, the 
phrase "the right of self-determination" was deleted from the 
Party Programme at the 1917 Party Congress and replaced with 
"right of : secession. ”79) The right of nations to self 
determination was his minimum programme. The maximum programme 
was a socialist world order in which national boundaries and 
national sentiments would dissolve.
As with his attitude to the peasantry, Lenin's revised 
assessment of nationalism was partly due to a realization of 
the role that national movements could play in the overall 
struggle against the Tsarist autocracy. An alliance with them 
was both necessary and possible, but in order to gain their 
support the Bolsheviks had to offer a concrete and attractive
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national programme clarifying the concept of self-determin­
ation. This pragmatism or opportunism, as it has been called 
variously "depending on whether one wishes to praise him or 
blame him”80 is indeed "one of the fundamental characteristics 
in Lenin's paradigm ... is ... a subordination of scientific 
exigencies to those of political activity” .81
As seen earlier, Marx and Engels devoted little time or 
energy to nationalism unless it helped to weaken the power of 
European reaction. In The Communist Manifesto they anticipated 
an end to nation-states: the class with no fatherland would
unite on an international level. Lenin agreed with this as 
something which would happen in the long-term. The overthrow of 
the bourgeoisie would tremendously accelerate the collapse of 
every kind of national particularism. It would not diminish the 
"wealth and variety of humanity, if we are to understand by 
this the wealth and variety of spiritual life, trends of ideas, 
tendencies, shadings".82 Proletarian internationalism by
definition strove to overcome such particularist tendencies as
<
nationalism, racism or religion. At his specific time on a 
world scale the scene is set for thinking not in terms of 
bourgeoisie/proletariat as Marx and Engels did (with the 
concomitant of looking for moves towards an integrated world 
capitalism without nations as the path to world socialism), but 
in terms of the oppressors (bourgeoisie of some countries plus 
their allies) against the oppressed (workers, peasants, etc.).
Curiously, the overriding struggle against Tsarist rule, 
which preoccupied him for most of his life, meant that Lenin's
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theoretical writings on the national question somehow showed a 
greater consistency - and a lesser tendency to polemical or 
conjunctural distortion - than those of Marx and Engels. Thus, 
whereas Marx and Engels had fairly rigid ideas on what enabled 
a nation to form its own identity and nation-state, Lenin 
emphasized the possibility and right of any nation to form its 
own state, whatever its level of historical development or 
’vitality*. After the Revolution, he actively combatted 
tendencies to Great-Russian chauvinism and promoted cultural 
and linguistic autonomy and the development of nationhood and 
national consciousness for most non-Russian peoples. It is true 
that he regarded the establishment of independent nation-states 
from inside the Soviet Union as a step backwards, and the 
Bolsheviks, both Russian and Ukrainian, fought against such a 
course in the Ukraine. More clearly still, the strategic needs 
of securing the survival of the revolution took precedence over 
national self-determination in the case of Georgia. But
although the(? right to secede was never as secure in practice as
<
it was in principle, the policy of genuine respect for the 
rights of non-Russian peoples only came to a halt with forced 
collectivization and the consolidation of Stalin's power.
Kubalkova and Cruikshank claim that the three separate 
slogans, "'the eventual amalgamation of all nations', 
'absolutely direct, unambiguous recognition of the right for 
self-determination', and the 'complete equality of all nations' 
do not easily fit together. It might almost be said that they 
are contradictory".83 They do not succeed in showing, however,
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that this contradiction is rooted in the principles themselves,
rather than in the tension between different forces and stages,
national liberationist and socialist internationalist, which in
the imperialist epoch were present simultaneously in the
political-historical arena. At any event, Lenin never saw a
contradiction in principle between the democratic right of an
oppressed nation to secede and form its own state, and the
socialist principle of centralization and internationalism.
Like Marx and Engels, he strongly believed in the superiority
of large, centrally administered economic units. But only when
democratic national rights had been granted could socialists
discuss with any moral authority, and without being
misunderstood, the problem of whether or not secession was
advisable from an economic and political point of view.
The right of nations to self-determinatnion implies 
exclusively the right to indpendence in the political 
sense, the right to free political separation from 
the oppressor nation. Specifically, this demand for 
political democracy implies complete freedom to 
agitate for secession and for a referendum on 
secession by the seceding nation. This demand,
therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for
separation, fragmentation and the formation of small 
states ... The more democratic a state system and has
complete freedom to secede the less frequent and less
ardent will the desire for separation be in practice, 
because big states afford indisputable advantages, 
both from the standpoint of economic progress and 
from that of the interests of the masses and, 
furthermore, these advantages increase with the 
growth of capitalism ...
The aim of socialism is not only to end the 
division of mankind into tiny states and the 
isolation of nations in any form, it is not only to 
bring the nations closer together but to integrate 
them ... In the same way as mankind can arrive at the 
abolition of classes only through a transition period 
of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, it can 
arrive at the inevitable integration of nations only 
through a transition period of the complete 
emancipation of all oppressed nations, i.e., their
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freedom to secede.84 
This refers to secession from colonial rule, I believe, not 
from a genuinely socialist order. In an age of imperialism 
'freedom to secede' became a progressive slogan.
In his 'Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the Rights 
of Nations to Self-Determination' Lenin drew some interesting 
conclusions. He proposed a division of the world into three 
groups:
(1) "the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe 
and the United States. In these countries progressive 
"bourgeois national movements came to an end long ago" and 
they had become reactionary; (2) Eastern Europe "and 
particularly Russia", where "the twentieth century has 
particularly developed the bourgeois-democratic national 
movements and intensified the national struggle" - here 
the need for proletarian unity was particularly acute; (3) 
the "semi-colonial countries such as China, Persia and 
Turkey, and all the colonies" - here "bourgeois-democratic 
movements either have hardly begun, or have still a long 
way to go" and where the concept of self-determination had 
gained a revolutionary significance.85
What is of special importance here is the dynamic way in which
Lenin saw the issue of nationalism - whether it is positive or
not depends on whether it brings the socialist revolution
closer.
Up to 1919-20 the decisive role in the struggle for 
revolution was reserved for the European proletariat. Lenin had 
earlier supported national movements outside Europe, even if 
this was a rather utilitarian approach in that he was prepared 
to use everything and everybody which might bring the socialist 
revolution forward. Already in 1908, in his article Inflammable 
Material in World Politics, referring to the Turkish and 
Persian revolutions, Lenin had discussed the possibility of
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mobilizing millions and millions of Asiatic proletarians to act 
against their own imperialist oppressors.86 And in several 
articles that he devoted to.,the Chinese revolution in 1912-13, 
'Democracy and Populism in China' (1912), 'Regenerated China' 
(1912), 'Big Achievement of the Chinese Republic' (1913), 
'Cultured Europeans and Barbaric Asians' (1913), Lenin saw the 
'awakening' of Asia as sounding the possibility of colonial 
liberation and the end of the European bourgeoisie. Nationalism 
in the colonies was not essentially a result of the diffusion 
of this idea from Europe, but rather it arose as a response to 
exploitation and oppression, a point emphasized even more 
strongly by Mao. The peoples of the East were now regarded by 
Lenin as 'independent actors', 'builders of new life', whereas 
previously they had been 'objects of international imperialist 
policy, and which for capitalist culture and civilization 
existed only as manure'.87 Writing in 1916 he even considered 
the possibility that the socialist revolution could be sparked 
off by a mutiny in the colonies.88
in writings such as these, Lenin remained faithful to the 
tradition of Marx in that his enthusiasm for national movements 
in the colonies was based on the premise that they would secure 
the conditions for capitalist development: the complete victory 
of commodity production, capture of the home market, political 
unification of territories whose population spoke a single
O Q
language, and so on. However, a difference emerges in that 
Lenin saw the success of the national movement depending on 
separation and independence from European countries. He
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stressed that the colonies were developing an important 
independent role and were no longer purely reactive. Lenin 
thought in this way since he had witnessed the decaying, over­
ripening of capitalism, which Marx and Engels had not. This was 
a new element in the socialist movement, for the Second 
International was mainly Euro-centric in its policies and, even 
after it quietly abandoned Engels's distinction between 
'historic' and 'non-historic peoples', did not consider the 
mobilization of colonial peoples. Kautsky, for instance, denied 
that the struggles of "the savages against civilization are our 
struggles".90 Nevertheless, during this period, Lenin did not 
devote much time to revolutionary movements outside Western 
Europe; as we have seen, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism is overwhelmingly concerned with the revolution in 
Western Europe, and he often repeated his general view that 
revolutionary movements were far more likely to be effective in 
the advanced capitalist countries than in the colonies.
In the years after the October Revolution, and the 
founding of the Communist International, the various strands in 
Lenin's earlier thinking gradually came together in the idea of 
a national liberation movement and the possibility of a 
national democratic revolution in the colonies and semi—  
colonies which would be broadly based in the working class, 
national bourgeoisie and peasantry. This would undermine 
Western European capitalism and the comprador bourgeoisie which 
it had created in the colonial countries. It would not be a 
socialist revolution, as in Russia, but rather a bourgeois
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revolution which would throw off imperialist domination and lay 
the basis for capitalist industrial development. Socialism
would then ensue, either through a continuing revolution or 
through the inherent contradictions of capitalism.
This shift in Lenin's thinking indicates a changed
assessment of the revolution in Russia. The Soviet state was 
now an independent factor in international politics - for
however long its revolutionary isolation continued. Indeed, 
intervention by foreign powers in the Soviet Union forced Lenin 
to take the closest interest in the world outside Russia. He 
pointed out at the Sixth Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of 
Soviets, "from the very beginning of the October Revolution 
foreign policy and international relations has been the main 
question that has been facing us".91
Internally, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was an
expression of this new assessment, while internationally Lenin 
concluded that the masses in the colonies were likely to play a 
more important role in the United Front against the imperialist 
powers, the imperialist bourgeoi'sie and the social 
imperialists. At the First Congress of the Comintern in 1919, 
all attention was focused on the socialist revolution which was 
supposedly at hand in Western countries. The Congress upheld 
the traditional Marxist view that emancipation of the colonies 
was possible only in conjunction with the emancipation of the 
metropolitan working class. The workers and peasants of Annam, 
Algiers and Bengal as well as Persia and Armenia would gain the 
opportunity of independent existence only when the workers of
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England and France had overthrown Lloyd George and Clemenceau
and taken state power into their own hands.92 But in November of
the same year (1919) , Lenin wrote about the position of the
peoples in the East towards imperialism, and he described their
national liberation movements as a factor of central importance
for the socialist revolution. The Congress of the Peoples of
the East, held in Baku in September 1920 strongly confirmed
this creative new role that was being assigned to the colonial
countries.93 From this time on the Western and the Eastern
revolutions were to develop hand in hand.
Only a common victory of the workers of Europe and
America and the toiling masses of Asia and Africa
will bring liberation to all ... Without our revolt
there can be no victory for the world proletariat 
over world capital. And just as you cannot wrest 
power from the hands of the capitalists without us, 
so we are not in a position to hold this power in our 
hands unless we have unity with you.94
More and more one can detect the possibility of the centre for
the world revolution moving from the West to the East. At the
time of the Second Comintern Congress held in 1920, colonial
liberation was no longer considered to be dependent on the
revolution in Western countries, although ultimately the
Western proletariat would play the key role in world
revolution. At the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921 it
was concluded:
It is absolutely clear that in the coming decisive 
battles of the world revolution the movements of the 
majority of the population of the world which was 
originally directed toward national liberation would 
turn against capitalism and imperialism and would 
perhaps play a bigger revolutionary role than we 
accept now.9
When Lenin began to realize that Soviet Russia could point
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a way to liberation and modernization for the colonial and 
semi-colonial countries, he wrote in his last essay (1923) that 
the final victory of socialism would be guaranteed only when 
Russia, China and India - which together formed the great 
majority of the world's population - had succeeded in carrying 
through the revolution. In an interesting counter-position, he 
also contrasted the "counter-revolutionary imperialist West and 
the revolutionary and nationalist East."96 This was certainly 
far from Marx and Engels, who had sought the closer integration 
of these areas into the world capitalist system. Lenin himself, 
commenting on the slogan 'Workers of all countries and all 
oppressed peoples, unite' issued by the Comintern journal The 
Peoples of the East, wrote: "Of course, the modification is
wrong from the standpoint of The Communist Manifesto, but then 
The Communist Manifesto was written under entirely different 
conditions. From the point of present-day politics, however, 
this change is correct".97 Thus it could be argued that he was 
emphasizing less strict class analysis within nation-states 
compared to an analysis of the world situation as a 
contradiction between exploited and exploiting nations.98 As 
monopoly capitalism in Western countries was stagnant and 
decaying, it was possible that it could be broken up by the 
force and vigour of the national revolutionary struggles in 
non-European countries. The centre of gravity for the struggles 
against capital was tending to shift from the centre of the 
system to the periphery. "Real communism can succeed only in 
the West," he said in June 1920 in an interview with a Japanese
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correspondent. But he immediately added: "the West lives on
account of the East; European imperialist powers support 
themselves mainly in Eastern colonies; but they, at the same 
time, are arming and training their colonies; thus, the West is
99digging its own grave in the East."
(ix) Class Alliances in the Colonies: Lenin's Debate with Roy
The tactical question of class alliances in the colonial 
and semi-colonial countries was to be at the heart of one of 
the most important early debates within the Communist 
International, conducted and partially resolved at the Second 
Congress which met in Moscow and Petrograd in July/August 1920. 
Earlier in a pamphlet written in 1914, (The Right of Nations to 
Self-Determination) , Lenin had supported the concept of a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution that would establish a 
capitalist nation-state and allow the antagonistic 
contradictions between capital and labour to develop in the way 
envisaged by Marx and Engels. At the Comintern Congress, Lenin 
recognized the importance of the peasantry, and also of the 
national bourgeoisie insofar as it was still on the side of the 
peasantry and the small proletariat against the imperialist 
exploiters.
In advocating an anti-imperialist alliance with the 
bourgeois-nationalist movements of the East, Lenin was 
motivated not only by what he saw as the potential of these
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movements but also by the need to find allies to relieve the 
isolation of the socialist regime in Russia. He stated: 
"Insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the 
oppressor, we are always, in every case, and more strongly than 
anyone else, in favour, for we are the staunchest and the most 
consistent enemies of oppression (emphasis in original)."100 
Lenin's vision of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie was 
based on a certain analysis of political realities. Unlike in 
Europe, there was a revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie which 
would at least go some of the way in fighting imperialism to 
implement liberal democracy and support capitalist development: 
"Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, 
spreading and gaining in strength. The bourgeoisie there is as 
yet siding with the people against reaction. Hundreds of 
millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom 
(emphasis in original)."101 The ultimate basis for this unified 
national sentiment was the fact that, in the imperialist epoch, 
it was no longer just classes but whole peoples that could be 
said to be exploited by big capital. Talking of a war between 
slaves and slave-holders, he saw himself as addressing millions 
and millions of people who, together with the Soviet regime, 
formed a gigantic majority of the world's population.
On the other side of the debate, the Indian delegate to 
the Second Comintern Congress, M. N. Roy, had come to the 
conclusion that the world revolution no longer depended on the 
Western proletariat, but on the revolution in Asia. Warning 
against the dangers of an alliance with the bourgeoisie in
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these colonial countries, he strove to emphasize the conflict 
between the proletariat and the native bourgeoisie. He 
suspected that the national bourgeoisie would oppose radical 
agrarian reforms and thus would not dare to mobilize the 
peasantry in an anti-imperialist struggle. By overriding class 
analysis, Comintern support for nationalism would undermine 
class struggle for the proletarian revolution as well. After 
all, he argued, the bourgeoisie was a weak class because 
capitalism had been implanted from the outside. Roy's and 
another delegate Sneevliet's (Maring's) strategy was based on 
the idea that these were 'Asian Societies', that is the 
bourgeoisie was a class implanted by and dependent on Western 
capitalism.
In the end it was Lenin's position that largely carried 
the day. But he adopted the suggestion of Roy that the 
proletariat should only work together with a truly
revolutionary nationalist bourgeoisie, the "white blackbird" as
102Claudin has called it, and not with any bourgeois groups. Roy 
also won the concession that Communists should retain their 
independent organization and not merge with any other group, 
even though this was precisely what the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) did not do in 1924 when allied with the Kuomintang (KMT) . 
This clearly indicated that although the Communists were 
interested in a temporary alliance with the bourgeoisie and the 
peasantry against imperialism, their ultimate intention was to 
take up the internal class struggle on new terrain. The point 
would not be lost on the leaders of the KMT in China. Indeed,
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in 1920 some of the problems ahead were already becoming 
apparent in Turkey, where Lenin supported Ataturk's 
nationalist, anti-imperialist government even though it was 
persecuting Turkish Communists. In principle, however, Lenin's 
idea was that the Communist Party in such countries could act 
as in a relay race and eventually take over from the local 
bourgeoisie in an uninterrupted revolution that would result in 
socialism. His two-stage conception of the revolution was as 
follows: first, a bourgeois revolution in which the proletariat 
joined as allies, and then a second stage in which the 
proletariat would establish its own social dictatorship. But 
only if the Communists kept their independent identity would 
they be capable of taking over from a bourgeois democratic 
alliance.
Lenin's new view of revolutionary alliances in the 
colonies became a central issue for various Comintern 
conferences, directly affecting the policies of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). Even though the working class was very 
small in colonial countries, it did exist and was recommended 
to ally itself with the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the 
struggle for the establishment of a liberal democratic state. 
Whereas the Marxist tradition had generally regarded the 
peasantry as an alien force with a petty-bourgeois attitude to 
property, a 'sack of potatoes' in Marx's contemptuous phrase, 
the experience of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in Russia 
allowed Lenin to make a major reassessment of its potential as 
a revolutionary ally, a force which the revolution itself could
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transform from a 'sack of potatoes' into a historical subject, 
a theme which Mao later extended further. The reason for this 
change was that in colonial countries revolutionary movements 
were largely directed against landlordism and feudal forms of 
land ownership. This was in turn a major similarity with the 
revolutionary experience in Russia itself, where the gaining of 
support from the landless peasants had been essential to 
success.
Remarkably, Lenin even advocated the formation of peasant 
soviets, albeit with less weight than the workers' soviets in 
national representation. Later on these peasant soviets were 
found in China. Lenin argued that active participation by the 
colonial peasantry in the bourgeois revolution would speed up 
this stage and help it to progress to the socialist stage - but 
only if the whole process remained under the guidance and 
leadership of the urban proletariat, with its advanced 
consciousness. Lenin and the Comintern never failed to stress 
the need for the political independence of the working class, 
and especially its representative, the Communist Party - a 
crucial issue for the CCP in the First United Front, 1923/4-27, 
and the Second United Front, 1936/7-45. Only a vanguard party, 
resting upon the historically most advanced force in society, 
could grasp the whole complex of national and international 
factors determining the ripeness of the situation for 
revolution. Practically on the ground in China, however, in the 
First United Front and Sneevliet's (Maring's) 'bloc within' 
strategy, the exact opposite happened. This lesson was well
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taken by Mao when it came to the Second United Front.
(x) Conclusion
The effects of metropolitan imperialism in colonial areas 
were not seen by Lenin in quite the same way as they were by 
Marx and Engels. Many ideas are the same: for example, that 
imperialism creates its own grave-diggers, or that colonies are 
a temporary safety valve. But Lenin's analysis of imperialism 
increasingly led him in practice to doubt whether Marx's idea 
of the progressive mission of capitalism could be fully applied 
to the colonial and semi-colonial world of the early twentieth 
century, where it was becoming increasingly difficult to detect 
the industrial growth that had once been confidently expected 
to follow from capitalist expansion. In the end, the change in 
perspective became so substantial that Schroder and others have 
referred tc^ . Lenin's differences with Marx and Engels as 
revisionism of Marxism - although I do not find this charge 
justifiable. As has been argued, Lenin had to develop practical 
revolutionary political tactics in order to succeed in Russia 
and he had to justify Bolshevik revolutionary politics in _the 
Socialist International during the First World War.
Similarly, whereas before the First World War and in his 
1917 essay on imperialism Lenin effectively limited the goal of 
socialist revolution to the advanced capitalist countries, 
after the October Revolution he came to see the colonial areas
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less as acted-upon and more as potential actors in the struggle 
against the decadent and dangerous force of imperialism and for 
the survival of the first socialist revolution that had 
unexpectedly occurred in Russia. It was now a question of 
combining - in ways that could not yet be precisely defined - 
social revolution by the proletariat in the advanced countries 
with a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements, 
including movements for national liberation in the 
underdeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.
An obvious difference here with Marx and Engels is that 
the correlation between advanced productive forces, social 
relations and proletarianization no longer implied a higher 
level of (revolutionary) consciousness and action, while 
economic backwardness did not necessarily result in political 
immaturity. In both cases, the outcome would depend on the 
precise working out of the law of uneven and combined 
development on a world scale. Not only was exploitation in the 
colonies fierce, obvious and unmediated; the whole structure of 
society was weak, volatile and contradictory. The backwardness 
of colonies could help to bring about revolution, and even a 
numerically small proletariat could play a strategically 
decisive role as long as it avoided the twin pitfalls of 
sectarian isolation from national political life and 
opportunist accommodation to its temporary anti-imperialist 
allies. In Lenin's view, we might say, the advanced form of 
economic progress of the imperialist states was paralleled by a 
high degree of anti-capitalist political consciousness in the
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underdeveloped world. Thus, basing himself on a concrete 
analysis of changes in the capitalist economy, Lenin was able 
to put politics in command against a one-sided adherence to the 
economic-determinist elements in the writings of Marx and 
Engels.
Although there were striking tensions in the articles 
Lenin wrote in the last few years of his life, at least a 
powerful strand can be interpreted as suggesting that the 
future of socialist world revolution would actually be decided 
in the East. By chipping away parts of the imperialist system, 
revolutions of national liberation would increase the internal 
contradictions of capitalism, while the Soviet Union might 
provide an attractive model for industrialization and 
resistance against exploitation in the colonial areas. This 
idea may indeed be said to have ’turned on its head' Marx's own 
assumption that "the victory of the proletariat over the 
bourgeoisie . . . [becomes] the signal for liberation of all 
repressed nations".103
In the next chapter we link Mao with Marx and Lenin. The 
various concepts, such as class analysis, the United Front and 
feudalism, which make up Mao's view of imperialism will be 
considered and how this generates anti-imperialism. This will 
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4. MAO AND THE USES OF IMPERIALISM
(i) Introduction. The Place of Imperialism in Maofs Thought
The aim of this chapter is to examine what Mao understood by 
imperialism. Mao was not interested in a general study of 
capitalism and how it would affect Third World development, as 
Marx had been. Unlike Lenin, Mao did not develop a theory or 
account of the causes of imperialism - of why America, Britain, 
Germany, Japan acted as they did. But he was interested in the 
nationalist implications of capitalism in its advanced version, 
imperialism: "the Chinese proletariat emerged and grew
simultaneously not only with the Chinese national bourgeoisie but 
also with the enterprises directly operated by the imperialists in 
China."1 This is one of the main questions at issue, as mentioned 
already in Chapter One, namely the interrelation of national and 
class oppression and exploitation. Imperialism was therefore, a 
central feature of Mao’s analysis of modern China and of the 
politics of revolution.
From the early 1920s Mao read Marxist-Leninist material that 
had been translated into Chinese. Earlier in Primary School in 
1910, he had learned about Washington, Napoleon, Catherine the 
Great, Peter the Great, Wellington, Gladstone, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu and Lincoln. He named Qin Shi Huangdi and Han Wu-ti as 
his ideals. A year later Mao cut his cue off, demanded the
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toppling of the monarchy, and the presidency for Sun Yatsen, the 
founder of the KMT (National People's Party, 1905) and creator of 
the 'Three Principles' (democracy, sovereignity and welfare 
state), which were meant to restore China's power. Such ideas were 
brought to Mao's attention through the pages of Min-Li Pao, a 
national-revolutionary paper. At this time, 1911-12, he read for 
the first time about socialism. Being undecided about his future 
career, Mao spent time reading in the Provincial Library of 
Changsha. There he read Adam Smith, Darwin, John Stuart Mill, 
Rousseau, Spencer and Montesquieu. He decided to become a teacher 
in 1913 and finished his studies in 1918. Among the newspapers he 
continued to read was Min-Li Pao, which was close to the KMT. 
Nonetheless, he also read classical literature, which was 
encouraged at the time by his teacher, Yang Ch'ang-chi, who 
pointed out patriotic writers such as Wang Fu-chih from the Ming 
Dynasty. Mao also read System of Ethics by Friedrich Paulsen. He 
thought about the rejuvenation of China, admired the American 
struggle of (independence and considered the idea that the total 
destruction of China was a necessary precondition of the new 
state.2
In July 1914, the first issue of Xiangjiang pinglun (Xiang- 
River Review) appeared, agitating against imperialism and 
warlords. Mao became one of its journalists. In 1915, he also 
became a reader of Xin ginqnian (New Youth) and took the editors 
Chen Duxiu and Hu Shih as his models. When he had completed his 
teacher's training (1918), he was employed by Li Ta-chao, China's
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pioneer Marxist and one of the progenitors of the Chinese 
communist movement, as Assistant Librarian at Peking University, 
but was also able to sit in on lectures and became a member of the 
Philosophy and Journalists' Club, although he was politically 
close to anarchism.3 He also met future CP founder Chen Duxun and 
CP leader Chang Kuo-t'ao. Among the books he read in 1920, three 
impressed him particularly, he stated: The Communist Manifest,
Kautsky's Class Struggle and the History of Socialism by Kirkup.4 
"By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory, and to some extent 
in action a Marxist, and from this time on, I considered myself a 
Marxist."5 In 1921, Mao was one of the 13 delegates at the First 
Party Congress of the CCP where he took the minutes, and back in 
Hunan he became Party Secretary.6
Arif Dirlik however, has suggested that "as late as 1921, 
when the Party was formally established, the intellectuals who 
participated in its founding knew little about Marxism, and even 
less about the Marxism of Lenin than about the Marxism of Marx."7 
Maurice Meisher claimed that "the dissemination of Marxist theory 
... increased rapidly in the wake of the May Fourth Movement."8
Jack Gray however argued: "What is striking is that he [Mao] read
so little of Marx and Engels. He read only the 'Communist
Manifesto' and 'Socialism, Utopian and Scientific', he seems to 
read little more even in the course of the next twenty years [up 
to 1940]. "9 However, a lengthy list of the Soviet and Chinese 
philosophical sources read by Mao during his period in Yenan, i. 
e. post-1935, suggests that he was quite well versed in
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contemporary Soviet and Chinese Marxist philosophy.10 In an 
article by Li Ji which lists the texts on philosophy available for 
study in the early to mid-1930s, it is stated that by 1937 Mao had 
read Capital, Anti-Duhrinq, and many of Lenin's writings.11 
Between April and May 1937-8, Mao lectured at the Anti-Japanese 
Military and Political University in Yenan. He gave more than a 
hundred lectures, some of which dealt with the Marxist philosophy 
of dialectical materialism. A little later, a number of Soviet 
texts on philosophy were available in Chinese, inspired by 
Stalin's aides Mitin and Yudin and finding their way into the work 
of Chinese writers such as Li Da and Ai Siqi. Stalin's History of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) , Short Course 
was translated into Chinese in 1939. Ai Siqi had written a very 
successful popular exposition of Marxism, The Philosophy of the 
Masses, which quoted at length from Stalin's Short Course. Another 
source for Mao was Mitin's Dictionary of Dialectical Materialism, 
translated into Chinese in 1939.12 However, Robert Elegant has 
claimed in h'^ Ls Foreword to Lazio Ladany's The Communist Party of 
China, 1921-1985, A Self-Portrait, that Mao was "an ignoramus 
regarding Marxism."13 This view is shared to quite a degree by 
Ladany.
The Party leaders did not really begin to study Marxism, 
until the late 1930s in Yenan, and what they studied 
was the Marxism of Stalin. Methodology of the Thoughts 
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin was printed in
Chinese in Moscow in 1942. This was a sort of
compendium of Stalinist Marxism. The introduction said
it should fill the gap left by the lack of Chinese
versions of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. What China 
learnt in those days was not Marxism but the Lenin-
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Stalin ideology.14 
In 1964, in a talk with members of the Socialist Party of Japan, 
Mao himself declared that during the student movement around 1918, 
he neither knew of Marx nor Lenin and that he believed in 
idealism, in Confucius and the dualism of Kant.15
Nick Knight has argued that neither Wittfogel's view of Mao's 
originality (he was merely a Soviet clone), nor Schram's view (his 
Chineseness overwhelmed everything else) are tenable. He quotes 
Shi Zhongquan, who recognized both the debt that Mao owed to the 
orthodox Marxist tradition as well as the areas in which he 
clearly made a theoretical contribution of some originality, or 
applied abstract principles of Marx in a novel way that could 
function as a model in the subsequent development of the theories, 
strategies and tactics which were to become part-and-parcel of 
Chinese Marxism.16
Mao did not write a major analysis of capitalism, but this 
had already been done by Marx. For Mao, the most important point
was the manifestation of capitalism/imperialism in China and its
<
effect on the country. The key aspects of his thinking were guided 
by an anti-imperialist nationalism. Although this issue will be 
discussed again in general terms, as well as in the context of 
Mao's United Front policy (see Chapter Six), at this point his 
philosophy of science will be considered, and more specifically 
the issue of the sinification of Marxism. The views of Arthur 
Cohen and Karl August Wittfogel, who believed that Mao's Marxism 
was only a thinly-disguised copy of its Soviet progenitor, will
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not be discussed.17
The sinification of Marxism does not indicate the power of
Chinese culture and the hold it had over Mao, causing him to
downplay the universal Marxist truths, but his utilitarian
approach to dogmas.18 Mao was most concerned with the problem of
integrating the universal theory of Marxism with the 'concrete
practice' of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution. In the
late 1930s he described this process of integration as the
'sinification of Marxism'. His concept of imperialism is part of
this sinified Marxism (others are, for example, his emphasis on
the peasantry, the establishment of rural base areas, class
struggle and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside) .
Secondly, the sinification of Marxism was not a Machiavellian ploy
to oust the Moscow-oriented faction of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) .19 I agree with Knight that
Mao's sinification of Marxism was neither of these, ... it 
was rather an attempt to establish a formula by which a
universal theory such as Marxism could be utilised in a
particular national context and culture without abandoning 
the universality of that theory (emphasis in original).20
According to Mao, 'truth' was the result of practical
investigations and from observation one could then draw
conclusions in the form of laws.
In discussing a problem, we should start from reality 
and not from definitions ... We are Marxists, and 
Marxism teaches us that in our approach to a problem we 
should start from objective facts, not from abstract 
definitions, and that we should derive our guiding 
principles, policies and measures from an analysis of 
these facts.
Laws are usually defined as having universal validity, but Mao
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departed from this by discussing 'laws* of specific validity. As
Knight puts it: "In Mao's hand a 'law' does not automatically have
a general or universal validity but provides at the level of the
specific instance an interpretation useful in understanding that
specific instance."22 He was interested in a 'law' at this level
for its utility, largely in the formulation of political and
military strategy. To quote Knight again:
Thus, by Mao's criteria, it was valid to accept a 
universal theory such as Marxism as representing a 
scientific reflection of objective reality if it had 
been constructed with regard to the. norms of inductive 
procedure, building from the particular to the
universal, and utilising the distilled wisdom of 
'scientifically abstracted' indirect experience. Mao
did not perceive, therefore, any contradiction between 
utilising an empiricist methodology under an
overarching world view, for he accepted implicitly that
this world view (Marxist dialectical and historical 
materialism) had been constructed in accordance with 
the idiosyncratic inductionist methodology which he 
espoused throughout his productive life.23
In this sense, Mao could accept that Marxism was universally
valid, and at the same time abstract and in need of 'sinification'
or concretization. However, Marxism as a guide to action had
i
helped to direct attention to the issue of class analysis (as 
discussed later in Chapter Five). As Dirlik has stated: "In its
conversion into an ideology of action, which is the ultimate goal 
of Marxism, the theory must inevitably be interpreted and 
instrumentalized. ”24 In his Rectify the Party's Style of Work-, Mao 
insisted that "It is necessary to master Marxist theory and apply 
it, master it for the sole purpose of applying it",25 which is in 
accordance with Marx's famous dictum that one should not only know
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the world, one should also change it. Mao's approach does not
signify the primacy of Chinese conditions over Marxism-Leninism,
but the rounding off of Marxism, in the sense of Marxist universal
laws applied to Chinese reality.
The theory of Marx, Engels and Stalin is universally 
applicable. We should regard it not as a dogma, but as 
a guide to action ... It is not just a matter of 
understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Stalin from their extensive study of real 
life and revolutionary experience, but of studying 
their standpoint and method in examining and solving 
problems . . . Being Marxists, Communists are 
internationalists, but we can put Marxism into practice 
only- when it is integrated with the specific 
characteristics of our country and acquires a definite 
national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism 
lies precisely in its integration with the concrete 
revolutionary practice of all countries. For the 
Chinese Communists who are part of the great Chinese 
nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood, any 
talk about Marxism in isolation from China's 
characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, 
Marxism in a vacuum. Hence to apply Marxism concretely 
in China so that its every manifestation has an 
indubitably Chinese characteristic', becomes a problem 
which is urgent for the whole Party to understand and 
solve.26
Mao also argued against people who did not know China's history
since the Opium Wars and students returning from abroad who could
<
only "parrot things foreign"27 and who violated a fundamental 
principle of Marxism-Leninism, i. e. the unity of theory and 
practice.
Nowhere in his Yenan writings did Mao present a coherent 
exposition of any of the Marxist classics. This is neither 
accidental nor a result of the confused war situation; on the 
contrary, he would have considered an exegesis of the classics to 
be a waste of time, and would have found some rustic peasant terms
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to express this view. Mao regarded the laws of Marxism-Leninism as 
valid, but did not accept the validity of these abstract 
principles divorced from Chinese reality; he was concerned to 
indicate the manner in which such phenomena were manifested in 
specific Chinese situations. He knew that imperialism was 
attacking the Chinese nation and wanted to determine its effect. 
Mao's concept of capitalism was not that of the first volume of 
Marx's Capital; for him an imperialist country was essentially a 
more developed country and one which was bullying others.
Mao did not analyze capitalism or rather in his case, 
imperialism as such, but used it in a way that was appropriate to 
Chinese conditions. It is clear, however, that Mao refused to 
accept that the specific principles or 'laws' arising from Marx's 
and Lenin's analysis of European capitalism and later imperialism 
possessed universal status. On the contrary, he believed that 
their relevance was limited by the specific nature of the 
historical situation from which they had arisen. The function of
such universal laws was to describe the general or universal
<
existence of a certain phenomenon (like class struggle), but not 
to anticipate the specific form that such a phenomenon might take 
in any concrete situation or historical moment. It is in this 
sense that Marxism could be 'universally applicable', for it 
served to direct attention towards such phenomena. Consequently, 
Mao asserted: "Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to
action, "28 and that is why, the Chinese revolution had been 
successful he claimed much later:
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Marxism is a general truth which has universal 
application. We must accept it. But this general truth 
must be combined with the concrete practice of each 
nation’s revolution. It w a s o n l y  because the Chinese 
people accepted Marxism and combined it with the 
practice of the Chinese revolution that they won 
victory in the Chinese revolution.29
Meisner formulated it in the following way:
Mao derived from the objective laws of historical 
development proclaimed by Marx some degree of assurance 
in the historic inevitability of a socialist future.
But, in the final analysis, Mao's faith in the future 
was not based upon any real Marxist confidence in the 
determining, objective forces of sociohistorical 
development. For Mao, the essential factor in 
determining the course of history was conscious human 
activity atid the most important ingredients for 
revolution were how men thought and their willingness 
to engage in revolutionary action.30
In the following section I will deal in detail with the
impact of imperialism on China, which was Mao's main concern, and 
attempt to understand the usefulness of Marxism and Leninism to 
counter it. The problem of overcoming the misery in China produced 
numerous approaches - from total resistance based on imported 
weapons, through a rejuvenation of Confucius, to extensive
accommodations with and mirroring of the West. Marxism-Leninism
IT
was one framework which seemed to many Chinese to provide a way of 
overcoming the consequences of Westernization without giving up 
their own identity completely. For Mao the net economic impact of 
imperialism was negative, but politically it gave birth to ajiti—  
imperialism. As the impact of imperialism was uneven in China, Mao 
suggested utilizing all conflicts among landlords, capitalists and 
Chinese sympathizers of imperialist countries, as well as
contradictions among imperialist countries. It will become clear
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that Mao's analysis of imperialism and with it, anti-imperialism, 
is a development of Lenin's thinking on anti-imperialism.
Mao distinguished, as did Lenin, between economic, military, 
political and cultural imperialism. He also did use 'imperialism' 
to mean 'capitalism', something which Lenin had done in 
Imperialism. The impact of imperialism on China was not to create 
one well-established capitalist mode of production, but a system 
of a heterogeneous character. This heterogeneity was perceived by 
Mao as positive, as it gave him room to manoeuvre domestically as 
well as internationally. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Mao 
did not suffer from the illusion that imperialism had been 
defeated. He believed that the USA had replaced Japan as the most 
aggressive global power, and would manifest this aggressiveness 
first by attacking Third World countries rather than the Soviet 
Union.
When Mao declared in 1949, "Ours will no longer be a nation 
subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up"31, he was
expressing what millions of ordinary Chinese citizens felt and
<
hoped. From then on, China would reject any unequal treaties32 and 
would establish diplomatic relations with other countries only on 
an equal basis. He stated: "We are willing to establish diplomatic 
relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the 
imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, 
will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals."33 He 
added that the Chinese people had won a tremendous battle against 
all odds because they had dared to take on, as once Yu Gong had
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done with the mountains outside his home, the twin evils of 
imperialism and feudalism.34
The CCP's Second United Front with Chiang Kaishek and the 
Nationalist People’s Party (KMT) against the Japanese was regarded 
as a betrayal by some in the Party, as was the softening of land 
policies in certain phases. This United Front had been conducted 
at the instigation of Moscow and Mao accepted that on the path to 
victory, compromise was legitimate, as long as it brought closer 
the realization of the maximum programme. Only by the use of long­
term historical goals could a compromise be judged principled or 
unprincipled. The Party, if it survived a compromise, would emerge 
strengthened, while the enemy would be correspondingly weakened, 
Mao believed. Thus he was prepared to discuss aid from certain 
imperialist countries against another imperialist, Japan. This 
ability to form compromises, while ensuring enough independence 
for the CCP to pursue socialist policies, was not the result of 
Mao's skill as fortune-teller,35 but was based upon an analysis of 
the contradictions of the time. In order to decide with whom to
K
work and whom to exclude, Mao had to answer the following 
questions over and over again:
(1) What was the impact of imperialism in China? Was it 
creative or destructive, in terms of the development of the 
capitalist mode of production?
(2) What impact was it having on Chinese social forces? What 
were the repercussions of imperialist actions on Chinese politics 
and economics?
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(3) What impact did imperialist actions in China have on the
imperialist countries themselves?
Generalizing within a Marxist-Leninist framework, which
initially took Stalin as the leader of the worldwide socialist
movement and the Soviet Union as the model, Mao developed his way
of leading the CCP to victory, which in turn created a Maoist
model of revolution in the Third World. "This war [against Japan]
will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to
advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all
nations, especially the oppressed nations such as India, to march
forward."36 His differential analysis of contradictions led him to
formulate a general conception of national revolutionary war:
Qualitatively different contradictions can only be 
resolved by qualitatively different methods. For 
instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist 
revolution; the contradiction between the great masses 
of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the 
method of democratic revolution; the contradiction 
between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by the 
method of national revolutionary war.37
In the case of China, this war was shaped by four characteristics:
The first characteristic of China’s revolutionary war 
is that it is waged in a vast semi-colonial country 
which is unevenly developed politically and 
economically and which has gone through a revolution 
. . . The second characteristic is that our enemy is big 
and powerful . . . The third characteristic is that the 
Red Army is small and weak . . . The fourth 
characteristic is Communist Party leadership and the 
agrarian revolution.38
This does not seem to provide an optimistic outlook, but the
contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese people was such
that, while involving the exploitation of China, it also created
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the opportunity to exploit imperialist activities in China to 
liberate it from foreign penetration. This may not have been 
exactly the dialectic of capitalist expansion that Marx had in 
mind in his writings on India, for example; but it was not 
entirely inconsistent with a Marxian or Hegelian sense of history 
as full of contradiction and unintended outcomes.
(ii) The Impact of Imperialism
For Mao the decisive turning point in modern Chinese history
had come with the 1840 Opium war. This is how he described the
ensuing period:
Chinese feudal society lasted for about 3000 years. It 
was not until the middle of the 19th century, with the 
penetration of foreign capitalism, that great changes 
took place in Chinese society. As China's feudal 
society had developed a commodity economy, and so 
carried within itself the seeds of capitalism, China 
would of herself have developed slowly into a 
capitalist society even without the impact of foreign 
capitalism. Penetration by foreign capitalism 
accelerated this process. Foreign capitalism played an 
important part in the disintegration of China's social 
economy; on the one hand, it undermined the foundations 
of her self-sufficient natural economy and wrecked the 
handicraft industries both in the societies and in the 
peasants' homes, and on the other, it hastened the 
growth of a commodity economy in town and country.
Apart from its disintegrating effects on the 
foundations of China's feudal economy, this state of 
affairs gave rise to certain objective conditions and 
possibilities for the development of capitalist 
production in China ... The history of the emergence 
and development of national capitalism is at the same 
time the history of the emergence and development of 
the Chinese bourgeosie and proletariat ... As distinct 
social classes, the Chinese bourgoisie and proletariat 
are new-born and never existed before in Chinese
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history ... They are twins born of China's old (feudal) 
society, at once linked to each other and antagonistic 
to each other. However, the Chinese proletariat emerged 
and grew simultanously not only with the Chinese 
national bourgeoisie but also with the enterprises 
directly operated by the imperialists in China. Hence, 
a very large section of the Chinese proletariat is 
older and more experienced than the Chinese 
bourgeoisie, and is therefore a greater and more 
broadly based social force ...39
This lengthy quote reveals much of Mao's assessment of the impact
of capitalism on China (it was not critical since capitalism
already existed in China), a possible strategy for responding to
it (an alliance with the bourgeoisie) and the view that China
fitted into the five-stage unilinear scheme of development.
Although this point goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
interesting to note that Mao added the paragraph on the first
sprouts of capitalism after 1949 and that he did not understand
China in an Asiatic Mode of Production way.
It was Mao's view that the imperialist presence in China was
double-faceted. On the one hand, it "hastened the disintegration
of feudal society and the growth of elements of capitalism,
thereby transforming a feudal into a semi-feudal society". Having
accorded imperialism this limited positive role in China's
historical development, he went on to show in considerable detail
how the other facet of the imperialist presence was negative. It
"imposed . . . ruthless rule on China, reducing an independent
country to a semi-colonial and (in the case of Japanese
imperialism after 1931), a colonial coun,try."40
Here we find many issues that had been discussed by Marx and
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Lenin. Implicit in Mao’s thinking is the view that the old, feudal 
order was overrun by foreign influence, something that both he and 
Marx saw in a positive light. Marx would not have agreed that 
capitalist sprouts already existed within Chinese society, as he 
had analyzed China as having an Asiatic Mode of Production. But 
the important point is that the introduction of capitalism was 
greatly speeded up by foreign forces, and that this had various 
consequences for Chinese society. Meisner phrased it as: 
"Imperialism ... served as 'the unconscious tool of history’ in 
creating conditions for a social revolution in China."41
One of the effects was the combined existence of the 
bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the feudal classes.42 This 
articulation of different modes of production was something which 
benefited imperialism, but is also created a multitude of 
contradictions, potential dangers, and opportunities for the CCP. 
Another effect was the uneven economic and political development 
of China.
A weak (capitalist economy coexists with a preponderant 
semi-feiidal economy; a few modern industrial and 
commercial cities coexist with a vast stagnant 
countryside; several million industrial workers coexist 
with several hundred of millions peasants and 
handicraftsmen, labouring under the old society; big 
warlords controlling the central government, coexist 
with small warlords controlling the provinces; ... a 
few railways, steamship lines, and motor roads exist 
side by side with a vast number of wheelbarrow paths.43
It is easy to recognize here Lenin's concept of 'uneven and
combined development': Capitalism in its imperialist form
possessed positive and negative characteristics, performing its
180
'Double Mission' but not in the way envisaged by Marx. Whereas 
Warren, for instance, has highlighted only the positive, 
revolutionizing effects of imperialist capitalism on the colonies, 
and Andre Gunder Frank ('The Development of Underdevelopment') has 
seen only the damage, these two aspects were inextricably 
intertwined in the thinking of Lenin and Mao. The result, 
according to Mao, was that "The uneven political and economic 
development of China gives rise to the uneven development of her 
revolution ... The transformation of this unevenness into a 
general evenness will require a very long time."44 Above all, 
there could no longer be any question of a thoroughgoing 
transformative modernization of these societies along the lines of 
the Western metropolises. Indeed, imperialism might even hinder 
the overthrow of the old mode of production whenever this suited 
its only purpose: profit. "It is certainly not the purpose of the 
imperialist powers invading China to transform feudal China into a 
capitalist China. On the contrary, their purpose is to transform
China into their own semi-colony or colony."45
Mao's position is very different from that of Marx, who 
believed that colonizing powers did not consciously pursue a
policy in occupied territories, except to plunder them or
otherwise make use of them. Secondly, Marx stated that ..their 
activities led to the destruction of the old order and the 
building of a new industrialized order, with all the hope this 
gave him for the future, summarized in the phrase from the Preface
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of Capital, vol. I: "The country that is more developed
industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its
own future."46 However, Lenin thought Marx's hopes for general
industrialization were exaggerated. In an analysis similar to that
of Moore in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, he noted
that the weakness of the local bourgeoisie prevented it from
establishing its monopoly of power and pushing through
industrialization and liberal democracy.47 Consequently, Lenin
maintained that local industrialization must be tackled by a
coalition of anti-imperialist forces, led by the Communist Party.
The assessment of imperialism's industrializing ability
apparently went too far for Mao, who stressed that the imperialist
powers consciously tried to keep China non-industrialized and in a
state of dependence. The important question then was what to do
about this state of affairs, and the multitude of contradictions
in China and among the imperialists left room for manoeuvre for
anti-imperialists.
China had been a target of imperialism for nearly a century -
at one time primarily European (i.e. British colonialism), then
Japanese and finally American. Jack Gray, assessing the validity
of the 'Marxist concept of imperialism', concluded:
Thus in the crisis following the defeat of China by Japan in 
1894-5 it was the most advanced capitalist powers - Britain, 
the United States and laterally Germany - which opposed the 
partition of China and so saved her from dismemberment at the 
hands of the predatory feudal powers, Russia and Japan. In 
sum, the Leninist theory of imperialism, if it is to fit 
China, has to be stood on its head: imperialism was not
connected with the last stage of capitalism but with its 
first.48
182
British, or Japanese or American, for Mao imperialism remained the 
same, only the facade had changed. Sun Yatsen had described China 
since 1895 as the 'Sick Man of the Orient' and a 'hypo-colony* 
which is a grade worse than a semi-colony because of the multiple 
control and exploitation exercized by the imperial powers. Chiang 
Kaishek attributed evil to the Unequal Treaties (as he expressed 
it in his book, China's Destiny) .49 A CCP resolution of the Sixth 
Congress in Moscow in 1928 (where Mao in absentia was again 
elected to the Central Committee), argued that "despite impressive 
development in the initial stage ... the revolution finally 
failed. At this historical stage, it did not have sufficient 
strength to overcome the numerous difficulties of the period."50
The resolution identified the causes of this failure as 
betrayal by the national bourgeoisie, the strength of landlord 
armies, vacillation by the petty bourgeoisie, uneven development 
of the workers' and peasant movements and, most important of all, 
"the powerful strength of the imperialists".51 In the case of 
China, therq has been much debate among Westerners about the 
actual extent of the imperialist impact, with some arguing that 
only coastal areas were affected, others that the geographical 
losses were especially significant.52 The question of what the net 
impact has been is still controversial, some believing imperialism 
blocked industrialization, others blaming domestic incompetence 
for China's state of affairs. Still others think that there was 
minimal foreign impact, both in quality and quantity.53 What 
cannot be denied is that imperialism siphoned off resources which
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the Qing dynasty could have used. Firstly there were the military 
defeats, Opium Wars, Yili crisis, Chinese-French war, conflicts 
with Tsarist Russia, the traumatic defeat by the ’former pupil* 
Japan and the humiliation following the Boxer uprising. Then 
European great powers such as Great Britain, France, Russia, 
Germany and later Japan demanded concessions, spheres of 
influence, war reparations, and the Most Favoured Nation status. 
They interfered in domestic affairs, playing off conservatives 
against revolutionaries, the Court against against warlords, or 
the Taiping against the Court. China was indeed a football of 
international politics. Economic exploitation was however also 
noticeable. There were interest payments on foreign loans. In 1899 
China's income was Tael 88. 4 mill., and Tael 24 mill, were paid 
back in interest. In addition reparations for various wars had to 
be paid. China's foreign trade deficit in 1911 was Tael 94 mill. 
Foreign capital controlled key industries in China.54
Areas which had been economically successful, such as
Sichuan, Huhan, Henan and cities such as Xi'an, Kaifeng and
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Luoyang were replaced by Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin and Tangshan. 
If the economic heart of China had during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties been at the Yangzi and South East Coast, it moved in the 
second part of the last century to North and East China because 
that is where the coal mines were and where the new railway lines 
were built. This move did not take into consideration Chinese 
economic needs, but was arranged according to the needs of the 
world market. Thus, the raw materials for the light industry in
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Shanghai or Tianjin came from overseas and not from the Chinese
interior. These industries were integrated into the world market
but did not have much to do with * China*. Consequently a domestic
market hardly existed. At one time, for example, Guandong exported
rice, whilst Hunan was starving. As Oskar Weggel put it:
If one summarises all these 'imbalances* and 
1 contradictions', which would not have been imaginable 
without foreign influences, one can conclude that the 
theory of imperialism, which is based on the assumption 
that misery and alienation are caused on the whole 
exogenously, does indeed fit the China of the time.55
Jonathan Spence agreed with this assessment: "The charges made by
Sun Yat-sen and by the CCP concerning the power of foreign
imperialism in China were on the mark.*'56
Foreign capital dominated modern key sectors of the Chinese
economy: banking, ship building, and transport, railways, mining
and heavy industry. Due to lack of customs control, China was
unable to protect infant industries. More difficult to measure is
the humiliation of the Qing government by foreigners. Naturally,
the slow pace of modernization in China cannot be explained by the
(
impact of imperialism alone. Increase in population, limited 
arable land and scarcity of raw materials as well as reliance on 
traditional techniques were also responsible. Mark Elvin's 'high 
equilibrium trap'5/ and Weber's 'Protestant work ethic'58 (and its 
relative absence in China) are to some degree useful in 
understanding the absence of industrialization. Foreign debt, 
reparations and exchange rate manipulation undoubtedly undermined 
the already weak power of the Chinese government. Were they
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available, official statistics might show that imperialism should 
not be understood primarily by a 'drain-of-wealth-thesis'. 
Nevertheless, foreign-induced instability, especially on the state 
apparatus, with its disintegrating effects on the economy and 
society cannot be denied.59 May and Fairbank have noted how little 
tangible economic profit either the USA or China drew from their 
relationship, and yet how emotionally charged the contacts have 
been.60 Fairbank declared, due to the Western impact traditional 
China entered an "era of collapse ... and only in the mid- 
twentieth century could a new historical orthodoxy become 
established through the application of Marxism-Leninism to China 
in the thought of Mao Tse-tung. "61 Without denying that the 
economic impact of foreign trade and investment is a highly 
complex issue, external factors, categorized by Mao as 
'imperialism1, played a formative role in the country's political, 
cultural and economic life up to 1949.62
Mao, for example, pointed to the many wars of aggression 
fought, the (infamous 'Unequal Treaties' and the fact that customs 
sovereignty and control over foreign trade and communications were 
in foreign hands. To deny, as for example Feuerwerker63 does, that 
the specific economic consequences of imperialism were of vital 
importance for China's twentieth-century history, however, does 
not (even for Feuerwerker) imply that imperialism in other guises 
did not play an important role - especially as the midwife of 
Chinese nationalism. Mao believed that imperialists exploited 
cheap Chinese raw materials and labour; monopolized the Chinese
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banking and finance system; used compradors and usurers for their
purposes and wanted to transform feudal landlords into a pillar of
support for imperialism. Finally he asserted:
1. The imperialist powers have waged wars of aggression 
against China ... 2. have forced China to sign numerous 
unequal treaties ... 3. gained control of all the
important trading ports ... 4. operate many enterprises 
in both light and heavy industry ... 5. monopolize 
China's banking and finance ... 6. have established a 
network of comprador and merchant-usurer exploitation 
... 7. have made the feudal landlord class as well as 
the comprador class the main props of their rule ... 8. 
supply the reactionary government with large quantities 
of munitions and a host of military advisers ... 9.
have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds 
of the Chinese people.64
All this is an example of Mao's 'objective facts', the numerous
observations on the functioning of the real world with which one
needs to start before developing guiding principles, laws.
Thus, even though imperialism had a positive side in that it
accelerated Chinese development towards socialism,65 it also
produced much human suffering and caused problems for endogenous
industrialization.
National capitalism has developed to a certain extent 
and has*' played a considerable part in China's political 
and cultural life, but it has not become the principle 
pattern in China's social economy; it is flabby and is 
mostly associated with foreign imperialism and domestic 
feudalism in varying degrees.66
Fairbank phrased it as follows: "Imperialism might be truly
exploitative in some situations but in others more like a ~crude
form of development.”67 Only certain raw materials were exploited,.
only certain roads to certain ports built, only in certain areas
did investment occur. Political privileges, economic benefits,
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penetration of the countryside, domination of Chinese 
industrialization to the exclusion of Chinese industrialists, 
support for feudal forces: these are some of the indications of 
the centrality of imperialism to Chinese life.
One of the interesting differences between Chinese 
nationalists and Communists, as well as being a point of 
difference between communists, was in the conclusions they drew 
from the fact that China was the victim not merely of one, but of 
many imperialist countries. While Sun Yatsen argued that this 
multiplied the evils and dangers, Mao argued that it multiplied 
the options. For Mao it was a fact that "China's economic, 
political and cultural development is very uneven, because she has 
been under the complete or partial domination of many imperialist 
powers.”68 Yet, inter-imperialist rivalry not only created the 
possibility for China to play off one imperialist power against 
ajiother - as had been originally proposed by Lenin in his policy 
of 'peaceful coexistence' - it also provided opportunities for
internal divisions to be made use of. Changes in imperialist
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tactics created changes in Chinese economic and political life, 
which could be instrumentalized, for example, in the form of the 
United Front.
China is a semi-colonial country - disunity among the 
imperialist powers makes for disunity among the ruling 
groups in China. There is a difference between a semi­
colonial country controlled by several countries and a 
colony controlled by a single country.69
And of course imperialism created nationalism in the colonies, a
point made by Lenin earlier (see Chapter Three) as it arose as a
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response to exploitation and repression - which is after all the 
key for Mao's understanding and utilizing of imperialism.
Finally, in none of his various writings, did Mao offer a 
comprehensive political-economic definition of imperialism, partly 
because he saw himself as standing in the tradition of Lenin's 
work. It is true, that at an early stage in Mao's career (1925), 
in order to make the peasants understand the strange slogan 'Down 
with the imperialists' he changed this into ' Down with the rich 
foreigners*.70 However, John Gittings has written in detail, as an 
example of imperialism, on the effect of the cigarette tax on 
Chinese cigarette production, national income and peasant 
income,71 and Mao and the peasants must have been aware, if not of 
this, then of similar examples of how the political economy of 
imperialism affected the Chinese.
In On Contradiction Mao talked about• different types of 
imperialism, the tough one of war, and the milder one of politics, 
economics and culture.72 The Second World War, like the First,
resulted from the need of imperialist countries to overcome their
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economic and political crisis with the help of war, redivision and 
plunder of the world - a key element in Lenin's original 
definition of imperialism which had been reinforced by Stalin. In 
an interview with Anna Louise Strong, Mao further differentiated 
between monopoly capitalism and the earlier capitalism of free 
competition which flows directly from Lenin's theory of 
imperialism. If one, however, compares this interview as it 
appeared under the original headline 'World's Eye Views from a
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Yenan Cave', with the edited version in Mao's Selected Works, it 
is clear that when discussing imperialism, Mao emphasized its 
political and military aspects73 with minimal reference to Marx's 
materialist base and super-structure approach.
Evidently, Mao's thought was concerned with economic, 
political, cultural and military issues, which Marxists would see 
as interconnected. As we will note in the discussion of class in 
Chapter Five, however, this does not solve the problem of the 
differential weight that should be attached to these and other 
areas of social life. The often quoted slogan 'Politics in 
Command' is, of course, open to various interpretations, according 
to both the period and the tasks at hand. But Mao believed that 
Marxism-Leninism, by being in the forefront of the struggle 
against different forms of Western penetration, would be able to 
rationalize and guide the tremendous force of nationalism. After 
all, it was the Japanese take-over of Shandong after Versailles 
which had sparked off the May 4 th Movement in 1919. This
nationalism umlike, say, that in Germany 1871, was not of the
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bourgeois kind but a national-liberation type, as discussed in 
Chapter Three. National unification and anti-imperialism were not 
possible without radical change in the social and economic 
situation. At the same time, Mao argued (and he was not the first 
to do so) that imperialism had become so structurally important in 
the articulation of China's social life that, "Unless imperialist 
rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot 
be terminated, because imperialism is its main support.”74 Thus,
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whether he placed the emphasis on national anti-imperialist 
struggle as a stage preceding the struggle for socialism, or as a 
kind of expression of class struggle, he was re-evaluating 
nationalism in the traditions of the socialist movement.
(iii)The Repercussions of Imperialist Actions in Imperialist 
Countries and Among Chinese Political Forces
Mao's analysis of imperialism provided a context for his 
analysis of class forces and in particular the role of the 
peasantry. We have seen that Mao did not directly or primarily 
analyze imperialism in the classical terms of political economy. 
But he did see that it had a major impact both on Chinese society 
and on politics in Europe and this informed his revolutionary 
political tactics, a point made already with Lenin. Marxism- 
Leninism had an inherent tendency to link together economic,
political ar^ d cultural issues, as well as the internal and the
'<
external, and this would make it possible to develop a response to 
the problems facing China. First of all, imperialism sharpened 
class contradictions in China and made them obvious. At the same 
time the different roles of the classes in the anti-imperialist 
struggle changed more confusingly than in countries that were not 
as heterogeneous as China, a point which is the focus of Chapter 
Five. Mao freely admitted, as Lenin had in Russia, that the 
subjective forces of the Chinese revolution were weak, but all
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reactionary dominant classes (state power, armed forces, parties, 
and so on) were even weaker in their attempt to remain dominant, 
as they relied upon a backward and dilapidated socioeconomic 
structure. For this reason, the revolution might not develop first 
in Europe - where the subjective forces of the revolution were 
stronger, but the reactionary classes still stronger - but in 
colonial or semi-colonial countries such as China.75
It was clear for Mao that imperialism had not created 
one unified capitalist mode of production throughout 
China: by 1940, the Chinese social formation contained 
a confusing mixture of various modes of production. 
Nevertheless, feudalism remained dominant into the 
twentieth century, although declining in its influence 
and fundamentally altered by imperialist penetration of 
China. This meant that the appropriate targets of 
revolutionary struggle could not be decided by economic 
criteria alone as suggested for example by the
'Returned Bolsheviks', but had to be carefully analyzed
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in terms of their interaction with the imperialist 
power. The argument in the Communist Party simplified 
in the so-called 'line struggles' had been about the 
target of the revolution and the class supporting it 
and for example Li Lisan was condemned for having 
launched unsuccessful attacks on cities.76 Already at 
the end of 1925 Mao believed, at least according to the 
official Selected Works, that the central force for the
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success of the revolution was the peasantry and that 
the revolution therefore had to be centred in the 
countryside. Ladany however stated that in 1928 ... Mao 
was still thinking of capturing the cities in the three 
neighbouring provinces and he quotes Zhou Enlai:- 'I 
think that at that time [1928] Comrade Mao Zedong had 
not yet thought of centering the work on the villages 
and enabling the Party, representing the proletarit, to 
lead the peasants in guerilla war. He still thought 
that the centres of work should be in the cities.77 
Even though Mao was in 1928 already at his base in Jing 
Gangshan in the countryside and even though in his Selected Works 
Mao would like us to believe that his thinking developed step by 
step rooted in Marx's and Lenin's and Stalin's thought, as he was 
guided to transform ideology into action with the accompanying 
necessity of compromise, it is true as Ladany and Zhou Enlai claim 
that Mao was not the inventor of the peasant movement and of land
reform. However, once pushed into the countryside, Mao did not see
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this as a handicap, but as a boon, as he then realized that in 
spite of established orthodoxy only adaptation to Chinese 
conditions would guarantee the survival of the CCP. In 1928 Mao 
was playing a dual game: trying to make it look as though he was 
toeing the Party line under Qu Quibai and then Li Lisan - attack 
cities - and developing a strategy for rural guerilla war, which 
the Party centre often disagreed with.
Even though it is possible to argue that the CCP was founded
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at the direct instigation of Comintern agent Voitinsky, and that 
the Comintern was dominant, at certain times this guidance of the 
CCP caused also immediate problems, if not with Voitinsky then 
with other Comintern agents such as Sneevliet (alias Maring) or 
Otto Braun (alias Li De) . In the end, it was the (Japanese
imperialist) intervention which acted as the catalyst, fusing the 
disparate elements in Chinese society: "The War [against Japan]
has changed a disunited country into a relatively united one."78
One positive result of China's heterogeneity, even before the 
Long March, was the possibility for Red Base areas to exist and 
survive; another the possibility to form alliances with a number 
of different partners and a third was to use this domestic
heterogeneity against the various imperialist powers.79 The uneven 
development resulting from economic imperialism had localized the 
agricultural sector and separated it from the cities. The 
Communist Red Bases were thus in a position to give support to 
peasant associations in various parts of China. It is true that 
united front* policy towards the KMT required a scaling down of 
radical transformations in the countryside. But this does not mean 
that such policies were irrelevant or that anti-Japanese
nationalism was the only element in the final victory as Chalmers
Johnson claimed.80 It meant simply that social policies alone were 
not capable of defeating both the KMT and outside powers. Through 
all the twists and turns of immediate policy, Mao never 
fundamentally altered the conception he had held since 1925-6 - at 
least as offered in the official Selected Works - of the social
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well-spring of the Chinese revolution.
Since China*s key cities have long been occupied by the 
powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese 
allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to 
turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated 
base areas ... and this is possible because China's 
economic development is uneven (her economy not being a 
unified capitalist economy), because her territory is 
extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to 
manoeuvre), because the counter-revolutionary camp is 
disunited and full of contradictions, and because the 
struggle of the peasants who are the main force in the 
revolution is led by the Communist Party, the party of 
the proletariat.81
Mao's position concerning the centrality of the peasantry and 
countryside is special as he led the Communist Party to victory on 
the basis of theoretical propositions worked out as early as 1925- 
6. This was all a long way from what Marx and Engels had ever 
imagined. And, although towards the end of his life Lenin was 
beginning to conceive of socialist revolutions outside Europe, he 
would have had great difficulty in grasping the idea of a 
revolution that proceeded outwards from the countryside. Indeed, 
for Mao the move to the cities was specifically excluded until 
after victory in the countryside, something he had learnt through 
experience and opportunity after 1927.
However, Mao believed that uneven development also inhibited 
the growth of Chinese capitalism. The national bourgeoisie was 
divided between those who sought to appease foreign imperialism or 
superexploit workers in marginal areas in order to survive, and 
those who looked ahead to the removal of the imperialist presence 
as the condition for their own prosperity. This latter strategy 
had enough in common with Mao's thinking - his idea of resistance
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to the principal contradiction, Japanese imperialism, rather than 
simultaneous opposition to all reactionary forces in China and all 
imperialist powers - to prevent a united front from appearing to 
be a utopian venture. All possible disputes had to be exploited 
between the enemy and its allies or potential allies. As we shall 
now see, Mao's attitude towards the different imperialist powers 
active in China stemmed from these same considerations.
(iv) The Questions of External Policy
The policy of manoeuvring between imperialist powers, 
exploiting a temporary coincidence of interests with one in order 
to weaken the immediate threat, went back to the early days of 
Soviet Russia, when the Bolshevik leadership feared above all a 
holy crusade of the whole capitalist world against the new 
workers' state. The signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty with 
Germany in 1918, on terms far from unilaterally favourable to 
Russia, gave rise to passionate debate within the Bolshevik Party, 
with many intransigents denouncing Lenin for an unprincipled 
surrender to the imperialist enemy. However, in the tradition of 
the Comintern and the Soviet state, Brest-Litovsk came to stand 
for a realistic policy of compromise and manoeuvre to gain short­
term advantages that would strengthen the fundamental position of
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socialist forces as a whole. In his famous pamphlet Left-Wing
Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Lenin drew the theoretical
lessons in simple and direct language that would echo among future
generations of Communists throughout the world.
To carry on a war for the overthrow of the
international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred 
times more difficult, protracted and complex than the 
most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to 
renounce in advance any change of tack, or any
utilization of a conflict of interests (even if
temporary) among one's enemies, or any conciliation or 
compromise with possible allies (even if they are
temporary, unstable, vacillating, or conditional 
allies) - is that not ridiculous in the extreme?82
It should be noted that Lenin referred to the utilization of
conflicts of interest among enemies, on one hand, and alliance
policy, on the other, as two distinct tactics. Mao's United Front
doctrine tended to combine the two into a single policy, as I will
explain in Chapter Six.
As we have seen, China was the victim not of one but of many
imperialist countries. Particularly after the outbreak of the
Second World War, Mao further developed the idea of an
'International United Front', which came from the Comintern.
Separate imperialist powers, on the basis of their particular
interests, could be won over, but only as allies in the specific
fight against Japan. Japanese pressure on domestic politics also
added to pressure on the activities of the other imperialists in
China, who began to display splits that could be turned to the
advantage of the revolutionary forces.
The contradiction between Japanese and British and American
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imperialism became glaringly obvious after 1937, as Mao wrote in a 
footnote to 'Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the 
Japanese Invasion'. If Chiang turned against the Japanese 
invaders, this was, Mao stated, because of the "nation-wide
popular pressure and as a result of the serious blow the Japanese 
invasion had dealt to the interests both of the British and
American imperialists in China."83 Because of this inter­
imperialist rivalry, and the momentary advantage for Japan, other
imperialist countries had to protect their spheres of influence. 
But the policy of appeasement, as advocated by Chamberlain and 
others, meant that British imperialism was for long treated by Mao 
with something worse than contempt as he was afraid of a Far
Eastern Munich. If the USA and Japan cculd enter into a non­
aggression pact for the Far East, Mao feared (with some 
justification) that Chiang or the right wing of the KMT would come 
to an accommodation over Japan's occupation of parts of China. 
Fortunately, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, and
the Japanese** attack on Pearl Harbor, put an end to this danger for
<
the CCP. In a way, the Party needed an extension of the war in 
order to stabilize the United Front with the KMT, and to conclude 
similar agreements with foreign powers. Moreover, the entry of the 
Soviet Union into the war - after a period of confusion produced
by its self-defensive pact with Nazi Germany following the demise
of collective security - meant that the central force in the 
international Communist movement would remain actively committed 
to the defeat of the main enemy of the national liberation
struggle in China.84
It should be stressed that Mao had a particular hostility to 
British imperialism, and as early as 1923 he hoped that the 
Chinese would recognize that Britain was as much an enemy as 
Japan. "Don’t they [the Chinese] know that the aggression of the 
English imperialists against China is even more atrocious than 
that of the Japanese imperialists?"85 Apart from its commercial 
interests, Britain also had the position of a colonial power to 
defend. Disorder in China and success for anti-colonial struggles 
might well have an impact on other parts of the colonial empire or 
even on British domestic politics.86 The United States, on the 
other hand, was not really tainted by colonial associations with 
the partial exception of the Philippines - and pursued simple 
economic gains through trade, which could also be conducted with a 
fully independent China. At one time Mao considered the idea that 
the USA might remain neutral in the Second World War, in order to 
pick up the pieces and put them together when everyone else was 
exhausted.87 (The conclusion of this phase is to be found in On 
Policy:
The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we 
make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which 
is now committing aggression against China and the 
imperialist powers which are not doing so now, between 
German and Italian imperialism which are allies of 
Japan and have recognized 'Manchukuo' and British and"
US imperialism which are opposed to Japan, and between 
the Britain and the United States of yesterday which 
followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined 
China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and United 
States of today which have abandoned this policy and 
are now in favour of China's resistance. Our tactics 
are guided by one and the same principle: to make use 
of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few
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and crush our enemies one by one. Our foreign policy 
differs from that of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang 
claims, 'There is only one enemy and all the rest are 
friends'; it appears to treat all countries other than 
Japan alike, but in fact it is pro-British and pro- 
American. On our part we must draw certain 
distinctions, first, between the Soviet Union and the 
capitalist countries, second, between Britain and the 
United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on 
the other, third, between the people of Britain and the 
United States and their imperialist governments, and 
fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United 
States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their 
policy today. We build our policy on these 
distinctions. In direct contrast to the Kuomintang our 
basic line is to use all possible foreign help, subject
to the principle of independent prosecution of the war
and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the
Kuomintang does, to abandon this principle by relying 
entirely on foreign help or hanging on to one
imperialist bloc or another.88
Even though Mao was not really strong or influential enough 
at the time as he was basically ignored by the great powers, he 
kept this sense of a saving mission and felt protected by the 
world wide might of the Comintern in Moscow.
A policy of splitting the ranks of the enemy had been 
advocated by Mao in 1928 in his Why Is It That Red Political Power
Can Exist ifr China?89 Closer relations with imperialists were as
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possible as closer relations with 'die-hards' in a United Front 
against Japan. He defined three conditions under which the Chinese 
could defeat Japanese forces: "First, the establishment of an
anti-Japanese united front; second, the formation of an 
international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the 
revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese 
colonies."90 It naturally followed that Mao was prepared to ask 
for and accept aid from those imperialist countries which were
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also fighting Japan. He did not mistake this aid as genuine help 
for the CCP, but in their own imperialist interests, the 
governments of Britain, the United States and France indicated 
that they will help China.91
There can be no doubt that, although Mao had few illusions 
about the aggressive capacities of each imperialist power, he 
hoped that the wartime conditions of cooperation could be extended 
at an economic level after the defeat of Japan. This is clear from 
the following report. At the end of the Second World War Mao wrote 
informing the United States State Department: China’s greatest
post-war need is economic development. She lacks the capitalistic 
foundation necessary to carry this out alone. Her own living 
standards are so low that they cannot be further depressed to 
provide the needed capital. America and China complement each 
other economically: they will not compete. China does not have the 
requirements of a heavy industry of major size. She cannot hope to 
meet the United States in its highly specialized manufactures. She 
(the United (States) also needs an outlet for capital investment. 
China needs to build up light industries to supply her own market 
and raise the living standards of her own people. Eventually she 
can supply these goods to other countries in the Far East. To help 
pay for this foreign trade and investment, she has raw materials 
and agricultural products. America is not only the most suitable 
country fully able to participate to assist the economic 
development of China: She is also the only country fully able to 
participate. For all these reasons, there must not be and cannot
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be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the 
Chinese people and America ... Neither the peasant nor the Chinese 
people as a whole are ready for socialism. They will not be ready 
for a long time to come. It will be necessary to go through a long 
period of private enterprise, democratically regulated. To talk of 
immediate socialism is 'counter-revolutionary' because it is 
impractical and attempts to carry it out would be self- 
defeating.92
The US Treasury Department sent someone to Mao's headquarters to
verify his position and found that,
Mao asked whether there was any chance for American 
support of the Chinese Communists . . . The Communists 
wished to risk no conflict with the United States . . .
The Communists do not expect Russian help . .. Mao thus 
indicated that the Chinese Communists would prefer 
[emphases in original] to have an American rather than 
a Russian orientation. Cooperation between America and 
the Chinese Communists would be beneficial and 
satisfactory to all concerned. Lenin wanted good 
economic relations with the USA after World War I, as 
Mao wanted after World War II. Mao said that ... they 
supported the industrialization of China by free 
enterprise with the aid of foreign capital.93
This need foX economic links with the United States and the world
it dominated was not a mere civil war tactic. John Service has
made an illuminating analysis of the brief honeymoon period of
first contacts at Yenan in 1944, when Mao and Zhou Enlai raised
the possibility of a working relationship with the United States.
In January 1945, they even requested a visit to F. D. Roosevelt to
plan in detail military cooperation against Japan. As late as
1949, on the verge of achieving power, Mao's group renewed
overtures to the United States concerning economic exchanges. Much
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discussion has taken place about whether China would have become 
the close ally of the Soviet Union in the 1950s if the United 
States had acted differently.94 However, not long after the Red 
Army had entered Beijing, the United States considered China to be 
another enemy in the Cold War. For his part, Mao was soon 
declaring that the United States had taken the place of Nazi 
Germany! 95
In the face of imperialism and exploitation in the world 
market, Mao developed the intermediate zone concept. This is not 
particularly a Marxist concept, nor does it necessarily contradict 
Marx or Lenin, but it is an example of Mao's strategic vision. We 
can conclude that although economic cooperation with the United 
States could have been greatly beneficial to China, the 
international context of the time meant that Beijing had no choice 
but to fall in with the two-camp theory of world politics that was 
being developed by Zhdanov and the Cominform. In a sense Mao's 
actions in pursuing the Chinese civil war right up to the defeat
of Chiang ,Kaishek left very little room for a subsequent
<
accommodation with the United States.
Nevertheless, Mao rejected Stalin's fear that civil war in 
China would lead to an escalation of the conflict between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. The battleground for the Cold 
War, in his view, was not a direct confrontation between these two 
countries, but rather a conflict between the countries, capitalist 
or colonial, in between. US attacks on the USSR were only 
camouflage for an attack, firstly on their own workers and,
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secondly on countries and colonies in Europe, Africa and Asia: 
"The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast 
zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial
countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the United States 
reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the 
Soviet Union is out of the question.”96
American imperialism, Mao argued in the same piece, as other 
imperialisms before, might appear strong but was weak at the core. 
Just as the Germans and Japanese had fatally overextended 
themselves, so too would the United States. He again saw the
possibility of a United Front to put an end to American
domination.97 The general historical development had become clear 
in the Second World War, when the people had defeated fascism, 
confirming that "the people, and the people alone, are the motive 
force of world history”.98 In other words, for Mao, when an 
imperialist power has succeeded in establishing its relative
supremacy at the expense of its rivals, it tends to fall victim to
a hubris whiph leads it to neglect or overstrain the real sources
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of its power. The resulting decline therefore has an element of 
inevitability about it, based on inherent laws of imperialism. In 
addition, at every point the imperialist power will find itself in 
contact with opposing interests and hostile nations. To withdraw 
from acquired positions - to cut down the maintenance of national 
interest overseas - would be to create a void into which other 
forces would flow and perhaps start a retreat that would end in a 
rout. A withdrawal from the exercize of power in a given area is
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liable to disrupt an imperialist system which is organically 
connected; it radically changes the expectations of competing 
countries, and allies, as well as domestic opposition and anti­
imperialist forces all over the world. As in the earlier case of 
Japan, American imperialism had to be taken seriously from a 
tactical point of view. But strategically it was, in Lenin's 
words, a 'colossus with feet of clay', or in Mao's own words a 
'paper tiger'.99
In these new conditions, Mao drew up the terms for a new 
international united front, involving at its centre the alliance 
with the Soviet Union. It is perhaps in his article On the 
People's Democratic Dictatorship that Mao most clearly expressed 
his views on this external orientation, and on its relationship to 
the united front within China.
(1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That 
is, unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban 
petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, form a 
domestic united front under the leadership of the 
working class, and advance from this to the 
establishment of a state which is a people's democratic 
dictatorship under the leadership of the working class 
and basdd on the alliance of workers and peasants.
(2) Externally, unite in a common struggle with those 
nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite 
with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally 
ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's 
Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad 
masses of the people in all other countries, and form 
an international united front.100
In 194 9 one imperialist power had been defeated. Imperialist 
countries, which had wanted to dominate and exploit even deeper, 
had unwittingly created the forces to defeat a powerful enemy. 
With this kind of experience, Mao looked to the future in a
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confident manner, not only because of the existence of a 
'socialist base country', the Soviet Union, but also because his 
assessment inside and outside of China led to a confidence in 
ultimate victory not many would have thought possible at any time 
during the First or Second United Front. Mao's emphasis on the 
alliance with the Soviet Union and his rejection of Titoism or a 
Third Way should not be understood as submission to the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets did not quite trust the Chinese 'nationalists', 
who were really only 'petty bourgeois'.101 Nor can one take Mao's 
eulogy at Stalin's 70th birthday in December 1949 without a large 
pinch of salt.102
Of course, the later rift with the Soviet Union sharply 
altered the terms of Mao's vision. As the Chinese state engaged in 
an independent foreign policy and sought allies of its own among 
the national bourgeoisies of various post-colonial states, the 
perception of the main contradiction in international politics 
would change several times. Although this structured the precise 
relations of( China with particular countries - India or Yugoslavia 
being two dramatic cases in point - it is clear both from the 
theoretical writings of Mao and the practical policies of Beijing 
that the concepts of differential contradiction and united front 
remained at the centre of Chinese thinking in the post-war period, 
as they had in the period of national liberation and struggle-in- 
unity with the KMT. In this sense, the record of Mao and the CCP 
may be regarded as a development of the insights of Lenin on 
Communist tactics in the epoch of imperialism.
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(v) Conclusion
As shown, Mao did develop ideas concerning how to tackle 
imperialism in general. This chapter began with a discussion of 
his understanding of Marxism. He did not analyze the causes of 
imperialism, but was interested to counter actual imperialism in 
China.- Even though his understanding of the classics might not 
have been very thorough, it is clear that Mao understood the 
basics of Marxism-Leninism. He knew and accepted the universal 
theory of Marxism, and was engaged in using it for the special 
circumstances of an Asian country, with a long history, and in the 
twentieth century. This sinification or nationalization of 
Marxism-Leninism was a result of paying attention to the reality 
of China. There were enough examples of imperialism's impact on 
the country, which Mao would turn into guiding laws for the CCP. 
Even though China was practically torn from the outside as well as 
from the inside, this unevenness and the lack of an established 
structure also helped revolutionaries, in Mao's opinion. One key 
issue in this context was of course the question of allies in the 
anti-imperialist struggle and this was related fundamentally to an 
assessment of China's place in history.
In Russia, Lenin had refused to concede that the development 
of Asiatic societies might pose something of an alternative to the 
five-stage schema of orthodox Marxism and this led him to the
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conclusion that Russia had been, prior to the development of 
capitalism, a weakly-distinguished variant of European feudalism. 
It also led to the related belief that the development of other 
Asiatic societies (such as India, China, Turkey, Indonesia, and so 
on) must conform in essential detail to this five-stage 
development, and that they must again constitute variants of 
European feudalism. If this was the case, then elements of 
capitalism could be expected to develop intrinsically and 
spontaneously within the feudal (or semi-feudal) mode of 
production which characterized those Asiatic societies. From this 
perspective, imperialism could not be regarded as having the 
historical function of disrupting the moribund traditional society 
and leading to alternative forms of development on the basis of 
the dissolution of that society. For the necessary development of 
capitalism within those traditional Asiatic societies would lead 
to the emergence of class formations (especially a native 
bourgeoisie) and this would lead to the eventual supersession of
the former ^ociety with or without the intervention of Western
<
imperialism.
Thus, it would appear logical that a theory of imperialism 
formulated by Lenin (who perceived Asiatic societies as basically 
feudal) should have a rather different motivation than that of 
demonstrating the historical function of imperialism in bringing 
Asiatic societies out of their millennial stagnation and into the 
mainstream of world (European) history (that is, Marx’s view). 
Indeed, it is clear in Lenin's book on imperialism that his main
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concern was to demonstrate how largely nationalist anti-colonial 
revolutions in the colonies, inspired by the predations of 
imperialism, would in turn lead to revolutions within Europe, the 
heartland of capitalism.
The concept of the Asiatic mode of production was therefore 
given little credence by the Bolsheviks under Lenin, and this was 
to have important implications on the manner in which they 
approached the formulation of policy in the Russian context. 
During the late 1920s, this concept emerged once more as the 
question of the revolution in China became a central concern for 
the Communist International. Basically the question was whether 
China should be treated as an Asiatic society in which the 
development of capitalism was only a by-product of imperialist 
intervention, or as a feudal (or at least semi-feudal) society in 
which the ' sprouts' of capitalism had emerged much earlier than 
the intervention of the West and which consequently possessed its 
own native bourgeoisie and domestic capitalism.
Those Who believed that China should be seen as an Asiatic
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society (like the Comintern agents in China, Besso Lominadze and 
Heinz Neumann, and the Chinese Communist leader, Qu Qiubai) argued 
that the Chinese bourgeoisie was a weakly implanted class owing 
its origin to Western imperialism rather than spontaneous internal 
economic developments. It was incapable therefore of leading a 
national democratic revolution. The strategy of the Communists in 
China should therefore be to ignore the bourgeoisie and press 
ahead with a 'permanent' revolution in which the proletariat in
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alliance with the revolutionary peasantry would push for the 
establishment of socialism. Accordingly, China could avoid a 
lengthy period of capitalist development and a democratic 
revolution under the auspices of the bourgeoisie.
Those who perceived China as a feudal or semi-feudal society 
where capitalism had developed spontaneously and intrinsically, 
argued that the native bourgeoisie was indeed strong enough to 
sponsor a national democratic revolution, and that it was the task 
of the working class under the leadership of the Communist Party 
to back this native bourgeoisie in its efforts. This was to be 
part of the reasoning behind the First United Front (1924-27) in 
which the CCP had entered, as the junior partner into an alliance 
with the KMT. The disastrous outcome of conceding leadership of 
the Chinese revolution to the bourgeoisie did not, however, lead 
to a concession that the concept of the Asiatic mode of production 
might be of greater validity in evaluating the Chinese situation 
than the comfortable assumption that China had been a feudal
society and jtoould pursue much the same sequence of development as
'<
had Europe. On the contrary, at the Sixth Congress of the CCP 
(held in June-July 1928) the concept of the Asiatic mode of 
production was explicitly rejected as having no relevance for 
China. Chinese revolutionaries thus found themselves working 
within the rigid five-stage schema which was regarded as orthodox 
Marxism. This created certain problems for it was evident to some, 
including Mao Zedong, that Chinese society could not be treated 
simply as an Oriental variation of European society. Despite this
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appreciation of China's historical uniqueness, such 
revolutionaries had to formulate their strategy and tactics within 
this orthodox framework, or at least formulate their responses in 
a manner which did not blatantly contradict that orthodoxy.
The force of imperialism was crucial to Mao and the 
foundation of his thinking, which was guided by Marx's laws of 
socio-economic existence. This chapter has raised a number of 
issues which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter 
on class analysis and Chapter Six on united front policy. What has 
become clear is the importance of the concept of imperialism for 
Mao in the sense that it creates anti-imperialism. In addition, he 
had to live with the Comintern and ever-changing daily politics. 
In this broad context, I will now consider Mao's attempt to 
differentiate between friends and foes, that is, class analysis 
and his attempt to forge alliances of social groups of varying 
short and long-term agreement, i.e., the United Front concept. He 
believed that the correct identification of social forces would
decide the partners in the anti-imperialist struggle. How to
<
identify different social forces and how to understand the balance 
of forces in China was of crucial importance for the success of 
anti-imperialism and with it the socialist revolution in the 
country. Class analysis is particularly difficult in China and Mao 
adapted the concept to Chinese conditions. This became crucial for 
him in understanding imperialism and how to deal with it. The 
following chapter will deal with the concept of class analysis in 
Marx, Lenin and Mao.
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5. CLASS AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM
Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a 
question of the first importance for the revolution.
The basic reason why all previous revolutionary 
struggles in China achieved so little was their 
failure to unite with real friends in order to attack 
real enemies.1
< i) Introduction
The issue of classes, and their various social and 
political characteristics, was central to Mao's strategy and to 
his analysis of how imperialism had shaped Chinese society. 
Class analysis is, after all, about power: the way in which men 
and women gain power over others, how they use that power, how 
they maintain that power, and how those 'others' respond. Mao, 
among many others in the CCP, had to try to understand domestic 
classes and their make-up, their relationship with each other, 
as well as their connection to foreign interests, if he wanted
i.
to survive add if the CCP was to give some direction to events. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main question at issue in 
Marxist theories of imperialism is the interrelation of 
national and class oppression and exploitation. Imperialism 
provided the impetus for the fluidity of the class structure. 
Imperialism stimulated and shaped the rise both of a 
bourgeoisie and a proletariat while contributing to the 
intensification of the landlord-peasant contradiction. 
Imperialism affected the alliances, strategies, and conflicts 
among various groups in China and the linkage these groups had
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to imperialist powers. It could even lead to temporary 
unification of the various classes, as will be shown in more 
detail in the next chapter. One's attitude to imperialism, 
rather than one's economic status became one of the key
criteria by which Mao assessed an economic group as progressive 
or reactionary.
Lenin, as the discussion with M. N. Roy showed, believed 
that the identification of distinctive classes in colonies was 
crucial to the success of the revolution. Understanding the 
balance of forces in Russia had been a key issue for Lenin in 
the revolution of 1917. The need to identify and assess
different social forces was even more difficult in China due to 
the uneven and unfinished nature of socio-economic 
developments.
The emphasis in this chapter will be on how Mao attempted
to understand and use Marxist-Leninist class analysis in
Chinese circumstances, for without using "the fundamental
viewpoint of Marxism, i.e., the method of class analysis"2, one
?■
would not gain knowledge of social conditions in China. This 
issue is important as it involves changes in Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy.
Certainly neither Marx nor Lenin could have conceived 
of a socialist-oriented revolution in which the 
revolutionary forces of the countryside would 
organize to surround and overwhelm the non­
revolutionary cities, with the urban working class 
passively awaiting their liberation by revolutionary 
armies composed of peasants.3
Mao argued that the activity of revolutionaries could mobilize
society in the cause of socialism even where the class basis
for a socialist revolution was missing - although he also
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recognized that there were constraints on revolutionary 
activity. Class struggle was part and parcel of China’s 
liberation from imperialism. Marx, however, had accepted that 
economic reality limited conscious activity: "Mankind sets
itself only such tasks as it can solve", Marx wrote in 1859, 
"since . . . the task itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in 
the process of formation."4
This chapter will also explain how Mao's departure from 
orthodox Marxism-Leninism affected 'class analysis', one of the 
conceptual bases of his view of imperialism. Mao's position on 
the centrality of the peasantry and the countryside should not 
be seen as simply replacing Marx's view of the centrality of 
the working class and the cities. In some of his writings, Mao
emphasizes the working class and the city as the leader of all
the revolutionary classes. This can even be found in the Report 
on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan of March 
1927 and in Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society, of late 
1925. The important point about Mao's theoretical contribution, 
and this is a position he maintained until his death, is that 
he brought together Marx's view on the role of the working
class with the reality of China - where in the short term the 
revolution could only be won in the countryside by the
peasantry after the CCP had been forced there after 1927. 
However, he also accepted that in the long term the working 
class and the cities would be decisive. Besides the issue 
concerning the role of the peasantry the other issue to be 
considered is whether, like Marx, Mao focused on the material
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base as the primary factor in analyzing the relations of 
production, or whether he focused on the behavioural aspects of 
classes whose existence is taken as given. In other words, was 
his primary concern with the attitude of a given class towards 
imperialism and the sources of this attitude, rather than with 
the role of that class in the production process?
In China, the sheer number of peasants and their 
sufferings demanded that every politician take note of them, 
and Mao allocated to them a special role. In On New Democracy 
he stated: "The Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant
revolution . . . the anti-Japanese war is essentially a peasant 
war."5 He believed that the greatest enemies of the revolution
were especially imperialism and also feudalism, colluding in
• * ... 6
oppressing the Chinese people. Accordingly, anti-imperialism 
could only succeed if the peasantry destroyed the rule of the 
feudal landlord class, and the decisive struggle would have to 
be fought in the countryside.
Mao believed that the history of modern China was a
<-
history of imperialist aggression, and this was shared by many 
Chinese across the political spectrum. This sentence could have 
been said by Sun Yatsen or Chiang Kaishek. The intensification 
of imperialist aggression from the last few years of the 
nineteenth century bound the radical left and traditional right 
together in what Mary C. Wright called "intensive anti­
imperialist nationalism".7 Even before the Boxer Rebellion of 
1900, the decrepit monarchy was desperately engaged in 
countering the impact of imperialism. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, in the years following the First Opium War
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(1840-42) China had gone through many stages in relation to 
colonialism and imperialism: from disregard or disdain
bordering on contempt, through resistance and confrontation, 
defeat, humiliation, and bankruptcy (in more senses than one) , 
to unequal and temporary accommodation in a desperate and
determined battle. After the liberation of 194 9, the new 
People's Republic was in Mao's view still constrained by 
imperialism, and he sought, both in the domestic and foreign 
policy spheres, to overcome its ill-effects on the country. 
China, perhaps for the first time in 150 years, was becoming a 
truly sovereign and independent country.
(ii) Against Imperialism and Feudalism
Together with many other nationalists in China, Mao 
perceived imperialism as the main disease, the primary 
contradiction that had to be dealt with before anything else. 
Of course, imperialist intervention had also hastened the
disintegration of feudalism, accelerated the growth of 
capitalism in China, transformed the country into a hybrid 
'hypo-colony' (Sun Yatsen) or 'semi-colony' (Mao). Sun Yatsen 
saw this as disaster: China was worse off than a colony since
"we are not the slaves of one country, but of all".8 While Mao
agreed that China had been plunged into servitude, he 
recognized (as did his Marxist predecessors) the positive side, 
or the opportunities created by imperialism. However, he did 
not find it hard to draw up a final, negative balance sheet on
- . 226
the effects of imperialism.
In the 1930s and 1940s, many social scientists in China
and outside maintained that imperialism was undermining the
country's economy (see Chapter Four and its relevant sources).
Some concentrated on the impact of imperialism on agriculture,
others on the effects of trade and foreign investment, but they
agreed in seeing imperialism as the main enemy. The impact of
the West meant that traditional China entered an "era of
collapse . .. and only in the mid-twentieth century could a new
historical orthodoxy become established through the application
of Marxism-Leninism to China in the thought of Mao Tse-tung".9
China was often depicted as the virtually passive victim of
various forms of oppression. This is apparent in Mao's writing:
the imperialist powers have ... waged many wars of 
aggression against China . . . forced China to sign 
numerous unequal treaties . .. carved up the whole 
country into imperialist spheres of influence 
gained control of all the important trading ports in 
China ... dump[ed] their goods in China, turn her 
into a market for their industrial products, and at 
the same time subordinate her agriculture to their 
imperialist needs. [The imperialists proceeded to] 
exert ebonomic pressure on China's national industry 
and obstruct the development of productive forces ...
They have also secured a stronghold on her banking 
and finance . . . created a comprador and merchant- 
usurer class in their service, so as to facilitate 
their exploitation of the masses .. . made the feudal 
landlord class as well as the comprador class the 
main props of their rule in China ... suppl[ied] the ___ 
reactionary government with large quantities of 
munitions and a host of military advisers to keep the 
warlords fighting among themselves ... poison[ed] the 
minds of the Chinese people, [with] their policy of 
cultural aggression ... turned a big chunk of semi­
colonial China into a Japanese colony.10
Thus, as a result of aggression by foreign powers, Mao
concluded China underwent a transformation into a colonial,
semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.
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A 'Resolution of the CCP' in 1929 stated that
"international imperialism is the real ruler of China's total
political and economic life". It added, however: "With the
growing aggression of imperialism in China, the basic conflict
of interests among the imperialists themselves has also
deepened in the past year".11 Previously, at the Sixth National
Congress of the CCP in July 1928 in Moscow, it had been
established that the "two major tasks of the revolution at
present are the overthrow of imperialism and the agrarian
revolution".12 At the time Mao appeared to accept the positions
and policies of the Comintern, although later, due to the
nationalist component in his worldview, he came to criticize
some of its instructions.13
In Mao's view and that of the CCP, revolution in China
would even have an important impact world-wide.
The first stage of the Chinese revolution - the 
bourgeois-democratic one - helps the socialist world 
revolution, of which it is a major component. The 
second stage, in the future - the proletarian 
socialist revolution - will be even more a direct 
componeftt in the world socialist revolution. At the 
same time, the Chinese revolution will affect 
neighbouring countries - large colonies like India, 
Indo-China, Java, and Korea - arousing the teeming 
masses of those oppressed nations to political 
struggle; it will fundamentally shake the foundations 
of imperialist Japan and England and deal a heavy 
blow to capitalism in the USA. Therefore, the 
completion of the Chinese revolution will be the 
prelude to the victory of the world proletarian 
dictatorship.14
Unfortunately,
despite impressive development in the initial stage 
the Chinese revolution finally failed. At this 
historical stage, it did not have sufficient strength 
to overcome the numerous difficulties of the period.
Among the objective difficulties and causes [of 
failure], these should be mentioned. The first 
[cause] is the powerful strength of the
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imperialists.15
The other objective causes listed in the same resolution of the 
CCP were the betrayal by the national bourgeoisie, the powerful 
army led by the landlords, the uneven development of the 
movement of workers and peasants, and the vacillation of the 
petty bourgeoisie.16
(iii) Structuralism and Agency
Within Marxist theory, agents such as 'imperial capital', 
the 'imperial state', with an 'imperial policy'17 are major 
determinants of global politics and economics. Nevertheless, it 
is necessary to analyze the specific form and degree of China's 
integration into the world system, by reference to the existing 
class structure, the role of the state, the size, natural
resources and geopolitical location of the country, and the
€
historical context. There is always some room for manoeuvre 
when confronted with imperialism.18 This is a point that recurs 
in the Marxist literature on imperialism. Indeed one of the 
main criticisms of Frank and Wallerstein is that they neglect 
the aspect of human agency, and replace it with a limiting 
determinism. An overall assessment of Marx's work (see Chapter 
Two) shows that he acknowledged human beings, in a particular 
historical context, to be the makers of their own history. The 
fundamental contribution of Marx and Lenin was to demonstrate 
that classes rather than individuals were the decisive agents
229
of change. Identifying the progressive, wavering or reactionary 
forces is the first essential task in the quest to influence 
the direction of history.
The concept of class, or class analysis, was of central 
importance to Marx and Engels, and also to Mao, as I hope to 
demonstrate. Class struggle, as explained at the beginning of 
The Communist Manifesto, was the driving force of history. The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles, they had claimed. In the case of China, 
Marxism began to sink roots only after the May 4th Movement, 
and the beliefs in parliamentarianism, anarchism and liberalism 
had failed to yield benefits; at the same time Leninist theory 
had arrived and with it Comintern propagandists and agents and 
the Bolshevik Revolution had succeeded.19 Mao was introduced, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, to Marxism from reading parts of The 
Communist Manifesto and Kautsky's Karl Marx’s Okonomische 
Lehren, as well as a history of socialism by Kirkup and, in 
Yenan, Stalin’s History of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course. "Once I had accepted it as 
the correct interpretation of history", Mao said later, "I did 
not afterwards waver", and in 1920 he considered himself a 
Marxist.20
Although Mao perhaps misunderstood some elements of 
Marxism-Leninism at that time, Schram's assertion that he only 
became a real Marxist in the mid-1930s is a matter of opinion.21 
There certainly are a number of problems with Mao's rendering 
of Marxism-Leninism at that period, for example in an article 
of 1923 he elevated the merchants to leaders of the revolution:
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The present problem in China is none other than the 
problem of the national revolution. To use the 
strength of the people to overthrow the militarists 
and foreign imperialism, with which the former are in 
collusion to accomplish their treasonable acts, is 
the historic mission of the Chinese people. This 
revolution is the task of the people as a whole. The 
merchants, workers, peasants, students and teachers 
should all come forward to take on the responsibility 
for a portion of the revolutionary work; but because 
of historical necessity and current tendencies, the 
work for which the merchants should be responsible in 
the national revolution is both more urgent and more 
important than the work that the rest of the people 
should take upon themselves.22
However, it is debatable whether this rare mentioning of the
merchants as leaders is evidence that he was or was not a
Marxist. Not only because Mao mentioned the proletariat as the
leading class of the Chinese revolution innumerable times, but
also because the basis of Marxism is analysis in terms of
classes and the question of which class assumes leadership in
various contexts. Thus it is not uncommon for Marxists to argue
that in the face of incomplete capitalist industrialization and
external and imperialist pressures the national bourgeoisie
should temporarily assume political leadership. The question of
t;
the 'national bourgeoisie', indeed, had been the central point 
at issue in the discussions at the Second Comintern Congress in 
1920, as was discussed in Chapter Three.
Before entering into a detailed discussion of Mao's 
approach to class analysis, it is useful to look briefly at the 
earlier contribution of Marx and Lenin.
(iv) Marx and Lenin on Class Analysis
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A theme common to all Marxists whatever other differences
they may have is that theoretical analysis is crucially,
intrinsically related to praxis, to the goal of socialist
transformation of society. In the words of Marx in the eleventh
thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted
the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change
it."23 It is also worth recalling another frequently quoted
passage by Marx:
History does nothing: it 'does not possess immense
riches' , it 'does not fight battles'. It is men, 
real living men, who do all this, who possess things 
and fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses men 
as a means of achieving - as if it were an individual 
person - its own ends. History is nothing but the 
activity of men in pursuit of their ends.24
Throughout their work Marx and Engels continually affirmed 
that historical options exist and choices have to be made. This 
is a theme taken up by Lenin and with particular fervour by 
Mao. There may be certain objective preconditions that place 
revolution on the agenda at a particular time, but the outcome
is never determined in advance: revolution can succeed or be
<
defeated as a result of the human choices that are made. It 
would be misleading to counterpose a 'voluntarist* Lenin or Mao 
to a unilinear, economistic, or deterministic Marx. Mao did not 
replace one traditional Marxist axiom by its opposite, but 
tried to weave together Marxist-Leninist principles with 
Chinese reality. Marx always accepted the possibility of 
purposeful political action while Lenin and Mao recognized the 
importance of objective constraints. Another valuable passage 
from Marx, which is often only half-quoted to prove Marx's 
determinism, comes from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
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Bonaparte:
Men make their own history, but not of their own free 
will; not under circumstances they themselves have 
chosen but under given and inherited circumstances 
with which they are directly confronted. The 
tradition of the dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the minds of the living.25
Marx did not claim that he had been responsible for the 
discovery of classes. Indeed, the concept can already be found 
among the Physiocrats. In his Tableau Economique, (Versailles, 
1758), • Francois Quesnay distinguished between the 'classe 
productive1 of the farmers, the * class distributive* of the 
landowners, who lived off the land surpluses, revenues and 
profits, and the 'class sterile' of tradesmen and merchants.
The only claim that Marx made for himself was to have 
demonstrated: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound
up with particular, historic phases in the development of 
production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to 
the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) that this
dictatorship, itself only constitutes the transition to a new
\
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society and the abolition of all classes. According to 
Dahrendorf, the essential point to note is that using Hegelian 
dialectics "Marx was concerned ... with the analysis of certain 
laws of social development and of the forces involved in this 
development",26 rather than with describing an existing state of 
society as earlier writers had done.
Thus the concepts of class and class struggle could be 
said to be at the centre of everything that Marx and Engels 
wrote. Unfortunately, as is the case with the state, there is 
no clear-cut definition of class in any of Marx's writings, or
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as McLellan wrote: "Considering the importance of the idea of 
class for Marxf it is surprising that he offers no systematic 
analysis of the concept."27 Nor is there any systematic 
discussion of the relationship between class and political 
forces. Marx's concept of class includes how people perceive 
their position (class consciousness) and how they act upon that 
perception (class organization). The concept of class captures 
not only the statistical distribution of a people but also its 
developing subjective and organizational forces. Classes are 
both made by, and makers of, history in the sense of developing 
from a class in itself through class consciousness and class 
organization, to a class for itself. There are some rudimentary 
paragraphs on classes in volume 3, Chapter 52 of Capital.28 But 
the key thoughts are to be found in The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Marx located classes initially at the level of relations 
of production, that is he identified people according to the 
relationship' in which they stood to the means of production. He 
believed that people's consciousness of their position, and the 
level of political activity they were engaged in were 
additional determinants, but their location in the economic 
structure was the primary determinant of their class. Classes 
had an objective base in the economic system and within the 
larger boundaries of classes, fractions of classes were 
located. A class was moved to becoming a political actor and 
gaining class consciousness in the process of contradictory 
interaction with other classes. Organizations were needed to 
guide and channel class objectives. Allen Cottrell has argued
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that
While the 'Manifesto' affirms a clear and definite 
proposition concerning the necessary relationship 
between the basic classes and political forces - one 
in which the latter must eventually coincide with or 
correspond to the former - Marx does not actually 
sustain this proposition ... The 'Eighteenth 
Brumaire', by contrast, provides a useful account of 
the many complex forms of concrete relationship which 
may obtain between classes and political forces.29
For Marx and Engels, the whole story of classes began when
the development of social productivity gave rise to a surplus,
and thus raised the question of how this surplus should be
divided. Eventually this led to a division within society
itself, with one class being in a position to control and
accumulate a surplus that it had not directly produced. In The
Communist Manifesto, capitalism is said to have created the
seeds of its own downfall, with the proletariat pitted against
the bourgeoisie. However, this does not mean that Marx and
Engels reduced society to just two classes. To take one
example:
In Gerfnany they [the communists] fight with the 
bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, 
against the absolute monarchy, the feudal 
squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie. But they 
never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the 
working class the clearest possible recognition of 
the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, in order that the German workers may 
straightaway use, as so many weapons against the 
bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that 
the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with 
its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of 
the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against 
the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.30
It is perhaps in The Eighteenth Brumaire that Marx moved
most clearly beyond the kind of two-class analysis of society
that some authors have seen in The Communist Manifesto and,
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with rather more justification, in the 1859 Preface to a 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Thus, in The 
Eighteenth Brumaire he discussed the role of the petty 
bourgeoisie as a transitional class, and paid considerable 
attention to the small-holding peasants.31 Not only did he 
recognize the complexity of the class structure, he argued that 
the bourgeoisie too should be seen not as a united class but as 
a class divided in itself, some fractions of which might be 
available for (temporary) alliances, something which became one 
of the key issues for Mao. We might say that there is not so 
much a contradiction in Marx’s work as a difference in 
theoretical level between The Communist Manifesto and his 
historical writings. The former lays down the ground rules, as 
it were, while in The Eighteenth Brumaire the theoretical 
conclusions are tested, adjusted and applied. This reading is 
supported by the short fragment in volume 3, Chapter 52 of 
Capital where Marx distinguished three basic classes: the
owners of (labour-power, the owners of capital and the 
landowners. He further noted the existence of "intermediate and 
transitional strata [which] obscure also here [in England] the 
class boundaries".32 It is this term 'intermediate strata' which 
will be discussed by Mao as well, as I will show in this 
chapter.
Finally, when Marx discussed economic crises in general, 
in his Theories of Surplus Value33 he announced that for the 
purpose of his preliminary analysis he would neglect "the real 
constitution of society, which by no means consists of 
industrial capitalists". A little further on, in considering
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the growth of the middle classes, he writes:
What [Ricardo] forgets to emphasize is the continual 
increase in numbers, .of the middle classes ...
situated midway between the workers on one side and 
the capitalists and landowners on the other ... [who] 
rest with all their weight upon the working basis and 
at the same time increase the social security and 
power of the upper ten thousand.34
Marx believed that the middle strata (or middle classes, or
sometimes 'middle estates') would sooner or later be forced to
choose between affiliation with either the bourgeoisie or the
proletariat. However, he regarded the struggle of the middle
strata against the bourgeoisie not as revolutionary, but as
conservative, if not reactionary. "If by chance they are
revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending
transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their
present, but their future interests",35 again an issue which
confronted Mao.
The peasantry was for Marx essentially a transitory
phenomenon as capitalism would wipe it out. Thus he never
focused in (his thinking on a feudal or semi-feudal society.
According to Marx, the relationship between classes depended on
the level of development a society had reached. If the issue
was movement from capitalism to socialism the proletariat would
fight the bourgeoisie. If however the bourgeois-democratic
revolution was on the agenda the working class could find
itself under bourgeois guidance locked in struggle against a
feudal class. However, he never addressed the issue of
relations between classes in a country fighting foreign
domination, i.e. imperialism. It is true that in the case of
Ireland he inferred that national autonomy might be a
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prerequisite for the solution of other problems.36
Turning to Lenin, we find that in 1919 he gave a general
definition of classes as
large groups of people differing from each other by 
the place they occupy in a historically determined 
system of social production, by their relation (in
most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means 
of production, by their role in the social
organization of labour, and, consequently, by the 
dimensions of the share of social wealth of which 
they dispose and the mode of acquiring it ... (and 
as] groups of people one of which can appropriate the 
labour of another owing to the different places they 
occupy in a definite system of social economy.37
Thus, the development of class consciousness was dictated by 
and related to the position which groups occupied in the socio­
economic structure.
One of the problems of class analysis for Lenin concerned 
the role of the peasantry. Basing himself on a few paragraphs 
in Capital, he divided the Russian peasantry into a land-owning 
village bourgeoisie (the Kulaks) and a village proletariat that 
sold its labour-power to the wealthier peasants. However, this 
seems like fa forced application of the two-class pattern. 
Marx's discussion of the French peasantry in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire had posed the theoretical problem in sharper focus:
The small peasant proprietors form an immense mass,
the members of which live in the same situation but
do not enter into manifold relationships with each 
other . . . Each individual peasant family is almost ~ 
self-sufficient ... Thus the great mass of the French 
nation is formed by the simple addition of 
isomorphous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack 
form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of 
families live under economic conditions of existence 
that separate their mode of life, their interests and 
their cultural formation from those of the other 
classes and bring them into conflict with those 
classes, they form a class. In so far as these small 
peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local 
basis, and the identity of their interests fails to 
produce a feeling of community, national links, or a
238
political organisation, they do not form a class.38
This line of argument refers us to the general problem of
class-consciousness. In describing the emergency of the
proletariat Marx put it in these words:
Economic conditions had in the first place 
transformed the mass of the people into workers. The 
domination of capital created the common situation 
and common interests of this class. Thus this mass is 
already a class in relation to capital, but not yet a 
class for itself. In the struggle ... this mass 
unites and forms itself into a class for itself. The 
interests which it defends become class interests.39
The peasantry, however, was not able to understand the nature
of its exploitation, nor articulate its grievances, nor
organize itself to change its situation. A similar problem,
though with many peculiarities, was raised by the social and
political role of odd groups such as the lumpenproletariat, a
significant actor in the class struggles in France between 1848
and 1850 and the subject of some fascinating pages in Marx's
writings on the period.
t
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(v) Vanguard Class and Vanguard Party
It is only in the context of Lenin’s analysis of 
capitalism that one can understand his characterization of "the 
proletariat as the vanguard class leading the struggle of all 
the exploited (artisans and rural proletariat and semi—  
proletariat included), first against the autocracy and then 
against capital. The proletariat was the vanguard class not 
simply because Marx had said so, and Marx never used the term
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vanguard anyway, but because it alone was in a position to come 
to an adequate understanding of the system of exploitation. The 
socialization of labour, its stark confrontation with massive 
wealth, its mobility, its convenient lines of communication, 
its distance from the patriarchal, religious and local ties of 
village life, formed the objective and necessary conditions for 
the growth of class consciousness and organization. But they 
did not form sufficient conditions. Lenin argued that the mass 
proletariat would spontaneously arrive at trade union 
consciousness only. In order to acquire genuine consciousness 
of its position in society and of its objectively grounded 
revolutionary potential, it needed a vanguard of professional 
revolutionaries, whose horizons were not defined by the 
immediate production process, to act as a kind of midwife. It 
was not necessary that this vanguard should be composed 
entirely of workers; members of other classes, breaking their 
ideological ties, could cross over and participate centrally in
the revolution. Lenin introduced this 'voluntarist' element by
<•
assigning to the Party the task of raising class consciousness 
among the proletariat where this was latent or not fully 
developed. While Marx believed that class consciousness came 
from an objective class situation, Lenin however believed it 
was possible to foster this consciousness. For this reason he 
emphasized the educational and organizational tasks of the 
Communist Party.
In describing the social nature of classes, and assessing 
their potential role in the revolution, Lenin gave considerable 
weight to moral, psychological and pragmatic criteria. He never
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abandoned Marx's view that in the last analysis it was the 
proletariat, with the help of the militant party, which would 
have to accomplish the revolution.40 In fact, many of his 
writings on party and class recall Marx's own arguments in the 
1847-4 8 period, when he insisted that although the German 
proletariat was still numerically weak, it could make up for 
this by theoretical and organizational sophistication and 
clear-sightedness.41 Nevertheless, this should not be taken as 
indicating that Marx was for a small group of self-selected 
militants standing above the proletariat.
Generally speaking, however, Lenin placed much greater 
emphasis than Marx on the distinction between organization and 
class. Moreover, this workers' vanguard now had enormous 
responsibilities: "(1) convincing the semi-proletariats of the 
identity of interest shared with the proletariat, (2) 
representing all (emphasis in original) the exploited in the 
national, hence political, domain, and (3) clarifying and
making more (apparent the essential polarity into which society
<
was riven.”42
As capitalism was quite far advanced in Russia, and as the 
bourgeoisie had shown itself incapable of accomplishing the 
democratic revolution, this task now fell to the workers. 
Later, Mao phrased this same issue as follows: "History has
proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot fulfil this 
responsibility, which inevitably falls upon the shoulders of 
the proletariat."43 They could not carry it out alone, however, 
and had to seek allies among the semi-proletarians - a wavering 
force but one which, as Marx had seen at the time of the
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Commune, could be united with the proletariat. Lenin also 
expected major opposition among the narrow-minded ranks of the 
peasantry, but he trusted them far more than the discredited 
bourgeoisie as a potential ally in the revolution. Indeed, 
after 1918 he declared the peasantry to be an autonomous class, 
able to engage in alliances and - under the leadership of the 
proletariat - to share state power. The Communist Party could 
not only have an impact on the development of consciousness in 
the proletariat, but in other classes as well. The proletariat 
could, if strong enough, arouse the peasantry to revolutionary 
consciousness. In this view Lenin differed with Marx, but on 
the idea that the proletariat could guide the peasantry, he was 
close to Marx.
Similarly, writing about China in 1912, Lenin stated that 
the principal social base for the democratic movement was the 
peasantry - the objective positions of semi-feudalism requiring 
struggle against rural-based reactionary bureaucracy.44 However,
mindful that the consolidation of the bourgeois revolution
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required the development and leadership of a proletarian class, 
he added: "Whether the peasants, who are not led by a
proletarian party, will be able to retain their democratic
positions against (emphasis in original) the liberals, who_are 
only waiting for an opportunity to shift to the right, will be 
seen in the near future."45 With regard to the position of
classes after the socialist revolution, Lenin was generally
very circumspect in his analyses and predictions. In conformity 
with Marx, who understood socialism as a transitional phase, 
not as a mode of production between capitalism and communism,
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Lenin wrote in 1920: "Classes still remain, and will remain,
everywhere for years after (emphasis in original) the 
proletariat's conquest of power." The nationalization or 
expropriation of landowners or industrialists did not eliminate 
classes, he added:
The abolition of classes means, not merely ousting the 
landowners and the capitalists - that is something we 
accomplish with comparative ease; it also means abolishing 
the small commodity producers, and they cannot be ousted, 
or crushed; we must learn to live with them. They can (and 
must) be transformed and re-educated only by means of very 
prolonged, slow, and cautious organization work, (emphasis 
in original)46
(vi) Beyond an Economic Definition of Class
Over the years it has become clear that an 'economic' 
definition of classes is inadequate. One cannot simply 'read 
off* the shape of political forces from an economic class 
analysis, since various kinds of national, religious, gender or 
racial loyalty can (and often do) override socioeconomic ties. 
Nevertheless, Marx's analysis in The Eighteenth Brumaire is 
still in many ways a model for disentangling antagonistic 
contradictions in capitalist society in theoretical terms and a 
guide for political struggles. Similarly, in Lenin's 
theoretical and revolutionary activity, he went far beyond a 
simple application of Marx's general thoughts - something that 
Marx and Engels themselves would have seen as totally out of 
keeping with the spirit of their work.
In China the situation was analogous. Marx and Lenin
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provided for the Chinese communists, in the selective versions 
available to Mao and his associates, a framework on which to 
base their analysis of existing reality, so that they might 
then use this analysis as a guide in their political struggle. 
It is not clear to what extent Lenin’s view of the 
revolutionary capacity of the peasantry influenced Mao, but he 
developed a similar view. For this reason, and some other 
similarities, Schram has called Mao a 'natural Leninist' as if 
in Mao's situation one could not really have chosen any other 
path.47 The theoretical task of class analysis was difficult in 
China, however, and the Marxist legacy less immediately 
relevant, as Marx's writings on the Asiatic mode of production 
had described a society in which there were no classes: if
there was anybody changing society it was the Oriental despot 
with his gentry, controlling the state machinery. Most Chinese 
communists however did not commence an analysis of Chinese 
society or history from this standpoint; rather they saw China
as a feudal or semi-feudal society. Marx's concept of an
<
Asiatic mode of production fits well into his own assessment of 
colonies in the Orient. As they were stagnant, these societies 
needed capitalism to brake this 'historyless' situation, the 
Asiatic mode of production helped to justify the 'progressive' 
qualities of Western intervention. It also tended to 
deligitimize the progressive potential of Asian revolutions. 
For Wittfogel in his Oriental Despotism, it also led to the 
'Tartarization' of the Soviet Union, especially after Stalin 
took over, who put an end to any discussion of this concept at 
a conference in Leningrad in 1931.48 Nevertheless, Mao
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confronted problems in much the same way as Lenin had done, and 
Marx had written about - from the perspective of how to achieve 
the socialist revolution. Many of the issues that they had 
touched upon were taken up again by Mao in China, with 
resulting similarities and differences. It is hoped that this 
is made clear in the following pages.
(vii) Mao on Class
Class struggle could be said, suitably transformed, to be 
the methodological key to an understanding of Mao's conception 
of the United Front, the mass line, proletarian consciousness, 
and political participation in social struggle. It could also 
be related in various ways to national liberation, nationalism 
and military mobilization. Moreover, as Mao suggested in the 
first article in his Selected Works, an adequate approach to 
all these iiiterlinked questions requires the carrying out of a 
serious class analysis.49 Mao perceived the actual struggle 
between classes as political in the broadest sense. Class 
struggle was a manifestation in intensified form of the 
economically generated hostility between classes, and _the 
hostility was played out in the realm of politics. Correct 
assessment of the contemporary balance of forces in Chinese 
society, and to an important degree also internationally, was 
essential for the survival of the still small forces of the 
Communist Party, especially after the collapse of the First 
United Front. With this in mind Mao asked: "Given the nature of
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Chinese society and the present targets and tasks of the 
Chinese revolution as analysed and defined ... what are the 
motive forces of the Chinese revolution?"50
The Marxist theory of class analysis is very difficult to 
apply in all societies, and this was so in China, especially 
given the ambivalence of many Chinese and their apparent 
preference for shifting allegiances and forging factional net­
works. For example, while the elite had conservative and 
reformist wings, these were not clearly bound groups, not to 
mention groups distinguished by divergent property interests. 
Moreover, the reformist elite was often connected by ties of 
sympathy or blood to that key radical stratum of educated 
people with low status, such as students or educated soldiers. 
Similarly, secret society members could fluidly establish ties 
with either the radical or conservative elements.51 In the 
orthodox vein, Mao believed the existence of classes and class 
struggle to be a fundamental and omnipresent factor of all 
human society except the most primitive. However, the assertion 
of the fundamental character of class and class struggle could 
not anticipate the form and intensity that these might assume 
at particular historical moments; there were clearly varied 
specific instances of the general rule, a point which I have 
made earlier concerning Mao's overarching Marxist laws and his 
sinification of them.
(viii) Classes in Town and Countryside
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As we shall see, the existence of many divergent classes, 
groups and sub-groups created a danger of confusion, but it 
also offered more options with which to endure difficult times. 
"So long as these splits and wars [among the compradors and 
feudal landlords] continue", Mao wrote in 1928, "it is possible 
for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to 
survive and grow".52
The problem was of course that the political and military 
situation changed constantly, leading to a different 
constellation of forces and perspectives for the revolution. As 
Mao put it: "The uneven political and economic development in
China gives rise to the uneven development of her revolution,1,53 
and continuing his analysis of classes of 1926 and 1927, Mao 
clarified in 1935 many of the central elements in his strategic 
thinking:
China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic 
revolution, and this revolution can be completed only 
under the leadership of the proletariat. Because the 
proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the 
revolution of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung 
and spread towards the Yangtze River, leadership was 
seized by the comprador and landlord classes and the 
revolution was replaced by counter-revolution. The 
bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a 
temporary defeat. This defeat was a heavy blow to the 
Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a blow to 
the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and 
landlord classes) ... The long-term survival inside a 
country of one or more small areas under Red 
political power completely encircled by a White 
regime is a phenomenon that has never occurred 
anywhere else in the world. There are special reasons 
for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop 
only under certain conditions.
First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country 
or in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but 
can only occur in China which is economically 
backward, and which is semi-colonial and under 
indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual 
phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another 
unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White
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regime . . . Two things account for its occurrence, 
namely, a localised agricultural economy (not a
unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist
policy of marking off spheres of influence in order 
to divide and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars 
within the White regime provide a condition for the 
emergence and persistence of one or more small Red 
areas under the leadership of the Communist Party 
amidst the encirclement of the White regime ... If 
only we realise that splits and wars will never cease 
within the White regime in China, we shall have no 
doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth 
of Red political power.
Second, the regions where China's Red political 
power has first emerged and is able to last for a 
long time have not been those unaffected by the 
democratic revolution, such as Szechuan, Kweichow, 
Yunnan and the northern provinces, but regions such 
as the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and 
Kiangsi, where the masses of workers, peasants and
soldiers rose in great numbers in the course of the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and 1927 . . . 
Third, whether it is possible for the people's 
political power in small areas to last depends on 
whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation
continues to develop . . . Fourth, the existence of a 
regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary 
condition for the existence of Red political power 
... Fifth, another important condition in addition to 
the above is required for the prolonged existence and 
development of Red political power, namely, that the 
Communist Party Organisation should be strong and its 
policy correct.54
Divisions within the bourgeois and landlord camp meant
<•
that the communists continually had to adapt their relations 
with classes in accordance with the shifting situation, or 
rather not pay much importance to them but to their policy 
interests. Thus the bourgeoisie, condemned at the end of __the 
1920s as the grave-digger of the social and national 
revolution, could appear in the mid-1930s as a partly reliable 
ally in the struggle against Japanese imperialism which took 
the form of the Second United Front.55
The problems of class analysis in China were, Muller has
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argued, threefold. First, methodologically, there was no 
tradition of sociological analysis in China, and much of the 
relevant terminology had to be developed from scratch. For 
example, 'proletariat' was rendered into Chinese as lao-tunq 
chieh-chi, as well as lao-kunq chieh-chi and also wu-ch'an 
chieh-chi. Secondly, linguistically, the nature of the Chinese 
language is such that lao-tung chieh-chi, for example, could 
mean either the modern 'working class' or 'the class of all 
those working', i.e. producing something, like workers, 
peasants or craftsmen, in contrast to those 'not working' like 
the bourgeoisie or gentry; or 'the working classes', i.e. the 
different classes of the working people. The Chinese 
terminology of class concepts was anyway, probably derived from 
the Japanese.56 The third problem was ideological. Muller argues 
that ideological problems in China could only be solved by 
taking over and propagating the complete theory of Marxism- 
Leninism, rather than just discrete parts of it.57 This however 
would have dpndemned Chinese revolutionaries to wait until all 
the works of Marx and Lenin had been translated for them if not 
to wait until the socio-economic situation in their respective 
countries was 'right* and 'ripe' for the revolution. If only 
partial, Mao's knowledge of their work undoubtedly affected-his 
approach to understanding social forces in China.
Class analysis in China, however, at any time after the 
foundation of the Communist Party in 1921, was confronted with 
more problems than Marx could ever have envisaged. Asiatic or 
feudal, semi-capitalist (as in Russia's obshchina) or semi­
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colonial, capitalists, workers, compradors, peasants and all 
their shades of differences: it was difficult to see how one 
could ever get it right categorizing people in different 
classes, when fighting a social revolution for the peasants or 
workers - together with a national revolution against foreign 
imperialists and their Chinese supporters. A further problem is 
that Mao, himself, in his attempts to define different classes, 
mixed together criteria related to politics or even life-style 
with more traditional economic criteria, as will be shown in 
Section xi of this chapter.38 In his later work he indicated 
that one had to differentiate between class background and 
personal behaviour and the main emphasis should be laid on the 
latter. To start with class background only would be wrong,59 as 
this would limit one's understanding of how a specific group 
would respond to imperialism. The important point was to agree 
with the political prospect and goal of the proletariat. 
Proletarian consciousness could exist independent of one's 
actual class background. This is the special contribution of 
Mao to the Marxist concept of class analysis.
(ix) Uniting the Masses against Imperialists
In the years up to his arrival in Yenan, Mao had been able 
to avoid the dangers within the Communist Party of putschism, 
in the city and the countryside, left and right opportunism and 
takeover by the right.60 But there is a certain consistency in 
his thinking on nationalism, military struggle, feudalism, the
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effects of imperialism on China and the need to come to terms 
with the Western world in general. These traits can be followed 
back at least to the time of the May 4th Movement in 1919, when 
Mao - who at the time was not a Marxist - rejected the Sino- 
Japanese peace on the grounds that it was signed in the context 
of the Peace of Versailles. But in The Great Union of the 
Popular Masses,61 where he praised the precedent of the October 
Revolution and revealed his radicalism, he advocated a
programme not so much of class struggle but of mobilization of
all social groups for the renewal of China, with the
unification of the peasants, workers, students, women, primary 
school teachers, policemen, rickshaw boys to fight imperialism 
together. In this task of achieving the great union (da tonq, 
the same term used by Sun Yatsen, the Taiping, Kang Youwei and 
of course Confucius) of the Chinese people, young people rather 
t.han workers or peasants as such were to play the main role. In 
the 'Manifesto of the Third National Congress of the CCP' in 
June 1923, when Mao was elected to the Central Committee, it 
was stated:
The Chinese people are doubly oppressed both by 
foreign powers and by warlords, and the nation's
existence, as well as the freedom of its people, are 
in an extremely precarious state. Not only the 
workers, peasants, and students, but also the 
peaceful and moderate merchants feel oppressed.62
The unusual thing here is that his class categories are not
rigorously identified at the level of relations of production;
they are descriptive rather than analytical. This cannot be
described as Marxist class analysis, except as a faltering
attempt to examine a situation in terms of class roles.
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Mao was consistent in fighting imperialism on the basis of 
unification with the masses - something Lenin saw in the same 
way, even though he might have been a bit more selective about 
the partners. Apparently at that time, the intensity with which 
one suffered imperialist exploitation qualified one as part of 
the popular vanguard. It is possible that Mao knew about 
Lenin's Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question, as 
Chinese delegates had been to the Second Congress of the 
Comintern in 1920.63 This draft discussed the proletariat's 
tactics concerning the agrarian problem and analyzed the 
peasantry. The First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current 
Situation (June 1922)64 saw the major problem in China as 
'imperial and feudal militarism' against which the proletariat 
should unite with democratic groups. There was however no 
analysis of the class base of the groups. Taking advice from 
the Comintern, the CCP joined the KMT in 1923 in an alliance. 
Since there was no analysis of the class base of the KMT (see 
the discussion of Sneevliet's (Maring's) 'bloc-of-various- 
classes' in the next chapter), considerations of class could 
not have been a primary motive for the First United Front. Mao 
discussed class in the context of "the problems of national 
revolution ... to overthrow the militarists and foreign 
imperialists".65 He did detailed class analysis in the context 
of rural revolution, especially in 1930.
In 1925, Mao retired to Shaoshan and the revolutionary 
force he found among the peasants had a deep and lasting impact 
on him. Consequently, in his statement on class in the same 
year (Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society) he devoted a
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major part to an analysis of the peasantry. Up to 1927 and the 
end of the First United Front, Mao mainly divided China between 
the masses, or popular masses or Chinese nation, and the rest. 
Just as Lenin ridiculed the idea of pure democracy, so Mao 
argued that the operation of democracy should be limited by the 
exclusion of certain classes from the people. For Mao the term 
'revolutionary masses' always meant more than the general
populace, it had a progressive connotation, it had class 
distinctions within it. The 'people' were more like those
worthy of being - the people. Any notion of democracy which 
extended to the whole people ignored the clash of
irreconcilable class interests.
After 1927 the central task for the Communist Party was to 
mobilize the 'broad masses' for the struggle against
imperialism and the KMT, and to spread the revolution.66 From
1.932 Comintern pressure grew for such a type of cooperation. In 
1935 Mao advocated changing the 'Workers' and Peasants'
Republic' slpgan into a 'People's Republic', again emphasizing
<•
the need for unity, which could be characterized with the term 
'united front from below'. The 'United Front' was to be based 
on an assessment of foreign forces rather than an economic,
internal class analysis, because the struggle against those 
forces represented the principal contradiction at the time.67
Nevertheless, Mao's distinctive emphasis on the
revolutionary potential of the peasantry had begun to take
shape in the 1920s. In 1925, a Chinese worker was killed by a 
Japanese foreman in Shanghai in what became known as the 30th 
May incident. In the resulting demonstrations more people were
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shot, the Chamber of Commerce called for a general strike, and
the peasants began to play a very important role in support of
the urban demonstrators.68 Mao later mentioned the influence of
these events on his own development:
Formerly I had not fully realized the degree of class 
struggle among the peasantry, but after the May 30th 
incident [1925] and during the great wave of 
political activity which followed it, the Hunanese 
peasantry became very militant. I left my home where 
I had been resting, and began a rural organisational 
campaign.69
His Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (1925), 
indicates an uncertain grasp of Marxist-Leninist theory. Mao 
classified some groups on the basis of income and not ownership 
of means of production. However by analysing class in terms of 
national revolution, in suggesting the evolution of alliances, 
in identifying the peasantry and its potential for a positive 
role in the revolution, and in using (however haphazardly) the 
concept of relations of production, Mao was operating largely 
within the Marxist-Leninist paradigm.
\(■
(x) The Peasantry as the Decisive Force
We will now consider Mao's assessment of the peasantry, 
which is generally mentioned either as an example of his 
deviation from orthodox Marxism-Leninism, or his enrichment of 
it. Remembering novels such as Water Margin and the peasant 
uprisings described in these, overall, Mao perceived China's 
peasantry as lacking effective political organization, 
leadership, and programmes for change. The class struggles of
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the peasants, the peasant uprisings and peasant wars 
constituted the real motive force of historical development in 
Chinese feudal society. Despite these numerous peasant 
rebellions, economic disaffection had not been translated into 
meaningful opposition to the feudal system; consequently, the 
proletariat in the form of the CCP was essential as a guiding 
force. Given the reality of China's economic and political 
life, the peasantry was then able to play a key role in 
defeating imperialism. "Without the poor peasants, there will 
be no revolution."70 For much of the next decade - the Hunan 
Report had originally been written in 1927 - the peasants
became the main force in Mao's theory of the revolution in 
China, if it was led by the CCP and the working class. This 
clearly conflicted with Lenin's view of the peasantry as an 
important but only ancillary force. It also contradicted the 
Comintern orthodoxy of the time which, though recognizing the 
centrality of the agrarian question, laid its main emphasis on 
the role of (the proletariat.
Sentences such as "Though not very numerous, the 
industrial proletariat represents China's new productive 
forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has 
become the leading force [before 1951 the text had read 'the 
main force', WD] in the revolutionary movement",71 do appear in 
Mao's work. Reinforcing the role of the proletariat in On New 
Democracy (1940) he said that the leadership of the Chinese 
revolution had passed into the hands of the proletarian CCP 
from around 1919 with the May 4th Movement. It is difficult to 
say whether these sentences form the organizing principle of
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his thought, and in any case they were sometimes 'edited into* 
post-war editions. Certainly up to the middle 1930s the CCP in 
general submitted to Comintern guidance. This guidance was
after Lenin's death defined in Stalinist and Soviet national 
interest terms. The only place where the CCP could physically
survive after the collapse of the First United Front was in the
countryside. In addition the revolutionary subject proletariat 
was very limited in numbers. Even though it is difficult to 
measure misery, at least in people affected there was more of 
it in the countryside. If the social and anti-imperialist 
revolution was to be achieved, and if the Party wanted to
acquire the leadership of this revolutionary movement, the
Party had to accept these realities. Anyway, the CCP had also 
been forced into the countryside. For those reasons Mao
advocated centering the CCP's work in the countryside among the 
peasantry in those years.
However, not only was final victory not assured without
the cities,( but with increasing knowledge of the Marxist-
<■
Leninist classics, the need to legitimize his status in the
Party, and the belief that the CCP represented proletarian
consciousness, Mao gave more attention to the working class.
However, I think the following quote is typical concerning
Mao's faith in the peasants:
It would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the
cities, but in our opinion it would also be wrong for 
any of our Party members to fear the growth of
peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' 
strength and harm the revolution. For the revolution 
in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must 
always fail if it does not have the leadership of the 
workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the 
peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the
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workers.72
Mao's analysis of the Chinese countryside was certainly
highly differentiated:
No matter where you go in the villages, if you are a 
careful observer, you will see the following eight 
types of people: big landowners; small landowners;
peasant landholders; semi-landholders; sharecroppers; 
poor peasants; farm labourers and rural artisans; 
elements declasses; these eight types of people form 
eight separate classes. Their economic status and 
standard of living differs, this in turn influences 
their psychology, so that their attitudes toward 
revolution also differ.73
In this article, he identified three groups of classes: the
landlord class and the comprador class, the middle bourgeoisie,
the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletariat and the
proletariat. He then discussed the interests of these different
'classes'. In a way this analysis and the Report on an
Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,74 where he made
divisions of rich, middle and poor peasants in terms of their
access to the means of production and then assessed their
revolutionary potential, does not really conflict with Marx's
\
economic analysis of classes. The difference lay in the 
definition of the revolutionary subject measured by their 
attitude against imperialism. In his Struggle in the Jinqqang 
Mountains, Mao pinpoints an intermediate class of small 
landlords and rich peasants; they are intermediate in the above 
sense of ' for us or against us' . Even though they have much in 
common with the thinking of the CCP, they might defect from the 
CCP because of the 'White Terror' or because of 'the pressure 
of daily life'. This analysis is also used by Mao for an 
assessment of the 'vacillating' bourgeoisie.75 This was not just
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a matter of numbers. In a table (deleted in the revised
editions) Mao found close to 200 million peasants of one kind 
or another who, as he stated, supported the revolution. This 
insistence on numerical majority was not just an attempt to 
discover grounds for optimism but also to locate the source of 






1. those with surplus (right-wing) 15,000,000
2. those self-supporting 75,000,000
3. those with declining incomes (left- 60,000,000
wing)
Semi-proletariat
1. semi-tenant peasants 50,000,000
2. "semi-self-supporting tenants?" 60,000,000
3. poor peasants 60,000,000
4. handicraftsmen 24,000,000





1. industrial proletariat 2,000,000
2. city coolies 3,000,000
3. agricultural proletariat 20,000,000
4. lumpenproletariat 20,000,000
Total 400,000,000 76
A point of interest is the language used by Mao in his Report
on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. At the
beginning of the report he wrote:
In a very short time, in China's central, southern 
and northern provinces several hundred million
peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a
hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no
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power, however great, will be able to hold it back.
They will smash all the trammels that bind them and 
rush forward along the road to liberation. They will 
sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt 
officials, local tyrants, and evil gentry into their 
graves.77
Language like this is hard to find in Mao's earlier writings. 
But it was not merely the fury of the peasants which played a 
part; he also argued that the peasantry was able to organize a 
coherent strategy through its peasant associations. Mao 
defended their extremes: "A revolution is not a dinner party,
or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing 
embroidery." The peasants were not 'riff-raff but the vanguard 
of the agrarian revolution.'78 It was experience, struggles 
against the big landlords, sometimes including their 
assassination, which created out of these downtrodden peasants 
the force which could challenge the feudal power in the 
country. A collapse of the power of the 'big* landlords was 
more important than it appeared because these landlords were,
together with the 'big' compradors, on the side of imperialism.
>
They hindered the development of productive forces in China,
and protected foreign imperialists.79 The peasant associations,
however, could unite the social, anti-feudal revolution with
the national, anti-imperialist revolution. Thus, everything
depended on the poor peasants:
The poor peasants have always been the main force in 
the bitter fight in the countryside . .. They are the 
most responsive to Communist Party leadership ... 'We 
joined the Peasants Association long ago' they say to 
the rich peasants, 'why are you still hesitating?'.
The rich peasants answer mockingly, 'what is there to 
keep you from joining? You people have neither a tile 
over your heads nor a speck of land under your feet!'
What, indeed, is there to keep them from joining the 
association?
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This Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in 
Hunan gives a preview of Mao's faith in the revolutionary 
potential of the peasantry and the central position he actually 
assigned to them in the revolution. In 1927, until the 
Comintern changed its policies in favour of peasant soviets and 
ordered the CCP to follow suit, Mao was out of tune with his 
own Central Committee. The centre of action for Mao thus lay in 
the countryside. The struggle in the cities was undoubtedly 
important, but the power of feudal landlords had to be 
destroyed before - or rather together with - the power of the 
compradors. After all, "the landlord class and the comprador 
class are wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, 
depending upon imperialism for their survival and growth",81 and 
the overthrow of this feudal power was after all the real 
objective of the national revolution.82 Mao sometimes called the 
peasantry the vanguard of the revolution. "The leadership by 
the poor peasants is an absolute necessity. Without the poor 
peasants there would be no revolution . . . They have never been 
wrong on the general direction of the revolution, they have 
never committed a mistake."83 And virtually twenty years later 
he wrote:
It is the peasants who are the main source of China's 
industrial workers ... It is the peasants who 
constitute the main market for China's industry ...
It is the peasants who are the source of the Chinese
army ... It is the peasants who are the main
political force for democracy in China at the present
stage ... It is the peasants who are the chief
concern of China's cultural movement ...84
Emphasizing the social revolution, the attack on landlords is
part of a Marxist-Leninist approach. However, the proposition
260
that the peasantry could be the leading force of the revolution 
goes beyond Lenin's view that one can give the peasantry a 
significant, though subordinate role. What one finds is a 
sophisticated analysis of the role of the peasantry. In 1929
Mao wrote:
In our opinion it is also a mistake - if any party 
members hold such views - to fear the development of
the power of the peasants, lest it overwhelm the
leadership of the workers and hence become 
detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution in 
semi-colonial China will fail only if the peasant 
struggle is deprived of the leadership of the 
workers; it will never suffer just because the 
peasant struggle develops in such a way that the
peasants become more powerful than the workers.85
In Mao's later writings, even when the main strength of
the Chinese communists was their peasant-based army, there was
a shift to more orthodox Leninist positions on the centrality
of the proletariat and its revolutionary leadership of the
peasant masses. The peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie,
Mao often noted, were quite willing to fight feudalism and
imperialism, but unfortunately their political outlook remained
(
limited by the fact that they were small producers.
He saw the petty bourgeoisie (or lower middle class) as 
small business owners, students, lower government 
functionaries, self-employed artisans, professionals, shop­
keepers and also the peasants. Their thinking developed from 
the contradiction of, on the one hand, accepting the viability 
of capitalism as a small proprietor, and on the other, 
suffering the experience of being squeezed out of the market by 
the big proprietors and imperialists and this had repercussions 
for their political actions. Marx and Lenin had referred to
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this class as having a vacillating character because although
it could be expected to ally with the working class to attack
the excesses of big business, it would ally with monopoly
capital to defend the viability of capitalism. While the
peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie formed the numerical mass
of the revolution, they could only act successfully if the
proletariat and the CCP carried the burden of leadership in the
national revolution. Mao explained this as follows:
In an era when the proletariat has already appeared 
on the political stage, the responsibility for 
leading China’s revolutionary war inevitably falls on 
the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. In this 
era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in 
defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to the leadership 
of the proletariat and the Communist Party. Of all 
the social strata and political groupings in semi­
colonial China, the proletariat and the Communist
Party are the ones most free from narrow-mindedness 
and selfishness, are politically the most far­
sighted, the best organised and the readiest to learn 
with an open mind from the experience of the vanguard 
class, the proletariat, and its political party 
throughout the world and to make use of this
experience in their own cause. Hence only the 
proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the
peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and 
bourgeoisie, can overcome the narrow-mindedness of 
the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, the
destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also 
(provided the Communist Party does not err in its 
policy) the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of 
the bourgeoisie - and can lead the revolution and the 
war on to the road of victory.86
However, despite emphasizing Mao’s role in identifying the
revolutionary potential of the peasantry in this section, I
want to make clear that Mao was not the first or only one doing
this. In his own Party and in the Comintern there were voices
recognizing that the fundamental problem of the Chinese
liberation movement was the peasant problem. What Mao did was
to elevate the importance of peasants in a way Marx and Lenin
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had not done and of course these were people who responded to 
their specific socio-economic situation and not to class 
struggle per se. Class struggle resulted from high taxes and 
unexpected surcharges, conscription labour without adequate 
compensation, compulsory purchase land for public-works 
projects. "The skill of Communist organizers like Mao lay in 
transforming a largely fiscal discontent into class warfare, so 
as to push effectively for revolutionary change under CCP 
leadership. "87
(xi) The Leadership of the Proletariat and the Chinese
Communist Party
After the United Front with the KMT broke down in 1927, 
the CCP under Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan looked to the urban 
workers as the leading force. Mao did not publicly oppose this, 
but his practical activities pointed in another direction. The 
task of Communist cadres, who were overwhelmingly from a 
peasant background, was therefore to provide, guidance for the 
peasantry and other social groups. "The serious problem”, Mao 
declared in On People1s Democratic Dictatorship (1949), "is the 
education of the peasantry".88 Two points are noteworthy here: 
first, that it is possible to educate the peasantry i.e. for 
them to accept the Party's guidance and others into anti­
imperialist, anti-feudal fighters; second, that the CCP, by the 
mid- to late 1930s and above all in the early 1940s, had gained 
sufficient self-confidence based on its own military strength 
and the growing anti-imperialist, anti-feudal movement to
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assume leadership in this struggle. In the inaugural issue of 
The Chinese Worker (February 1940), Mao explained this as 
follows: "Led by its own political party, the Communist Party
of China, the Chinese working class has waged heroic struggles 
for the past twenty years and become the most politically 
awakened section of the people and the leader of the Chinese 
revolution. "89
Peasant revolutions had occurred for centuries, more often 
than not without success. What was needed was the leadership of 
an advanced class and an advanced political party, which was 
provided for Mao by the proletariat and the CCP. In On New 
Democracy, Mao explicitly adressed the question of when the 
driving forces and leadership roles of the Chinese revolution 
had changed. He divided Chinese history into two distinct 
periods, one before, the other after the May 4th Movement in 
1919. In the earlier period the petty bourgeoisie and the 
bourgeoisie were the leaders of the Chinese bourgeois-
democratic revolution. They did not succeed and the CCP took
<■
over, as Lenin had done in St. Petersburg.
The Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the 
political scene as an awakened and independent class 
force, but participated in the revolution only as a 
follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie 
Being a bourgeoisie in a colonial and semi­
colonial country and oppressed by imperialism, the 
Chinese national bourgeoisie retains a certain 
revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a 
certain degree - even in the era of imperialism - in 
its opposition to the foreign imperialists and the 
domestic governments of bureaucrats and warlords . . . 
and it may ally itself with the proletariat and the 
petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready 
to oppose.
Writing in 1940, Mao stated that the leadership of the
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Chinese revolution had passed into the hands of the proletariat 
and the CCP in about 1919 with the May 4 th Movement. He 
described the period from 1927 to 1937 as the one in which the 
CCP had led the masses toward the revolution.91 The Chinese 
proletariat had a rare history, Mao claimed. It suffered triple 
repression: by imperialism, the bourgeoisie and feudal forces. 
Having gone through these experiences, the workers were more 
determined and more influential in their actions. They had not 
succumbed to the attractions of the labour aristocracy, and 
under the leadership of the CCP had become, he asserted, "the 
politically most conscious".92 One should remember in this 
context the points made above. Not only were Mao's articles to 
a certain degree re-written post-1949, but also Leninist dogma 
demanded the attribution of hegemony to the working class. One 
should not overlook the practicalities of the CCP's anti­
imperialist struggle and the role of the poor peasants, that 
Chinese workers had until recently been peasants and that even
the lumpenproletariat had often been positively assessed by
<■
Mao. The proletariat in the countryside really was the CCP, in 
Mao's assessment. A typical example of this operational 
analysis of classes can be found in Mao's The Situation and 
Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and 
Taiyuan (November 1937) written in the context of the Second 
United Front.
The left wing of the Anti-Japanese National United 
Front is composed of the Communist-led masses, 
the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty
bourgeoisie. Our task is to do our utmost to extend
and consolidate this wing . . . [to] reform the 
Kuomintang, the government and the army, . . . [to]
establish a unified democratic republic, [to] turn
partial resistance into total resistance and [to]
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overthrow Japanese imperialism.
The intermediate section ... is composed of the
national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the 
petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to help [it] to move 
forward and change its stand.
The right wing .. . consists of the big landlords and 
big bourgeoisie, and it is the nerve centre of
national capitulationism ... Many of them are already 
collaborators, many have become or are ready to 
become pro-Japanese, many are vacillating, and only a 
few, owing to special circumstances, are firmly anti- 
Japanese .
If this constellation was understood, one could as a result 
"develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and 
isolate the die-hard forces."94
This shows, it can be argued, that the decisive element of 
understanding social forces in China depended not on
theoretical class analysis, but on the practical attitude of 
people to anti-Japanese imperialism, and thus attitude towards 
the CCP, as it was the only force which was in Mao*s view 
unconditionally fighting Japan. Groups such as the bourgeoisie 
could be included in this struggle, but one had to understand
their interests, which would lead them to vacillate, they were
(
not totally *reliable, as were poor peasants, middle peasants 
and of course the proletariat.
In 1939, in an article entitled The Chinese Revolution and 
the Chinese Communist Party, Mao had referred to the landlords 
and upper bourgeoisie as the dominant classes. Then there were 
the proletariat, the peasantry and the different categories of 
the petty bourgeoisie. "The attitude and the stand of these 
classes towards the Chinese revolution are entirely determined 
by their economic status in society."95 Mao then examined these 
three classes, their attitudes toward the revolution,
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recommending the way one should deal with them. Although in 
this instance he emphasized the question of socio-economic 
background far more often in his writings, for example when in 
the same year he stressed that "hard struggle" leads to 
"correct political orientation",96 Mao stressed that ideological 
tendencies and attitude toward the CCP and imperialism played a 
greater role than socio-economic position in defining a class, 
a point noted already at the end of Section viii.
Before proceeding to a discussion of Mao's analysis of the 
Chinese bourgeoisie, it is useful to consider his curiously 
positive assessment of soldiers, bandits, robbers, beggars and 
prostitutes. For Marx, this lumpenproletariat was able to lash 
out violently only under certain yet unforeseen circumstances. 
Mao shared the feeling that these 'classless' elements could 
also be very dangerous and reactionary, being so desperate to 
survive that they could easily be corrupted by someone with 
money. The number of these rural vagrants was extremely high in
China in the 1920s: about 20 million. In Mao's view, "Brave
€
fighters but apt to be destructive, they can become a
revolutionary force if given proper guidance,"97 not forgetting,
that they tend towards 'putschism* and 'vagabond outlook'.98 And
in the Political Resolution at the end of its Sixth National
Congress in 1928, the Chinese Communist Party declared:
In their social basis the min-t'uan ('militia corps') 
and bandits are related to poor peasants. In some 
places the poor peasants, unable to make a living, 
are forced to become bandits; furthermore, most of 
the members of the min-t'uan are employed in this way 
(by the landlord gentry) in order to make a living. 
Therefore the Party should strengthen its work among 
them . . . These armed masses should be absorbed and 
alienated from the hegemony of the gentry and
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landlords.99
In 1927 in Hunan, Mao prepared for an autumn harvest 
uprising. At the time he believed that "Objectively, China has 
long since reached 1917".100 During the uprising in September 
1927, defecting KMT troops, peasant groups, bandits and 
unemployed miners united to form the First Division of the 
First Peasant and Worker's Army. When the uprising was defeated 
Mao was held responsible by the Politburo. Among his faults 
were mentioned lack of mobilization of the peasantry, military 
opportunism, disregard for Central Committee directives and the 
above-intentioned cooperation with bandits. However, in the 
same month as this condemnation (November 1927) Mao united the 
surviving troops with those of the bandits Wang Tso and Yuan 
Wen-ts'ai, who were also members of secret societies.101 Equally 
spectacular was the appeal in July 1936 addressed to the 
Gelaohui (Ko-lao Hui) secret society in the name of the Central 
Committee, in which a United Front against Japan was proposed.
Secret sociefties were important as sources for recruitment as
<:
Mao had experienced in Jiangxi in 1927, but the CCP moved 
beyond this undependable base as soon as their strength 
permitted.102
Perhaps because of his admiration for the Water Margin 
(with its description of peasants-turned-bandits, rebels, 
secret societies and their struggle with the Son of Heaven) Mao 
apparently believed in November 1928 that by intensifying 
"political training [one could] effect a qualitative change in 
these elements".103 This went beyond anything Marx or Lenin had 
ever said; as Schram commented, "the idea that rural vagrants
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can be transformed by suitable training into the vanguard of 
the proletariat is hardly an orthodox one".104 This represents 
an emphasis on the human will against objective factors which 
is a shift, indeed a new direction in Marxist thought. In The 
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (1939), Mao 
was apparently clear about the character of the 
lumpenproletariat, seeing some as mercenaries in the hostile 
camp and others as participants in the revolution. Once they 
supported the CCP, it was necessary to be on guard against 
their anarchism and destructive tendencies.105 Admittedly Mao 
believed that the lumpenproletariat could be transformed, and 
that its ideological perspective was irrelevant so long as it 
assisted victory. But the limits of this belief are also clear 
from a rebuke to nameless comrades in March 1949, and a number 
of similar references can also be found already in the years 
1-927-30. "On whom shall we rely in our struggle in the cities? 
Some muddle-headed comrades think we should rely not on the
working class but on the masses of the poor."106 We would argue<■
that in reality, what Mao meant by proletariat was CCP members 
and they were after all overwhelmingly peasants. It is 
indicative that these assessments of elements declasses have 
either been cut from the official version of Mao's writings, 
the Selected Works, or that their importance is downplayed from 
their original by adding terms such as 'destructive* to secret 
societies or the lumpenproletariat. Post-49, Mao wanted to 
appear with his Selected Works orthodox and universal. Pre-49, 
he wanted to achieve the revolution. Without wanting to imply
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longstanding consistency in everything he said over the 
decades, Mao regarded the lumpenproletariat as useful but 
volatile in its allegiance, but nevertheless they were a 
sizeable group of people worth recruiting.
(xii) The Problem of the Bourgeoisie
In On New Democracy, Mao went to great pains to stress the 
special features of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, compared 
with its counterpart in Russia which had been part of the 
military-feudal bloc. As the national bourgeoisie was to a 
degree revolutionary, the proletariat could form a united front 
with it against imperialism.107 In the same article, however, he 
warned against placing too much trust in the national 
bourgeoisie:
Even when it takes part in the revolution, it is 
unwilling to break with imperialism completely and, 
moreover, it is closely associated with the 
exploitation of the rural areas through land rent; 
thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow 
imperialism, and much less the feudal forces, in a 
thorough way.108
In the heat of the struggle in the mid-to-late thirties, 
Mao had often expressed himself in much sharper terms. If the 
bourgeoisie had played a positive role, say in the first and 
second decades of the century, then this had deteriorated 
rapidly after 1927. At various times he referred to: "The 
general characteristic of the national bourgeoisie is to 
vacillate;"109 "the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the 
bourgeoisie";110 "the national bourgeoisie has become a tail to
270
the big bourgeoisie” .111 Basically, he maintained, it was always 
"prone to compromise."112 It had thus forfeited its privileged 
place in the fight to destroy feudalism and imperialism.113 Due 
to the open conflict with the KMT after 1927, which was based 
on the compradors and landlords, the focus of the revolution 
changed to a certain degree against internal forces.
How the CCP would relate to the bourgeoisie, and for that 
matter to the other classes in China, depended not only on 
decisions in the Party but also on external events, and this 
applied to the time before 1949, as well as afterwards. As the 
Japanese became more threatening in the early 1930s, Mao's 
analysis of the various classes centred even more around their 
struggle against Japanese imperialism. The national bourgeoisie 
with limited ties to foreign capital might be neutral or even 
support the revolution.
We thus find in Mao's articles a subtle analysis of the 
class forces in China, their political stand constantly 
measured by jtheir attitude to the two major issues of feudalism 
and imperialism but linked also to their economic status. 
Consequently, his theory of class analysis differed from that 
of Marx and Lenin. This analysis, which was instrumental in 
distinguishing friends from foes, did not remain constant, as 
the feudal, and imperialist balance of forces was itself 
constantly changing. Some of Mao's most acute insights deal 
with this dialectic of internal and external politics.
Summing up the question of class relations, we may 
say that the basic change in the situation, namely, 
the Japanese invasion of China south of the Great 
Wall, has changed the relationship among the various 
classes in China, strengthening the camp of national
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revolution and weakening that of counter­
revolution.114
Mao argued along similar lines in The Tasks of the Chinese
Communist Party, but here he added that the Japanese aggression
threatened the existence of even the warlords and was turning
them against imperialism.115 This development had turned the
relations and contradictions between classes in China into
secondary problems. They continued to exist, to be sorted out
when the anti-Japanese war had ended.
The same is true of the contradictions between China 
and the imperialist powers other than Japan. 
Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Chinese people are faced with the following task - to 
make the appropriate adjustments with regard to those 
internal and external contradictions which can and 
must be adjusted at present so as to fit in with the 
general task of unity against Japan.116
Two years earlier, Mao suggested that a People's Government may
include
those who are interested only in the national 
revolution and not in the agrarian revolution, and 
even, if they so desire, those who may oppose 
Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, though 
they afre not opposed to the European and US 
imperialists because of their close ties with the 
latter.117
Clearly, Mao believed that the widest possible class 
collaboration was acceptable to defeat imperialism and that 
internal class struggle was subordinate. In this context he 
elaborated Lenin's views but asserted the priorities in terms 
of class relationships which should guide the revolution in 
colonial and semi-colonial countries. In On Practice Mao laid 
the primary emphasis on practical activity in interpreting the 
transition from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. The 
implications for class analysis are significant - it is not the
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physical nature of owning means of production that may change a 
person*s consciousness in its relations to others but their 
collective relationship to a third phenomenon, here the 
Japanese intervention.
One can observe a basic pragmatism or empiricism in Mao 
informing his approach to class, and the same applies, for 
example, to the national bourgeoisie, i.e. its experience 
informs its approach to the revolution. Mao's analysis of
classes was carried out for particular purposes, to assist in 
the solution of practical problems of policy implementation, to 
clarify class relationships as a particular stage of the 
revolution, to serve as justification for a certain course of 
political action or to create a very broad base of mass 
support. Therefore, it is necessary to know the context in 
which Mao analyzed classes, for a rigorous conceptualization of 
class in a sociological sense cannot be found. However, there
is in Mao a continuity in his underlying assumptions and these
are Marxist-Leninist concepts of society and revolution. 
Whether this represents an undermining or an extension of 
Marxism-Leninism remains open to question. The Communist Party, 
which was meant to be the vanguard of the proletariat,
according to Lenin, led the revolution to victory while its 
organic ties with the proletariat were severed to a substantial 
degree after 1927 and few of its leaders were of proletarian 
origin. Political power grew out of the 'barrel of the gun' in 
a peasant war under proletarian leadership. Mao changed Marx's 
emphasis on economic causes for change. This he described as 
'sinification of Marxism', meaning among other things that he
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•.ook Marxism-Leninism as a guide, while action, practice, as 
developed in his On Practice and On Contradiction, generally 
played the principal and decisive role. In Mao's writings there 
is a complex, dialectical relationship between practice and 
theory.
In the next chapter we will look more closely at the whole 
problematic of potential alliances in China, a discussion which 
had already been conducted between Lenin and M. N. Roy and 
later became particularly relevant. But for the moment let me 
just note the difference between the First United Front of 
1923-27 and the second experience after 1936. The CCP was now 
determined to avoid the mistakes of the First United Front, it 
insisted on organizational independence, freedom to criticize 
and independence of its own forces. The Communist Party was 
able to increase enormously its weight within the United Front 
as a result of its growth in the previous decade.118 One of the 
key elements which had made this possible was the experience of 
rural guerjrilla warfare. "Without armed struggle the 
proletariat and the Communist Party would have no standing at 
all in China, and it would be impossible to accomplish any 
revolutionary task.”119
(xiii) The Phases of Revolution
In distinguishing between two phases of the revolution, 
Mao was in agreement with Lenin's concept of the bourgeois- 
democratic revolution as a nationalist revolution to defeat
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imperialism, followed by the proletarian-socialist one.120 
However, he went further than Lenin, by leaving a place open 
not only for the KMT but also for the compradors within the New 
Democracy bloc. According to Mao's perception, Chinese of all 
classes could be progressive and fight for the revolution, even 
though fighting for the revolution and fighting against 
imperialism are not the same. Class struggle could be 
subordinate to national struggle. He further developed his 
ideas in the 'People's Democratic Dictatorship' of 1949 which 
originated during the united front strategy in Yenan - an idea 
which can be traced back to Lenin's 'Democratic Dictatorship of 
the Workers and Peasants' and Stalin's 'Four Class Bloc' and 
which I will develop in the chapter on the united front. The 
four classes in question were the workers, peasantry, petty 
bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Leadership was to be 
exercized by the proletariat - with its Communist Party as its 
representative. Although the national bourgeoisie may waver and 
be excluded (from the people if it joined the reactionaries, it 
would nevertheless be of great importance. Mao also believed 
that the CCP could use the national bourgeoisie and its 
expertise for national recovery. Imperialist oppression would 
provide the framework which would make this development 
possible. In The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels had 
elaborated the progressive role of national unification and an 
ideology of unification ('nationalism'). Mao went beyond this 
but remained within a broad Marxist-Leninist framework.
With the change to the 'People's Democratic Dictatorship* 
and 'New Democracy', there was also a geographical change. In
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194 9 the focus of activities was no longer the countryside, but 
changed to the cities. "From now on, the formula followed in 
the past twenty years 'first the rural areas, then the cities' 
will be reversed and changed to the formula, first the cities, 
then the rural areas'."121 This posed the same kind of questions 
that had been put in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s in the
countryside: who are the friends, who are the foe, who are the
wavering forces? However, the old constellation had changed as
122the focus became the urban areas.
Mao saw great advantage in working with the KMT, the 
bourgeoisie and others who wanted to 'mend' their ways. In his 
Analysis of Classes he stated that the 'big bourgeoisie' and 
'middle bourgeoisie' were hostile to the revolution. Despite 
misgivings about the 150 million members of the petty 
bourgeoisie, however, he believed that they could be convinced 
by action and agitation to join the revolution. In 1928 he had 
already accepted the division of the socialist revolution into
two phases,( with the bourgeois-democratic first which however
<
had to be led by the CCP, as the bourgeoisie did not fulfil its
responsibility of thoroughly industrializing China and (as it
seemed until the early 1950s) the socialist revolution
occurring only much later:
We fully agree with the Communist International's 
resolution on China. There is no doubt that China is 
still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution. The programme for a thorough democratic 
revolution in China comprises, externally, the 
overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete 
national liberation, and, internally, the elimination 
of the power and influence of the comprador class in 
the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution 
in order to abolish feudal relations in the villages, 
and the overthrow of the government of warlords. We 
must go through such a democratic revolution before
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we can lay a real foundation for the transition to 
socialism. 23
(xiv) Conclusion
Undoubtedly, Mao's writings on class analysis in the 
period from 1920 to 1935 went much further than Lenin had done 
in assessing the positive characteristics of the peasantry. 
There is of course no real comparison possible here between 
Marx and Mao. Lenin included the peasants in the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, thus broadening Marx's term; Mao went even 
further and included national capitalists and petty 
bourgeoisie. His view of the bourgeoisie was guided by an 
attempt to include these forces in the anti-Japanese struggle. 
He did not see the victory of 1949 as a victory of communism, 
but of 'New Democracy' or the 'Democratic Dictatorship of the
People'. From 1940 onward the bourgeoisie was told that it was
(
wanted, if nbt essential, in the coming struggle for national 
economic, political and cultural development. Later, however, 
and especially in the (post-) 1951 revised editions of his 
Selected Works, Mao constantly emphasized the primacy of the 
industrial proletariat as the mass basis for the Communist 
Party and as the leading historical force. Numerous references 
to this leadership are to be found in his writings, and 
characterizations of the peasantry as an ancillary force. 
However, this might have been (particularly after 1949) in 
order to gain legitimacy in Marxist-Leninist circles where the
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determinist belief in the industrial working class was still 
prevalent. Anyway, to describe the peasantry as the main force 
of the revolution does not in itself mean that working class 
leadership is repudiated.
In practical terms, Mao had put the peasantry at the 
centre of revolutionary activity, had further developed Lenin's 
concept of voluntarism and emphasized a political 
conceptualization of class. He was not in the first place 
interested in a sociological determination of class and the 
question of who owned what; his aim was to find out the status 
of social groups in terms of hierarchy of power and 
particularly to what degree they were exploited. This enabled 
him in turn to assess those groups' potential for revolutionary 
activity. The level of exploitation and attitude towards the 
revolution and imperialism were a guide to the determination of 
class practice.
In On Practice, for example, Mao wrote:
In all class societies, the members of the different 
social * classes also enter, in different ways, into 
definite relations of production and engage in production 
to meet their material needs. This is the primary source 
from which human knowledge develops ... In class society 
everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and 
every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with 
the brand of class.124
We can say that even for Mao, peasants could not have been the
bearers of a socialist future. The bearers of socialism are the
ones who possess political consciousness which exists
independent of a specific social class and is created through
experience and action. The understanding of class interests
could only arise with the guidance of revolutionary theory.
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However, Mao put much greater emphasis on consciousness and the 
subjective factors which could form a reactionary or 
progressive individual. Objective social realities (i.e. 
economic position in life) could be modified by changes in the 
individual's consciousness, particularly through practical 
action, which in the China of the 1920s and 1930s largely meant 
by means of military action. Indeed, informed by his theory of 
knowledge and concept of contradiction, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter, Section ii, Mao believed 
the most important aspect of class analysis, and certainly of 
proletarian class consciousness, was not so much objective 
economic factors as the experience of struggle. Class status, 
not class origins is for Mao the decisive element, one could 
argue, and this led him "to superimpose the supraclass 
categories of friends and enemies upon his delineation of the 
classes themselves."125 The ordering element in this was the 
Communist Party, as the proletariat was thin on the ground, 
replacing the working class in a way, and at the same time
opening the way to new recruits to becoming proletarian, by 
joining this Party. The primacy of moral qualities is
especially apparent in his discussion of the role of declassed
elements, and in the Gutian resolution of 1929 (where five
qualifications for new Party members are given and only one 
related to class background).
According to Mao's theory, classes are not defined merely 
by the formal, legal concepts of ownership and non-ownership, 
but in terms of a whole complex of social relations, making it 
a rather subjective form of class analysis. For Mao, politics
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and ideology, measured by anti-imperialism had an effect at 
least equally important as that of economics on one's 
consciousness. The problem was not so much to justify the 
existence of a certain number of peasants or lumpenproletarians 
in the revolutionary movements - to some extent there was a 
precedent for this in Lenin or even Marx - the real problem in 
Marxist terms was to justify the high specific weight of these 
layers in the Communist movement and the Red Army.
Mao's strategy envisaged the Marxist-Leninist leadership 
of " the Communist Party, armed and relying upon relatively 
secure base areas, able to overcome any problems with the 
allegedly unreliable peasantry and lumpenproletariat. Lenin's 
later writings, where he laid much stress on class struggles in 
the colonial and semi-colonial countries, would no doubt have 
been a source of inspiration for Mao had he been aware of them. 
Lenin was also aware that countries such as China, or Turkey 
for that matter, were all agricultural societies, and he argued
that this fapt should be taken into consideration when building
(
up communist parties or other organizations. During the Second 
Congress of the Comintern he wrote: "There is practically no
industrial proletariat in these countries. Nevertheless, we 
have assumed, we must assume the role of leader even there."126
It is not certain that Lenin would have been happy with a 
Communist Party made up almost entirely of peasants, but at 
least he had opened the door for such a party. Like M. N. Roy, 
he believed that as long as it was controlled by workers, their 
vanguard, or people with proletarian consciousness, the Party 
could overcome the physical lack of workers. Mao for his part
280
undermined the universal leadership of the Party by saying that 
"the masses are the real heroes", compared with whom Communist 
Party members are often "childish and ignorant".127
Because of these departures from Marx and Lenin, Mao has 
been labelled either voluntarist, populist, peasant 
nationalist, or all together. The reason for his course of 
action is extremely simple. At times he seemed physically and 
emotionally violated by feudalism and imperialism in his 
country. He needed a concept which would help him to discover 
the trends and strength of the extremely disparate social 
forces in China, as well as to understand the strength of 
imperialism and its internal allies in order to work out a 
strategy for ending them. Although it might be said that a 
concept of imperialism and a concept of class analysis are two 
different things, they are closely related when it comes- to 
political practice. From Marx and Lenin - even in the limited 
articles known to him in the 1920s - and the other authors
mentioned particularly in Chapter Four, Mao acquired a key to<
understanding the balance of forces in China and the world.
In The Communist Manifesto which Mao had certainly read, 
he discovered a new way of conceiving past and present. "We 
thank Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin", Mao wrote in 1949, "for 
giving us a weapon [to fight internal and foreign enemies]. 
This weapon is not a machine gun, but Marxism-Leninism."128 
Earlier in 1937 he had concluded that "Marxism-Leninism alone 
is the compass, which can guide the Chinese revolution to 
victory (1937) ,"129 and: "It was through the Russians that the
Chinese found Marxism."130 The difficulty in analyzing groups
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and classes by Marxist criteria in semi-feudal, semi-colonial
China also applied to their ideologies, which Mao tried to
categorize - again in a rather unorthodox manner:
So long as classes exist, there will be as many 
doctrines as there are classes and even various 
groups in the same class may have their different 
doctrines. Since the feudal class has a feudal 
doctrine, the bourgeoisie a capitalist doctrine, the 
Buddhist Buddhism, the Christians Christianity and 
the peasants polytheism, and since in recent years, 
some people have also advocated Kemalism, fascism,
131vitalism.
As a result of the direct or indirect influence of imperialism, 
classes in China were as difficult to define as their actions 
were to predict. But this did not discourage Mao. The 
apparently confusing situation, expressed in the options for 
different alliances or united fronts, actually presented many 
more possibilities than existed in a thoroughly colonized 
country. In an argument anticipated by Lenin, Mao maintained 
that it was the economically more backward society where class 
struggles were more intense, the institutional framework less 
complete, an^ d breakthroughs more likely to take place. Although
K
he was aware of the world-historic role of the proletariat 
according to Marx, he realized that in China, as expressed 
already clearly from his Analysis of the Classes in Chinese 
Society onward, it was the peasantry - with the right
leadership - which would decide the revolution. The leading 
role of the working class was mentioned often enough, but the
real centres of decision lay in the countryside, where the
power of the feudal landlords had to be broken.
Although Mao was suspicious of the peasantry, as mentioned 
above, he did believe that a Communist Party could exist for
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some time with a limited proletarian base, so long as the right 
consciousness existed. He claimed that the CCP spoke for the 
relatively small industrial proletariat, the rural proletariat, 
small and lower middle peasants, the national democratic forces 
and the people with the right revolutionary spirit. There was 
in China no traditional peasant community which could be saved 
and become a stepping stone to socialism, like the narodniks 
believed could happen in Russia. However, Mao celebrated the 
revolutionary traditions of the Chinese peasantry, which does 
not mean that he attributed 'proletarian consciousness' to it. 
This is why the role of the Communist Party was crucial. At the 
same time, Mao was to a degree hostile to the cities and people 
living there including the proletariat. This, it can be argued, 
was a response to the defeat of the 1927 uprising.
There is little either Marxist or Leninist in anti-urban 
notions. To send workers to the countryside to learn from 
peasants, as happened during the Cultural Revolution, would
have been absurd to Marx. This applies also to Lenin, for whom
<
the proletarianization of the peasantry would only follow after 
the thorough growth and proletarianization of the working 
class. Mao's anti-urban notions have sometimes given rise to 
the accusations of 'voluntarism' against Mao, but it would 
appear that it was a necessity if the Chinese Communists were 
to survive and advance. In any case, Mao's voluntarism was not 
arbitrary - he believed in the ability of revolutionary 
activity to create the conditions for its own fulfilment. In 
addition, his writings contain determinist as well as 
voluntarist elements. Marxism tamed Mao's subjectivism, and
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taught him the constraints placed on revolutionary will by 
socio-economic circumstances. He first discussed this
dialectical relationship in On Practice and indicated that he 
was not oblivious to social and material constraints on
revolutionary activity. The belief in subjective will freed him 
from the necessity of waiting for history to create the 'right* 
socio-economic conditions for a successful socialist 
revolution.
The purpose in this chapter has not been to establish
whether or not Mao was orthodox, nor has the emphasis been on 
distinguishing what Mao originally wrote and how he edited it 
after founding the People's Republic of China in 1949. Rather, 
it has been attempted to explain the various concepts
(initially that of class) which went into building up his view 
of imperialism. What has been established, among other things, 
is that imperialism made Mao analyze classes in China primarily 
in the sense of how social groups would deal with imperialism. 
Mao introduced following Lenin, but different from Marx, much 
more emphasis on national differences, national oppression and 
the national struggle, but is still concerned to maintain the 
orthodox Marxist importance of class. In the next chapter we 
will deal with another concept which was necessary in Mao's 
attempt to deal with imperialism, namely, the United Front. 
Class analysis, as explained above, was the source of his 
awareness that it was necessary to differentiate between 
different potential allies in the fight against imperialism.
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6. THE UNITED FRONT IN MAO'S STRATEGY
(i) Introduction
The question of alliances is a central part of the 
strategy developed by Mao and a central component of his anti­
imperialism. Domestic and international events made the task of 
guiding the revolution an especially difficult one while the 
small size of the - Party necessitated the formation of 
alliances. The United Front concept (developed by Lenin 
earlier) , the First United Front of Sun, Chiang and the CCP, 
and the Second United Front are ail crucial in order to 
understand Mao's development as a theoretician and thinker, as 
well as his attempt to develop a 'correct' anti-imperialist 
strategy. This chapter will, therefore, ascertain how Mao and 
the Party approached the question of alliance and the United 
Front by examining the role of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in Chinese politics in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.
In The Communist Manifesto Marx had discussed the question 
of alliances but it was not a matter of great concern to him 
reading and writing in the British Museum. Lenin of course .was 
much more concerned with the practicalities of identifying 
suitable partners, both for bringing about the revolution and 
for conducting Soviet foreign policy. With the advent of the 
First World War, the international crisis among capitalist 
powers became decisive and impinged on international 
revolutionary tactics. Lenin believed that the contradictions
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of capitalism had reached a zenith. Monopoly capitalism
represented the moribund state of capitalism, and its relations 
with the colonial world. Europe had assumed a parasitic rentier 
role. Consequently, Lenin's vision of the course of the
national liberation struggle moved from an emphasis on its
inherent bourgeois-democratic character to an emphasis on its
role in fighting bourgeois imperialism. Thus the alignment of 
the labour movement and the national struggle was necessary to 
build a broad-based anti-imperialist United Front. 
Revolutionary strategy had to confront the objective 
integration of the world economy through the expansion of 
imperialist capital. These were concerns which Marx had not 
experienced. Lenin developed Marx's theory in the conditions of 
his time. For tactical reasons the result was- an emphasis (in 
the face of weak Asian Marxist revolutionary movements), on 
anti-imperialist United Fronts. His attitude toward indigenous 
bourgeois classes of colonial or semi-colonial countries was 
not uncompromisingly negative, as was that of M. N. Roy in the 
Comintern debate of 1920 discussed above in Chapter Three.
Chinese politics from the 1920s to 1949 was turbulent, 
lurching from a United Front to bloody fighting between the 
Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT), in the face of 
Japanese aggression; reverting to United Front and back again 
to civil war; ending in the development of the New Democracy 
concept. On the whole, however, forging the broadest possible 
United Front was indispensable to Mao's two-fold aim of (a) 
mobilizing people domestically, (b) confronting imperialism 
domestically and then internationally. The problem of course
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was on what basis the United Front would be constructed and
what its long-term goal should be. This chapter will shed light
on these questions.
In reading Mao's writings, one is continually struck by
the centrality of the concept of the United Front for the CCP
from the 1920s to the establishment of the People's Republic in
1949 - and beyond. Mao himself even used it retrospectively to
account for his early family life:
There were two 'parties' in the family. One was my 
father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition was made up 
of myself, my mother, my brother, and sometimes even 
the labourer. In the 'united front' of the 
Opposition, however, there was a difference of 
opinion. My mother advocated a policy of indirect 
attack. She criticized any overt display of emotion 
and attempts at open rebellion against the Ruling 
Power. She said it was not the Chinese way.1
On a more formal note Mao said in 1949 that the United Front,
the Red Army, and Marxism-Leninism were the three principal
weapons o f .the Communist Party which had enabled it to defeat
its enemies in a twenty-eight year struggle.2 Ten years earlier,
he had argued that the United Front, armed struggle, and Party
<
building "are the Chinese Communist Party's three 'magic 
weapons'."3 One could even go so far as to argue that Mao's 
article written in 1919, The Great Union of the Popular Masses, 
already incorporated the (later clarified) concept of United 
Front. Schram rejects this connection, however, in his 
discussion and translation of the article.4
Whether in family relations, or as something to be 
accomplished and perfected, or as something which would bring 
about victory, the United Front is crucial to an understanding 
of the twisting and turning policies of the CCP.
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This chapter begins by considering the theoretical 
background to the development of the United Front concept both 
in the thinking of Lenin and Mao. A brief discussion of 
Comintern policy towards China is followed by a discussion of 
the experience of the First United Front, its disastrous 
conclusion, and the years of struggle by the CCP to survive. 
The Second (and far more successful) United Front is then 
discussed, and the whole period up to the Communist victory in 
1949, when the concept takes on new dimensions in internal and 
international policy. It will also become clear that the United 
Front was important in Mao's struggle for ascendancy within the 
Party, but as indicated above, this was not the key element in 
the development of the concept.
(ii) Theoretical Background to the Concept of the United Front
It was Lenin who developed this concept in his thinking 
and practice. He began by discussing 'temporary* or 'limited' 
alliances in his 'Left Wing Communism' - An Infantile Disorder; 
even earlier, however, Marx and Engels had referred to such 
possibilities in The Communist Manifesto and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the actual term and theory of the 'United 
Front' only really became part of the general thinking of the 
Communist movement in 1920-22. The first few years after the 
October Revolution had been marked, among West European 
Communist parties, by a confident expectation that Germany and 
other key countries would soon follow Russia under Communist 
leadership. Particularly in Germany, this had blended with a
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tendency towards extreme political tactics which culminated in 
the disastrous March Action of 1921, when the mass of workers 
failed to follow the putschist inspiration of the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) . In the aftermath of 
this action, which coincided with the turn from War Communism 
to the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, the Communist 
International (Comintern) drew the conclusion that Social 
Democratic workers would not immediately or automatically join 
the Communists in a revolutionary assault on capitalism, and 
that a protracted period of United Fronts between the 
Socialists and Communists would be necessary, both in order to 
lay the basis for joint defensive action against capital and to 
prepare the ground for a further advance of the whole working 
class. Even before this, Sneevliet, working under the pseudonym 
Maring, who had been sent to China by the Comintern and had 
played a leading role during the first plenary meeting of the 
CCP Congress in Shanghai in 1921, had introduced the idea of 
' bloc-within(' United Front in the Dutch East Indies in 1916-20
t;
between the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereenigung (ISDV) 
and the Sarekat Islam, a popular mass organization of 
Indonesian Moslems with a Pan-Islamist ideology. This had been 
highly successful, and to some extent can be regarded as the 
model for the First United Front (1923-27), as will be seen 
later on. The Third Congress of the Communist International 
(1921) marked the victory of this new policy, although the next 
decade was to witness a series of twists and turns that we 
cannot go into here.
In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, where
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political divisions in the anti-imperialist camp involved 
parties of different classes, the problem of the United Front 
was somewhat different. Moreover, it was combined with the
problem of the conditions under which socialism could be built, 
if at all, in these relatively undeveloped parts of the world.
(1) The transition in a colonial country to socialism was 
possible if, in another part of the world, fully developed
capitalist production as well as a revolutionary proletarian 
movement already existed.
(2) This transition demanded cooperation in the class struggle 
between the working class in the advanced and less advanced 
parts of the world. As the proletariat, if it existed as such,
was small in numbers - sometimes existing only as a vanguard
party - it was necessary to form 'United Fronts' with other, 
more popular groups and parties, such as the KMT in China.
(3) The transition to socialism, under these circumstances, 
would be a difficult and painful process, made easier by the 
increasing number of revolutions in the industrialized world.5
The main issue for Communists was which parties and groups 
could be considered as possible collaborators in a United Front 
for change. In Lenin's view, the answer depended on the phase 
through which a society was passing. If the Communists were 
confronted with the final resistance of feudalism, then they 
could unite with all forces fighting feudalism - including, 
after the experience of 1905 in Russia, the peasants.6 However, 
Lenin also considered that a convergence of interests in one 
phase did not remove the possibility of future struggle, 
particularly in those countries where the alliance included
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parts of the bourgeoisie, which as a class would in the end 
itself have to be eliminated. As we shall see, this element of 
struggle was developed to a greater extent by Mao than by any 
other Marxist-Leninist thinker. In Sneevliet's experience, the 
United Front was not only useful where the Communist Party was 
still too weak to fight alone; it also allowed 'entryism', in 
the sense of gaining access to other mass forces within the 
Front which could be convinced of the correctness of Communist 
analysis and future policies. In Lenin*s view, when considering 
alliances, one had to be aware of the nature of the 
revolutionary situation and one had to be adaptable.
Permanent alliances were impossible as at one time or 
another various social forces would play various roles and one 
partner of now would be a foe later. To safeguard the 
revolution one not only would have to come to agreement with 
the leadership in other parties or organizations, but also with 
the average party member to pull them over to one's side. The 
latter approach was called 'united front from below' which
t
becomes a key element in Mao's policies. The former was called
'united front from above' which became the policy after 1936 -
without ever neglecting the one from below. Another key element
in Lenin's approach was the need to remain separate in a united
front, because the opposite side was of course also busy
pulling over members of the Communist Party.
A Social Democrat must never for a moment forget that 
the proletariat will inevitably have to wage a class 
struggle for socialism even against the most 
democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty 
bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt. Hence the absolute 
necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class 
party of Social Democracy. Hence, the temporary 
nature of our tactic of 'striking a joint blow' with
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the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict 
watch 'over our ally as over an enemy'.
Lastly, Lenin's views both agreed with and were different
compared to those of Mao. In 'Left-Wing Communism' - An
Infantile Disorder, Lenin wrote that before the "final and
decisive battle" was joined, it was necessary to determine,
whether the historically effective forces of all 
classes - positively of all classes in a given 
society without exception - are arrayed in such a way 
... that: (1) all the classes hostile to us have
become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at 
loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently 
weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond
their strength; (2) all the vacillating and unstable
intermediate elements .. . have sufficiently exposed 
themselves in the eyes of the people, have 
sufficiently disgraced themselves through their 
practical bankruptcy; and (3) among the proletariat, 
a mass sentiment favouring the most determined, bold, 
and dedicated revolutionary action against the 
bourgeoisie has emerged and begun to grow 
vigorously.8
For both it was crucially important to find out about the power 
and lack of it in all classes in a society. The revolution 
would not happen over night, but was only the last part of a 
long-term strategy. In this long-term process, the proletariat
t;
played for Lenin the key role and middle layers of society 
merely had to be neutralized. Mao thought that proletarian (or 
simply 'advanced') consciousness was a vital leadership 
attribute, but he emphasized the mobilization of an 
overwhelming majority, including the middle forces and even 
some of those in the enemy camp, in order to isolate the 
principal enemy.
Before moving on to consider the experience of the United 
Fronts in China, we shall now turn to two articles by Mao - On 
Practice and On Contradiction (1937) - for a general discussion
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of his methodological approach as attempted already in Chapter 
Four. The latter text is particularly appropriate, since it 
contains a theoretical justification of a new United Front with 
the Kuomintang (KMT). These articles, based fairly closely on 
Soviet texts on philosophy, were written at the beginning of 
the Yenan period, after the experiences in Hunan and Jiangxi of 
defeated peasant uprisings and the establishment of Soviets in 
liberated areas. Although Mao had not been centrally involved 
in shaping the first United Front, these articles contain much 
that is relevant to the 1920s and the domestic struggle against 
imperialism, as well as to issues of socialist construction and 
political economy,9 the party/masses relationship and the 
problem of communism and future society. On Practice and On 
Contradiction were an attempt on Mao's part to establish his 
credentials as a Marxist-Leninist and a philosopher. He hoped 
that the theory of contradiction would give guidance for
correct theoretical analysis and justification for a correct 
political line. But, he was also confronting a life-and-death 
situation for the CCP.
Mao's theories of knowledge and contradiction are crucial 
to an understanding of how he perceived the driving forces of 
history, the definition of goals and aims, and the necessary 
means to accomplish them. Two key elements are the progress of 
knowledge during the process of social change and the
recognition of the contradictions in this process. These
conscious factors in turn influence the actual realization of
development and change people's idea of how development should 
be realized.
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Mao believed that knowledge is derived in the first place
from personal, sensory experience, which can only be gained
through social practice. Ideas grow out of practical experience
and, in turn, shape that experience:
All genuine experience originates in direct 
experience ... All knowledge originates in perception 
of the objective external world through man's 
physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such 
perception, denies direct experience, or denies
personal participation in the practice that changes 
reality, is not a materialist.10
Sensory experiences have to be worked into concepts, decisions, 
and conclusions. Nevertheless, neither Mao nor any other
empiricist can tell us how this should be done. At the end of 
this process, however, we have rational knowledge. The
dialectic of this theory of knowledge expresses itself in the 
need to deepen sensory experience and to progress to rational 
knowledge. Practice is guided by this rational knowledge and 
expresses itself as social and revolutionary struggle - the
form this struggle takes changing according to the historical 
phase. At ohe time it might be anti-imperialist struggle (the 
1930s), at another, internal class-struggle (1945/6-49), and 
then struggle to construct socialism (1949- ) . Not even in the
higher stage of communism does this revolutionary struggle come 
to an end. The process of gaining knowledge depends to a 
considerable degree on interaction with the masses (the mass 
line), as the vanguard of the workers does not possess this 
knowledge in a ready form. Much later, in 1964, Mao would 
declare that his revolutionary theory resulted entirely from 
his years of practice and struggle.11
This theory of knowledge led Mao to his theory of
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contradiction. Contradictions are in all things, they are the 
most fundamental law of materialist dialectics. Mao criticizes 
metaphysical, evolutionary views of change in the world, which 
comprehend development only as an eternal up and down, where 
movement is instigated from the outside but things as such 
remain unchanged. According to this view, for example, class 
society does not change as such; the reason for any historical 
change lies with external factors such as climatic or 
geographical conditions. In a dialectical-materialist view, on 
the other hand, although external stimuli are important 
preconditions, change essentially takes place in accordance 
with an internal necessity - for instance, because class 
society is impelling the process of change or development. 
Thus, as we have seen in Chapter Four, imperialism, Japanese 
expansionism and the October Revolution caused internal 
development in China, but only because traditional Chinese 
society was in itself contradictory.
Mao's (theory of practice involved a view of life and
€
politics as ever-changing, and therefore rarely in a state of
finality, balance or harmony. Disequilibrium and disharmony
result from ever-present contradictions in society, the most
fundamental of which are class struggles. Already in 1917 Mao
had written in Xin Qingnian (New Youth) : "According to my
humble opinion there is nothing on earth or in heaven but
movement."12 And twenty years later he wrote:
What are the characteristics of the present movement?
What are its laws? How is it to be directed? These 
are all practical questions .. . The movement is 
developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they 
are emerging in an endless stream.13
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Contradiction and movement, then, are inherent in all 
things (neibu de maodun=internal contradiction). Mao wrote in 
1958: ”If there were no contradictions and no struggle, there
would be no world, no progress, no life, there would be nothing 
at all."14 Because of the existence of internal contradictions, 
change is not merely a quantitative but also a qualitative 
phenomenon. Moreover, there is a 'principal' or 'fundamental* 
contradiction which forms the core reason for change, the 
'particularity of contradiction'. With this 'particularity' one 
is able to recognize the identity of the dominant movement or 
issue of the time. This movement or issue, of course, itself 
contains contradictions and is in constant change. The 
different contradictions need different solutions, and only 
precise knowledge of the specific situation allows the correct 
ones to be chosen, avoiding dogmatism and putschism which might 
endanger the revolution.
In society, then, there are a variety of contradictions, 
and it is important to understand exactly how these inter- 
relate. One key distinction that Mao introduced is between the 
'principal1, 'fundamental' or 'basic' contradiction (genben 
maodun=basic contradiction or zhuyao maodun=principal 
contradiction) and the 'secondary contradiction' (ciyao 
maodun). The former may change between historical phases, but 
in each there is only one principal contradiction which remains 
the same for as long as that phase persists - in capitalist 
society, for example, the contradiction between the social 
character of production and the private character of 
appropriation. This principal contradiction determines the
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existence, development and possible solution of other 
secondary, or subordinate, contradictions.15
To discover the 'principal contradiction' is always a 
difficult task, but only in this way can the essential 
character and tendencies of a particular historical phase be 
grasped. This was historically a real problem for Mao, if one 
did not go beyond narrow empiricism and did not grasp the 
essence of a phenomenon. Based on this differentiated concept 
of contradiction is Mao's argument that united fronts of one 
kind or another will necessarily exist all the time. In the 
case of the CCP, at his time of writing, the most burning 
practical issue referred precisely to the need for a Second 
United Front with the KMT. In On Contradiction Mao saw the CCP 
and the KMT as the two aspects of a contradiction, whose 
precise relationship with each other was subject to change. The 
'fundamental contradiction' (genben maodun) in China in the 
1930s, was between capitalism and socialism. But in the 
specific period of imperialist aggression by Japan, the CCP and
<r
the KMT were on the same side of a contradiction between the
great majority (around 90%) of semi-colonial Chinese society
and Japanese imperialism.
When imperialism launches a war of aggression against 
[a semi-colonial country], all its various classes, 
except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a 
national war against imperialism. At such a time the 
contradiction between imperialism and the country 
concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while 
all the contradictions among the various classes 
within the country ... are temporarily relegated to a 
secondary [ciyao] and subordinate [fuconq] position.16
Mao's use of the word 'temporarily' indicates that there is at 
the same time unity and struggle, although struggle was not
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being emphasized at that time. There are always contradictions, 
dialectical changes and a unity of opposites. As there are 
always united fronts entailing unity and struggle, the purpose 
of the United Front of a specific phase is, as explained in On 
Policy, to solve one contradiction and to go on to the next. In 
the United Front the CCP should "make use of contradictions, 
win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by 
one.”17 Hence "the principal contradictions must be 
distinguished from secondary contradictions; contradictions 
between the main enemy and other forces as well as 
’contradictions within the enemy camp' must be exploited."18
As mentioned above, Mao described the United Front concept 
as one of the three 'magic weapons' (together with armed 
struggle and party construction, in the Introduction to 'The 
Communist', 1939) and ten years later as one of three principal 
weapons which helped the CCP to win the struggles against 
Japanese imperialism and the KMT. (On the People's Democratic 
Dictatorship, 1949) . This concept was not only important for 
the time of the First and Second United Fronts, but also for 
the time of the civil war from 1945 to 1949 and for the 
People's Republic's foreign and internal policies. According to 
van Slyke, it became an "integral part of Chinese Communist 
thought and practice"19 and he concluded that "the CCP has 
thought in united-front terms for so long, and it has applied 
this kind of analysis to various situations so frequently, that 
the approach has become a habitual, almost instinctive, cast of 
mind."20 Schram was in full agreement: "For Mao himself, the
alliance of all Chinese for the salvation of their country was
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not merely skilful tactics; it was a value in itself.”21
Having looked at the general theorization of the United 
Front, let us now turn to why and how the First United Front 
was formed.
(iii) The First United Front 1923-1927
When in 1921 The First Congress of the CCP was held in 
Shanghai, the twelve delegates set themselves a seemingly 
impossible task: Revolution in China. Of course, they could
simply have joined the other, more prominent revolutionary 
formation, the KMT, but their final goal was not merely 
independence but socialism. For this reason, the CCP, like most 
political organizations, introduced constitutional provisions 
to exclude membership in other parties. This would have made it 
all the more difficult for the 57 Party members to be told to 
join the KMT. The KMT was, itself, not exactly a mass party, 
but the small number of Communist Party members could easily 
have been swallowed up in the pursuit of nationalism and 
'alliance* with the Chinese bourgeoisie, which would have led 
away from a proper understanding of Marxism-Leninism, that is 
class struggle. Indeed, much of the CCP's early history is one 
of meandering between the extremes of left-wing excesses or 
'infantilism' in the words of Lenin, and right-wing 
opportunism.
A purist approach of no compromise and an exclusion of any 
relationship with other parties or groups had to be however
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short-lived. In January 1922 Party members travelled to the
' First Congress of the Communist and Revolutionary
Organisations of the Far East* in Moscow and Petrograd and
learned of the need to compromise with the national
bourgeoisie, insofar as certain of its aims overlapped with
those of the Communists.22 The result can be seen in the
'Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party1 (July 1922):
The proletariat's support of the democratic 
revolution is not [equivalent to] its surrender to 
the capitalists. Not to prolong the life of the 
feudal system is absolutely necessary in order to
raise the power of the proletariat. This is the 
proletariat's own class interests ... The successful 
democratic revolution develops the capitalist class, 
at present in its infancy - capitalist opposition to 
the proletariat being left to the future ... At 
present the CCP must, in the interest of the workers 
and poor peasants, lead the workers to support the 
democratic revolution and forge a democratic united 
front of workers, poor peasants, and petty
bourgeoisie.23
The CCP was certainly not giving the bourgeoisie carte blanche; 
the United Front offer was limited, although in reality the KMT
t
was accepted5 as the leading force in the alliance. The Party 
Congress defined the revolution as anti-feudal and anti­
imperialist, demanded a bourgeois-democratic revolution as well
as a united front against imperialism and militarism. It also
decided to join the Comintern officially.
The CCP was enjoined to retain independence, to prepare 
for the establishment of soviets and to support the poor 
peasants: "the workers must not become the appendage of the
petty bourgeoisie within this democratic united front ...”.24 At 
the same time however Comintern advice was to join as
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individual members. Leninist theory and Stalinist pragmatism 
clashed - to the disadvantage of the CCP as we will see.
In the view of Sneevliet (alias Maring, the Comintern 
representative) this did not go far enough in seeking to 
attract more widespread support. Having come from Indonesia, 
where he was instrumental in setting up a united front of the 
'bloc-within type', and armed with the December 1921 Comintern 
'Theses on the United Front'25, Sneevliet pushed the CCP to join 
the KMT as individuals. This required the Party to notify the 
KMT of every CCP member joining and to reassure the former that 
its members would not be poached. Sneevliet agreed fully with 
these conditions, and went considerably further than Lenin on 
the question of what is permissible in a temporary alliance 
with the national bourgeoisie. However, Sneevliet and his 
supporters in the CCP did not command a majority on the Central 
Committee at the time (August 1922),26 and they had to employ a 
variety of tactics and commit ideological acrobatics to gain 
acceptance for this type of united front by a Communist Party 
membership which still in June 1922 at its Second Congress 
preferred to think of it in terms of 'acting jointly* or 
alongside the KMT.27
Sneevliet used the Comintern's (Stalin's) novel idea of 
labelling the KMT a 'block of various classes', rather than a 
party of one economic class. Previously, it had regarded the 
KMT as a loose coalition, a bloc of four classes, the workers, 
peasants, petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. CCP members were 
thus not being asked to join a bourgeois party but a bloc 
within which they could represent the workers in their dealings
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with other classes. However, a year later, in June 1923, the 
'Manifesto of the Third Congress of the CCP' stated: "The KMT
should be the central force of the national revolution and 
should assume its leadership."28 This was certainly 
unprecedented in Marxist-Leninist theory. It was essentially a 
response to Lenin's and Stalin's policy and the wish to avoid 
challenging Western powers and the Chinese bourgeoisie. It also 
contradicted all the rules of the book as laid down by Lenin 
and made the Party into a subordinate body in the United Front, 
accepting bourgeois leadership, curbing the militancy of urban 
workers and the rebelliousness of the peasantry. At this time, 
the options in China and internationally for the Soviet Union 
were constrained, for it had become clear that the Russian
Revolution would remain for some time the only one. The
agreement between Sun Yatsen and Joffe (another Comintern 
adviser) in January 1923 had laid out how the KMT and the
Soviet Union could cooperate. Finally, after a lengthy 
controversy (between Chang Kuo-t'ao, one of the founder members 
of the CCP and Ch'en Tu-hsiu who had become Secretary General 
at the Second Congress in July 1922, and after pressure from 
Sneevliet, who invented this 'entryist* tactic which shaped and 
one could argue ruined the early CCP, the decision to join the 
KMT in this unusual enterprise was ratified at the Third Party 
Congress in June 1923.
Mao was one of the twenty delegates, representing 432
party members, who attended this Congress. After first 
supporting a minority led by Chang, against the new-style 
United Front, he then voted with the majority replacing Chang
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as head of the Department of Organization - one of whose tasks 
was to liaise between the CCP and the KMT. There seems to be no 
evidence that Mao was practically involved in developing this 
First United Front, nor did he write much about it at the time. 
Besides the above mentioned article by Mao of 1919 The Great 
Union of the Popular Masses, one can detect elements of united 
front thinking in his Analysis of the Classes in Chinese 
Society. His writings of the 1930s and 1940s suggest that he 
must have felt instinctively at home with the whole approach to 
revolution via anti-imperialist nationalism, with the socialist 
goal coming afterwards. In any event, after the First National 
Congress of the KMT agreed in January 1924 to admit Communists 
as individual members, Mao worked actively in the KMT. After 
this First National Kuomintang Congress he became chairman of 
the Kuomintang Department for the Peasant Question. Mao was 
criticized at the time (Summer 1924) for being too close to the 
KMT as a right-winger, i.e. nationalist and consequently he was 
sent back tb his home province - as a punishment, he did not 
attend the Fourth National Congress of the CCP in 1925 and was 
not re-elected to the Central Committee - in time to witness, 
take part in and then to write a report on the peasant uprising 
there in 1927.29
The question to be asked then is why the CCP membership 
joined with the KMT. The task that the Communists consistently 
set themselves was, in the first instance, the same as that of 
the KMT: the eradication of provincial warlordism, the
unification of the country and the limitation of foreign power 
and influence. The key question was whether the methods and
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long-term goals of the Communists were better suited than those 
of the KMT to accomplish these tasks, which were traditionally 
associated with the bourgeois revolution. However, the domestic 
bourgeoisie in China, as in Russia, was weak and irresolute 
according to Mao. Thus, the decision to join the KMT (whatever 
the enormity of the theoretical and practical mistakes), can be 
seen both as a recognition of the common ground of national 
revolution and a realization that the struggle for leadership 
within that revolution would be a protracted and difficult 
process.
It is likely that Marx would have approved of a struggle 
against warlordism, as it would have made possible a thorough 
development of the capitalist mode of production. And the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP, at least in 
their majority, felt themselves on secure ground in arguing 
that the national revolution should be the structuring 
principle of their activity. The socialist goal had become 
secondary fgr the time being, and this seemed to accord with 
Lenin’s and Stalin's way of thinking on this issue.
However, within the United Front the small and 
inexperienced CCP had no alternative, the Comintern claimed, 
but to accept the terms dictated by the KMT to gain access to 
the masses and a degree of political legitimacy. For his part, 
Sun Yatsen, who had clashed with former supporters in Canton, 
found himself in difficulties within the KMT and hoped to gain 
support not just from the CCP but also from the Soviet Union.
The real problems in the alliance began with the death of 
Sun Yatsen in March 1925. M. M. Grunzenberg, alias Borodin, the
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successor of Sneevliet, had been the chief adviser to Sun. He 
had kept the left-wing critics of the United Front in the CCP 
under control but had lost his political base with Sun's death. 
The right-wing of the KMT felt that it had got enough out of 
the United Front, and that now it was time to assert a clear 
superiority over its revolutionary partner. Although Chiang 
Kaishek was coming closer and closer to his goal of uniting all 
China under one government (particularly with his military 
victories from 1926 onwards), he was nevertheless unable to
stop CCP members and the KMT's left-wing from gaining a 
majority at the Third Kuomintang Central Executive Committee
(CEP) Plenum in March 1927. The Comintern and CCP policy was 
apparently paying off; in reality, however, the CCP had 
manoeuvred itself into a corner, where, it was unable to move 
without losing freshly gained influence. With the military 
right in the KMT becoming restive, the Communists decided to 
pursue a cautious policy on the agrarian question, contrary to 
Mao's advocacy of radical land reform with land confiscations. 
The position of the Comintern was that no pretext was to be 
given to the right of the KMT to break the United Front, no
doubts created in the minds of the left of the KMT about the
long-term possibilities of bourgeois-socialist cooperation.
However, during the years of the United Front, the CCP 
remained active among the workers and the peasantry. While the 
Comintern wanted a cautious and unprovocative CCP, it had in 
fact been developing a mass base in the countryside and the 
cities. At the Fifth Party Congress in April/May 1927 delegates 
represented some 58,000 Party members. Mao claimed two million
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members of peasant associations in Hunan alone in January
1927.30 The labour movement in 1926 had reached more than one
million.31 In this critical phase, as pressure was put on the
KMT for more radical policies and the right-wing in the KMT
would feel threatened and end the United Front with the CCP and
the whole national government, the Chinese Communist Party
naturally turned for advice to the Comintern, which pronounced:
The fear that the aggravation of the class struggle 
in the countryside will weaken the united anti­
imperialist front is baseless ... Not to approach the 
agrarian question boldly by supporting all the 
economic demands of the peasant masses is positively 
dangerous for the revolution. To refuse to assign to 
the agrarian revolution a prominent place in the 
national-liberation movement, for fear of alienating 
the dubious and disloyal cooperation of a section of 
the capitalist class, is wrong. This is not the 
revolutionary policy of the proletariat. The 
Communist Party must be free of such mistakes.32
The new line, then, was to urge an intensification rather than
a dampening of peasant agitation. But this was inconsistent
with the policy of strengthening ties with the left KMT, which
had no wish to see a revival of militancy among the peasantry -
t*
mainly because so many of the KMT officer corps were drawn from 
the landlord class. The result of these contradictions in the 
Comintern line was an insufficient number of allies within the 
KMT to block the move to the right and the black-balling of the 
Communists. The CCP may not have been squeezed like a lemon (as 
Stalin hoped for the KMT) , but it was certainly discarded when 
it was no longer useful to Chiang Kaishek.
The first coup against the United Front came in March
1927. The next month, after Chiang had taken Shanghai, disaster 
struck the CCP. Unable to prevent the consolidation of a
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military regime under Chiang, and a wave of bloody repression, 
the movement entered a period in the wilderness where 
revolution was a long way off. Ingenious as he had been with 
his four-class-bloc concept, Stalin now claimed, incredibly, 
that the disaster was a success. Not only did the Comintern 
back the KMT to the bitter end, but also beyond it, when it 
encouraged the continuation of the United Front with the left- 
KMT rump in Wuhan. Its Stalinist leadership claimed that the 
United Front was now purified of the bad influence of Chiang 
and his cronies, that the bloc of four classes had developed 
into a bloc of three classes - minus the bourgeoisie. The 
revolutionary KMT could now convert itself into "an organ of 
the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry".33
We have not brought into this discussion the internal role 
China played in the context of the Stalin-Trotsky debate, but 
there can be no doubt that one of the reasons why Stalin 
continued wiith his pro-Kuomintang line was so as not to give 
ground to the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union. So 
incoherent did policy now become, and so desperate was Stalin’s 
attempt to keep up the pretence of CCP-KMT alliance, that the 
increasingly restive peasantry was once more called back by its 
leaders. As peasants and soldiers clashed, any semblance of a 
United Front came to an end, with the KMT banners flying high 
over the prostrate CCP. Soviet advisers left the KMT, shortly 
to be replaced by Germans.34 The reaction of the Comintern to 
the 1927 debacle was to blame the CCP for a faulty
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implementation of their correct directive. The CCP had simply 
become an accessory to the KMT and had become a brake on the 
mass movement.
(iv) Mao's Lessons from Disaster
It is not easy to disentangle Mao's genuine assessment of 
the situation in the aftermath of the KMT disaster from the 
need to maintain Comintern discipline. At any event his 
writings sought to prove that all was not lost, and indeed that 
an uprising in Hunan could be successful. In line with the 
Comintern's new 'class against class' line, he wrote: 
"Objectively China has long since reached 1917 [referring to 
the Soviet Union], but formerly everyone held the opinion that 
we were in 1905. This has been an extremely great error ..."35 
If the future looked bright, it was necessary to learn from 
past mistakes. This process of learning would have to deal with 
the first piroblem the CCP had had when it entered the united
K
front: namely, inexperience. Secondly, the lesson had to be
drawn that a key element in any united front should be the 
preservation of a separate identity and independent action. The 
third reason for defeat had been the lack of military power, 
and the fourth had been a failure to win over the wavering 
middle forces and isolate the small group of reactionaries. A 
fifth issue which would have to concern the difficulties faced 
by Chinese Marxists, not so much perhaps in serving Soviet 
goals as in importing new concepts and ideology from abroad, 
inflected by the deterministic interpretation of Marx prevalent
316
among the victors of the first socialist revolution.
Nor was the Comintern exactly helpful with its vague and 
indecisive guidance. Ironically it was M. N. Roy, who felt much 
more comfortable with a stance of intransigent opposition to 
the national bourgeoisie, who had been sent in 1927 to China to 
solve the mounting problems between the CCP and the KMT. When 
he failed, he became a scapegoat for Comintern policy on 
China.36
At the Fifth National Congress of the CCP in May 1927,
there were complaints that although it had taken the initiative
in forming the United Front, and had fought for the unification
of the country,
Chiang Kaishek's class, the bourgeoisie, turned the 
victory [in the Northern Expedition] to its class 
advantage by bearing down on the masses who 
constitute the vast majority of the nation. Chiang 
Kaishek is not only the leader of the bourgeoisie but 
also the ally of the feudalists. We must therefore
oppose him with all our strength ...37
The question was how to oppose the bourgeoisie.
This discussion of the First United Front has revealed the<•
questions that every member of the CCP must have asked at the 
time: where did their strength lie? And, if it was not possible 
to survive alone in Chinese politics, how could it be done?
The next section will deal with the way in which the CCP
eventually moved from its wilderness to begin the climb to
power, under Maoist direction and within the context of a 
United Front - only this time with knowledge gained from
previous experience.
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(v) The Transitional Phase 1927-1937
The period from Autumn 1927 (Harvest Uprising in Hunan) to 
the Zunyi Conference in 1935 is sometimes called the 
insurrectionist phase in CCP policy. The 'First Left 
Deviationist Line', as it was labelled later on, concerned the 
uprising in Nanchang, Changsha and Guangzhou. The 'Second Left 
Deviationist Line' was connected with Li Lisan who accepted 
Stalin's orders for renewed insurrections in the cities with 
the countryside playing a supportive role. It ended in 1930. 
The 'Third Left Deviationist Line' began with Wang Ming's, one 
of the 'Returned Bolsheviks', take-over of the Party in 1931. 
These lines all emphasized the primary role of the proletariat, 
uprising in the cities, dominance by the Party headquarters in 
Shanghai and the domineering influence of the Soviet Union. The 
result was the near defeat of the CCP. Only the Japanese 
invasion (1931) and the Long March saved the Party from total 
defeat. As C[tto Braun (alias Li De, the only Comintern adviser 
on the Long March) has shown, contrary to legend, the March was 
not a well-prepared and planned move by the wise CCP 
leadership, but a desperate attempt to escape from KMT 
persecution.38 The Zunyi Conference in 1935 - in the midst of 
the Long March - represented an important turning point in 
Mao's party life. At this meeting of the highest-level 
Communist leadership Mao became chief assistant to Zhou Enlai 
for military planning, extending his influence dramatically in 
the Party. The previous military strategy advocated by Otto 
Braun was condemned and replaced by guerrilla warfare. It also
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represents a weakening of the Comintern influence and of Wang 
Ming over the Party.39 For the first time an Asian revolutionary 
movement contradicted the Comintern and Moscow. Following 
Comintern guidance, the Communist Party had been decimated. 
Comintern instructions regarding the establishment of tiny 
rural bases, the use of trial-and-error learning to create 
Soviets and ragtag armies, to rebuild urban parties and trade 
unions, to recruit the proletariat were all meaningless and 
irrelevant. The result had been, Mao wrote in November 1928: 
"Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof . . . 
We have an acute sense of isolation which we keep hoping will 
end.”40
After the collapse of the First United Front, Stalin and 
the Comintern had advocated insurrections in the cities and in 
the countryside. The former Left Opposition under Qu Qiubai 
supported by Stalin, removed Chen Duxiu in August 1927. In 
conformity with the advice of the Sixth Comintern Congress, and
in the case fof Qu Qiubai with the help of Comintern agent Besso
<
Lominadze, the workers in the cities became the centre of 
activities, and the countryside was meant to play a supportive 
role only. Qu in turn was condemned as a putschist in February
1928.
In Europe at this time the Comintern retreated into a 
policy of united front from below. Any agreement with the 
leadership of Social Democratic parties or unions would lead 
the masses into fascism, the KPD discovered in 1928. Indeed, 
social democracy, or 'social fascism', was in a way even more 
dangerous, since it lulled the workers into a continuation of
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bourgeois rule. Even after Emergency Legislation was introduced 
in Germany after the Reichstag fire provocation in 1933, the 
KPD and other European Communist Parties continued to reject a 
united front from above with the Social Democratic leadership. 
The decisive turn came only with Dimitrov's report to the 
Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935. The Seventh Congress in 
July-August 1935 thus advocated a change in approach to Social 
Democratic and other parties - and also to states that were 
willing to fight fascism, whatever their other policies might 
be. All prominent communists such as Ulbricht, Pieck, Dahlem 
and Florin, and without doubt Thalmann, then in a Nazi camp, 
would have agreed with this self-critical turn. Alas, it came 
too late for Germany, and other parts of Europe.41 But in China, 
where Japanese imperialism was marching forward, it seemed a 
heaven-sent opportunity to correct the gross mistakes of the 
previous decade.
In China the situation entered a new phase with the 1931 
Mukden incident and the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. A 'Red 
Army Open Letter', signed by Mao among others, called on KMT 
troops to rebel against their leaders. And in January 1933 Mao 
made an offer over the heads of the KMT leadership to join with 
all willing KMT troops in a cease-fire agreement and a pact 
against Japanese imperialism.42 But all such calls for a united 
front from below, which were designed to exclude Chiang and the 
KMT leadership, fell on deaf ears among workers and students 
terrorized by Chiang's secret police into distancing themselves 
from the Communists. The road to a more substantial move toward
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bourgeois forces came only hesitantly, in China as in Europe, 
and again it was not until 1934/35 that the CCP began to revise 
its policy of making any agreement dependent on the prior
removal or exclusion of Chiang and the top KMT leadership.
As Stalin came to see the danger of war inherent in the 
rise of fascism, the Comintern advocated common action with 
Western European bourgeois democracies and was generally more 
and more inclined to revive the idea of united fronts from 
above. In China, however, the new Comintern policy hardly
arrived at a propitious moment, for Chiang Kaishek, with Hans 
von Seeckt's advice (one of the seventy German military
advisers at the time43) , was launching his Fifth Extermination 
Campaign (janmiexing zhanyi, 1933-4) against the CCP. At the 
Seventh Comintern Congress (1935), Wang Ming called for a
united front with Chiang Kaishek, as Stalin was acutely
interested in having the Japanese threat against the Soviet 
borders in the Far East diverted by opening up a front against 
Japan in China for which he needed Chiang, as well as 
reenforcing ties with Chiang's KMT, as it was seen by him as a 
more important player in China than the CCP.
"As is well known", Chalmers Johnson wrote, "the [Second] 
United Front tactic was ordered at the Comintern Congress ___ in 
1935. "44 The use of the word 'ordered', highly appropriate to 
the period of Stalin's domination, would have been less 
understood in the early days of the Communist International, 
when its Congresses were arenas of genuine debate and formation 
of a majority line - even though Lenin tended to regard 
decisions made in Moscow as binding whenever they had been
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reached. The Bolsheviks, however, as living proof of successful 
revolution, naturally commanded great moral authority, and 
Lenin's advocacy of temporary alliances with the national 
bourgeoisie in the colonies was congruent with, if not crudely 
derived from, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The 
adoption of the compromise with M. N. Roy at the Second 
Comintern Congress in 1920 was, as we have seen, a prelude to a 
general turn to United Front tactics which was either expressed 
in terms of a direct appeal ('from below') to the base of other 
parties, or an agreement ('from above') with another 
leadership, or some combination of the two.
As discussed above, this period, which included the First 
United Front in China, came to an abrupt end in 1928, when the 
Comintern launched its disastrous so-called 'Third Period* when 
Social Democrats were categorized as social-fascists.
As the pressure was exerted from Moscow, via the 
Comintern, and as the situation and relationship among the
various classes in China changed under the impact of Japanese
<
aggression, there was a marked shift towards a policy of 
cooperation with the national bourgeoisie - a policy which, 
arguably, would have been the spontaneous inclination of Mao 
throughout, but not in the form of a blank cheque for Chiang. 
Mao was in favour of a united front policy in order to 
strengthen the CCP's armed forces, base areas and to maximize 
revolutionary expansion.45 The Politburo meeting in December 
1935 in Wayaopao which continued developments of the Zunyi 
Conference formally endorsed this call for an anti-Japanese 
United Front from above but under the leadership of the CCP and
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excluding Chiang, who was still then one of the "running dogs"
of Japanese imperialism, because he and the Japanese
imperialists might "carry through their policy of disrupting
this united front" and because of "Chiang Kai-shek's policy of
betraying China".46 In November 1935 calls for the creation of a
government of National Defence and Anti-Japanese Alliance had
already been made, which were a direct result of the Seventh
Congress of the Comintern. In his report in Wayaopao, Mao
analyzed the different classes according to their attitude to
the anti-Japanese struggle, and came to the conclusion that not
only the petty and national bourgeoisie but also pro-British or
pro-American compradors could join the anti-Japanese United
Front, so long as they were genuinely committed to a struggle
against Japanese imperialism. In May and July of the next year
(1936), Mao also appealed to the Hui (Muslims) in China and the
Secret Society Gelaohui (Ko-lao Hui).
The minority nationalities, and especially the people 
of Inner Mongolia who are directly menaced by 
Japaned^ imperialism, are now rising up in struggle.
As time goes on, their struggle will merge with that
of the people in northern China and with the 
operations of the Red Army in the Northwest.47
In the Comintern, however, there was an increased
willingness to let bygones be bygones as far as Chiang was
concerned - something which was more difficult for Mao to come
to terms with as his agenda differed from Stalin's. The
'Telegram from the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Red
Army* to Chiang Kaishek in Nanjing, sent on 5 May 1936, is
given by the CCP itself as the document which represents a
clarification on its side and a full orientation for a united
323
front. The old slogan 'Resistance against Japan and Opposition
against Chiang Kaishek* was changed to 'To Force Chiang to
Resist Japan' and after the Xian incident in December 1936 to
'Ally with Chiang to Oppose Japan'.48 By repeated appeals to
Chiang and promises to integrate the Red Army into the National
Army - alluding to the positive aspects of the First United
Front and also softening its land reform policy - the CCP
applied increasing public pressure on Chiang to enter into
negotiations. These appeals must have seemed ironic to Chiang,
for he was with his Fifth Extermination Campaign in 1934 then
apparently concerned only with mopping-up operations in his
area against Communist forces, and the rest of the Red Army had
apparently disqualified itself from participation in the
national arena by fleeing to the edge of China.
For Mao, the domestic class contradiction had become
Secondary due to the foreign policy contradiction between Japan
and China. All patriots had to act in common, he declared:
The seriousness of the Japanese aggression ... is so 
formidable a menace that before it all the forces of 
China must unite. Besides the Communist Party there 
are other parties and forces in China, and the
strongest of these is the Kuomintang. Without its
cooperation our strength at present is insufficient 
to resist Japan in war. Nanking must participate . . .
We are obliged to reconsider in detail the concrete 
formula under which such cooperation can become _ 
possible.49
Matters finally came to a head in the famous Xian incident 
- the so-called 'Double 12' of 1936 - when Chiang visited Xian 
to relieve Zhang Xueliang, a KMT general, of his command as he 
had shown himself unwilling to fight the Communists while his 
native Manchuria was still occupied by the Japanese. However,
324
rather than arresting Zhang, Chiang Kaishek was himself 
arrested, half-dressed, without his false teeth, hiding in some 
bushes and with a resulting loss of face. This arrest had not 
been coordinated with the CCP, which suddenly found itself with 
the opportunity to present the bill for the massacre of 1927. 
Indeed, in a first telegram Mao demanded that Chiang be placed 
on trial. If he later changed his mind and agreed to 
negotiations (conducted by Zhou Enlai) , this was not only 
because of pressure from Stalin but probably also because of 
fears that Chiang's possible death sentence would lead to a 
more pro-Japanese and more anti-communist figure controlling 
the Nanjing Regime.It was the crucial goal of the CCP to keep 
the KMT in the war and the Japanese army and the KMT locked in 
combat. In addition Chiang's arrest appeared not to fit the 
anti-Japanese mood in the country at large. A CCP advocating 
the killing of Chiang Kaishek would have appeared unpatriotic. 
On 23 December 1936 the two sides agreed to the ending of the
civil war, the creation of an anti-Japanese United Front, the
release of political prisoners and the sacking of pro-Japanese 
ministers in Chiang's KMT Nanjing government. This represented 
a turning point for the CCP and the KMT, signifying not only 
the end of the war and the extermination campaigns by Chiang, 
but also the creation of the Second United Front. It was the 
beginning of the end for Chiang,50 even though in 1937 Mao 
agreed that he could be the titular leader of such an alliance.
Over the following months, which saw a fresh attack by 
Japan in July 1937 in North China, Mao gave his attention to
the guarantees for the KMT and the demands of the CCP in a
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United Front.51 Whether the agreement would eventually have been 
implemented without the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July, 
however, it is doubtful. The attack by Japanese forces on the 
bridge, Spence argued, "can be considered the first battle of 
World War II."52 A United Front for joint resistance against 
Japan finally came about 1937.
(vi) The Second United Front 1937-1945
It is likely that Mao believed - given the situation in 
China - in the absolute necessity of a Second United Front from 
1927 and so there was no dramatic shift in CCP policy in 1935 
or 1937. This was the period when Mao finally established his 
ascendancy within the Party and the clash with Wang Ming over 
the United Front was one of the instruments he used. However, 
the Wayaopao report of December 1935 was consistent with Mao's 
approach.
A great change has now taken place in the political 
situation. Our Party has defined its tasks in the 
light of this changed situation ... Its main 
characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to 
turn China into a colony.5
Relating these trends to his class analysis and theory of 
contradictions, Mao explained that the two basic contradictions 
between imperialism and China, and between feudalism and the 
broad masses, still existed. What had changed was the relation­
ship between the different classes in China.
When imperialism launches a war of aggression against 
such a country, all its various classes, except for 
some traitors, can temporarily unite in a national 
war against imperialism. At such a time, the 
contradiction between imperialism and the country 
concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while
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all the contradictions among the various classes 
within the country (including what was the principal 
contradiction, between the feudal system and the 
great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated 
to a secondary and subordinate position.54
In these circumstances class struggle took the form of national
struggle, but class struggle inside China "must be subordinate
to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War of
Resistance".55 This interrelation of national and class
oppression and exploitation is at the very centre of my thesis.
The middle classes, the wavering, unreliable customers
with a 'dual character', were very important, if not decisive.
He stated in 1939:
The dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution exerts a great effect 
on our political line and our Party building, and 
without grasping this dual character we cannot have a 
good grasp of our political line or of Party buiding.
One important component of the political line of the 
Chinese Communist Party is the policy both of unity 
with the bourgeoisie and of struggle against it. In 
fact, . the development and tempering of the Party 
through its unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie 
are an important component of Party building. Unity 
here means the united front with the bourgeoisie. 
Struggle here means the 'peaceful* and 'bloodless' 
struggle, ideological, political and organisational, 
which goes on when we are united with the bourgeoisie 
and which turns into armed struggle when we are 
forced to break with it.56
This is what Mao meant by "revolutionary dual policy."57 It
applied not only to the partner in the United Front but also to
Communist activities within the Front: neither too much unity
as Wang Ming was proposing - nor too much struggle. To continue
to call Chiang Kaishek in 1936 a fascist would have been too
much struggle; not to give him this label in 1945/6, would
certainly have been too much unity.
It would appear that throughout the turn to the Second
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certainly have been too much unity.
It would appear that throughout the turn to the Second
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United Front, Mao had to use all his powers to convince 
comrades within the Party of the wisdom of the new course. A 
typical argument, at the end of 1935, was that "the tactics of 
the closed doorism", was the "tactics of the regal self­
isolationist”.58 Some idea of the spontaneous contrary ideas 
within the Party is given by the following ironic presentation 
of an opponent of the United Front:
The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely 
pure, and the road of the revolution must be 
straight, absolutely straight. Nothing is correct 
except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The 
national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally 
counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded 
to the rich peasants . . . Intellectuals are three-day 
revolutionaries whom it is dangerous to recruit.59
When the CCP in February 1937 sent its United Front proposals
to the KMT, it coupled concessions with a number of conditions
and there was a period of bargaining. It was good that the KMT
joined in an anti-Japanese United Front, but a continuation of
other, older policies did not need to be approved.60 The
proposals were that the KMT stopped collaborating with Japan;
i
if the CCP gained legitimacy and if the civil war could be 
stopped, it would be worthwhile making various concessions - 
especially if one took a long view of revolutionary dual 
policy, that is unity (now) and struggle not only for the 
hearts of the wavering middle forces (now), but also against 
the next group of die-hards (later) .61 The CCP agreed to 
implement Sun's 'Three People's Principles' (nationalism, 
democracy and people's livelihood), stop fighting the KMT, 
dissolve the Soviets, and integrate the Red Army into the 
national (KMT) army.
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As these proposals were framed by references to Sun 
Yatsen's 'Three Principles', the CCP tried consciously to 
connect with the First United Front.62 The CCP now kept control 
of considerable territory from Yenan and had a Red Army which, 
though nominally under National command, was in effect an 
independent agent. A Party had been built which could serve as 
an organizational tool in politics and which kept its 
independence, and the KMT recognized the special status of the 
Shen-Kan-Ning base, or Border Region. Even though in On the New 
Stage in October 1938' Mao recognized the leading role 
('backbone') of the KMT in the alliance but also in the phase 
of reconstructing China after the victory against the Japanese, 
at the same time however, contrary to the main report in The
Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War, Mao
emphasized independence and self-reliance in the United Front.63 
This was even more pronounced in The Chinese Revolution and the 
CCP (December 1939), where he clearly claimed leadership in the
United Front.
<•
Summing up the foregoing sections of this chapter, we
can see that the Chinese revolution taken as a whole
involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces 
both the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new- 
democratic revolution) and the proletarian-socialist 
revolution, i.e. both the present and the future 
stages of the revolution. The leadership in this ... 
twofold revolutionary task devolves on the Chinese 
Communist Party, the party of the proletariat, 
without whose leadership no revolution can succeed.64
Before that, Mao had declared in May 1938 that the land reform
of the CCP was 'irreversible'.65 This freedom of action, with
the ability to initiate policies, shows the dramatic change the
CCP had undergone from the humble beginnings of 1921-24 to the
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late 1930s. No longer was the Party 'bound hand and foot'.66 It 
was able to correct a mistake made by Mao's predecessors, who 
had followed, according to Mao, Lenin's conception of dual 
policy in a United Front wrongly. Whereas for Lenin this had 
meant neutralizing the wavering forces, Mao developed this into 
an active attempt to convince and win them over.
If the CCP had simply accommodated the KMT, the Communists
might have finished in the same position as before; if they had
followed the 'struggle line* too forcefully, the KMT and its
pro-Japanese forces might have surrendered to Japan in order to
fight the CCP together. "Our chief purpose”, Mao declared, "is
to extend the ground already won and to realize the positive
aim of 'winning the masses in their millions for the Anti-
Japanese National United Front and the overthrow of Japanese
imperialism'."67 In Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-
Japanese United Front, Mao reviewed the then current situation,
analyzed Chinese society and proposed continued united front
activities. (Together with On Policy (December 1940) one finds
that united front policy has become part of virtually all CCP
policies. Mao elaborated in Current Problems ... the tactics to
be used in the struggle against the right-wing in the KMT, the
winning over of middle forces inside and outside the KMT_ as
well as the development of progressive forces in general. It is
worth quoting the central passage from Current Problems .. . at
length for the light that it casts on his thinking at the time.
Winning over the middle forces means winning over the 
middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the 
regional power groups. They are three distinct 
categories, but as things are, they all belong to the 
middle forces. The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the 
national bourgeoisie as distinct from the comprador
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class, i.e. from the big bourgeoisie. Although it has 
its class contradictions with the workers and does 
not approve of the independence of the working class, 
it still wants to resist Japan and, moreover, would 
like to grasp political power for itself, because it 
is oppressed by the Japanese imperialists in the 
occupied areas and kept down by the big landlords and 
big bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang areas. When it 
comes to resisting Japan, it is in favour of united 
resistance; when it comes to winning political power, 
it is in favour of the movement for constitutional 
government and tries to exploit the contradictions 
between the progressives and the die-hards for its 
own ends. This is a stratum we must win over. Then 
there are the enlightened gentry who are the left- 
wing of the landlord class, that is, the section with 
a bourgeois colouration, whose political attitude is 
roughly the same as that of the middle bourgeoisie. 
Although they have class contradictions with the 
peasants, they also have their contradictions with 
the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. They do not 
support the die-hards and they, too, want to exploit 
the contradictions between us and the die-hards for 
their own political ends. On no account should we 
neglect this section either, and our policy must be 
to win them over. As for the regional power groups, 
they are of two kinds - the forces which control 
certain regions as their own, and the troops of 
miscellaneous brands which do not. Although these 
groups are in contradiction with the progressive 
forces, they also have their contradictions with the 
Kuomintang Central Government because of the self- 
seeking policy it pursues at their expense; they, 
too, want to exploit the contradictions between us 
and the! die-hards for their own political ends. Most 
of the leaders of the regional power groups belong to 
the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and, 
therefore, progressive as they may appear at certain 
times during the war, they soon turn reactionary 
again; nevertheless, because of their contradictions 
with the Kuomintang central authorities, the 
possibility exists of their remaining neutral in our 
struggle against the die-hards, provided we pursue a 
correct policy. Our policy towards the three 
categories of middle forces described above is to win 
them over. However, this policy differs from that of 
winning over the peasants and the urban petty 
bourgeoisie, and, moreover, it varies for each 
category of the middle forces. While the peasants and 
the urban petty bourgeoisie should be won over as 
basic allies, the middle forces should be won over as 
allies against imperialism. Among the middle forces, 
it is possible for the middle bourgeoisie and the 
enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight 
against Japan and also in the setting up of anti- 
Japanese democratic political power, but they fear
agrarian revolution. In the struggle against the die- 
hards, some may join in to a limited degree, others 
may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others 
a rather reluctant, neutrality. But, apart from 
joining us in the war, the regional power groups will 
at most observe a temporary neutrality in our 
struggle against the die-hards; they are unwilling to 
join us in establishing democratic political power 
since they themselves belong to the big landlord 
class and the big bourgeoisie. The middle forces tend 
to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should 
educate and criticize them appropriately, with 
special reference to their vacillating attitude.
The winning over of the middle forces is an
extremely important task for us in the period of the 
anti-Japanese united front, but it can only be
accomplished given certain conditions. These are: (1)
that we have ample strength; (2) that we respect 
their interests; and (3) that we are resolute in our 
struggle against the die-hards and steadily win
victories. If these conditions are lacking, the
middle forces will vacillate or even become allies of 
the die-hards in the latter's attacks on us, because 
the die-hards are also doing their best to win over 
the middle forces in order to isolate us. The middle 
forces carry considerable weight in China and may 
often be the decisive factor in our struggle against 
the die-hards; we must therefore be prudent in 
dealing with them.68
In the first place, of course, the CCP tried to win over 
the middle forces to its side simply in order to strengthen the 
anti-imperialist front and reduce the number of enemies. But 
there was always a long-term vision of reconstructing the 
United Front after the main present enemy had been beaten. "We 
shall be able to expand the progressive forces, win over the 
middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces.69
Despite the great difference between the First and Second 
United Fronts, compromises still had to be made. It must have 
been, difficult for peasants who had gained from Communist land 
reform to have to reduce their outpourings of 'bitterness* 
against landlords. It must have seemed unjust for workers to 
cooperate with 'yellow trade unions', and to party cadres in
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Yenan it must have appeared virtually impossible to work 
together in a meaningful way with the newcomers from the cities 
and universities, not to mention to cooperate, on however 
temporary a basis, with compradors. But the problems were not 
just on the level of the individual and his/her capacity to 
think strategically; a dichotomy also appeared within the Party 
as such. On one hand the CCP tried to gain support and trust 
from landlords and the bourgeoisie; on the other, the Party 
tried to strengthen its support in its natural constituency 
among the popular masses. A move in one direction always 
threatened a loss of support in the other.
Depending on the audience he was addressing, Mao 
emphasized either cooperation or leadership with the KMT in the 
United Front. From the outset, Mao had been quite frank about 
the use of the United Front by both sides. "Confronted with 
Japanese imperialism, the bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang are 
temporarily forced to seek an ally in the proletariat, just as 
we are seeking an ally in the bourgeoisie."70 However, this 
instrumental approach by no means excluded a third level of 
potential conflict. The animosity or even open hostility by 
parts of the KMT against the United Front continued virtually 
uninterrupted. It tried continually to minimize the political 
success of the CCP. Serious military clashes occurred from 1939 
onwards, and the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941 shows 
that civil war was never very far from the surface. With this 
incident the KMT also stopped subsidies for the Border Region 
and increased the blockade of Yenan. Mao complained bitterly 
about the death of his comrades:
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To be frank: there is a limit to our concessions; the 
stage of concessions is over as far as we are 
concerned. They [the KMT] have inflicted the first 
gash, and a very deep one at that. If they still care 
for their own future, they should come forward of 
their own accord and dress the wound."71
After the renewal of military clashes with the KMT, the 
CCP increasingly found itself in direct competition within the 
United Front for leadership of the Chinese national struggle. 
Throughout the period until 1945 relationships between the two 
parties fluctuated. Each regarded the other suspiciously and 
prepared accordingly for the new period that would begin after 
the defeat of Japan. Already in 1940, in an article entitled On 
New Democracy,continuing a theme from The Chinese Revolution 
and the Chinese Communist Party (December 1939), the form the 
future society would take was being outlined by Mao. Ultimately 
the Second United Front, conducted both from above and below, 
enabled the CCP to maximize revolutionary expansion, but 
stopping short of breaking the United Front. It was one of the
most important clues for the CCP's anti-imperialist wartime
(
success. '
(vii) From United Front to New Democracy (Xin Minzhu Zhuyi)
Even if it is difficult to take seriously Mao's 
declaration (at the time of the dissolution of the Comintern in 
May 1943) that the Comintern had supported the Chinese 
revolution in its most difficult years from 1927 to 1937, it 
should not be forgotten that Mao had matured politically as a 
result of receiving edicts from the Comintern and having
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discussions with its advisers. What the CCP had borrowed had
been transformed under Mao into something appropriate for the
Chinese context - as we have seen in the case of policy towards
the middle forces. As Fairbank remarked, the way the United
Front concept was used in China complemented the guerrilla
strategy developed by Mao.72 It also reinforced Mao's position
in the Party and his brand of 'sinification' of Marxism. In Liu
Shaoqi's report on changes in the Party constitution Mao's
thinking becomes the guiding ideology.
It [Mao's thought] is the greatest achievement and 
greatest pride of our Party and of the Chinese people 
in its long struggle and it will bring benefit for 
our nation for generations .. . Mao Tse-tung Thought 
is the further development of Marxism in the 
national-democratic revolution of a colonial, semi­
colonial and semi-feudal country in the current era 
. . . Nobody, except our Comrade Mao Tse-tung has been 
so successful and outstanding in the solution of the 
extraordinary task of adapting Marxism to China . . . 
our Comrade Mao Tse-tung is not only the greatest 
revolutionary and statesman of Chinese history, but 
also its greatest theoretician and scientist.73
The United Front concept was applicable to the
contradiction with Japan, and served as a constant tool for
dealing with a variety of problems. At the time there were two
possibilities for China, Mao claimed - either the continuation
or the destruction of the fascist dictatorship of the KMT,
supplemented by democratic reforms and the construction of an
independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful new
China.
In Mao's article On Coalition Government (1945), he set
out the broad lines of the new regime envisaged by the CCP
after the end of the war.
In these circumstances, what ought we do? Beyond all 
doubt, the urgent need is to unite representatives of
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all political parties and groups and of people 
without any party affiliation and establish a 
provisional democratic coalition government for the 
purpose of instituting democratic reforms, 
surmounting the present crisis, mobilizing and 
unifying all the anti-Japanese forces in the country 
to fight in effective co-ordination with the allied 
countries for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, 
and thus enabling the Chinese people to liberate 
themselves from the latter's clutches. After that it 
will be necessary to convene a national assembly on a 
broad democratic basis and set up a formally 
constituted democratic government, which will also be 
in the nature of a coalition and which will have a 
still wider representation of people from all parties 
and groups or without any party affiliation, and 
which will lead the liberated people of the whole 
country in building an independent, free, democratic, 
united, prosperous and powerful new China.74
The question which arises at this point is why the CCP
should continue to work in a united front or coalition
government. The reasons were very practical, for the solution
of a whole range of internal problems required a concerted
national effort. Who would run the factories? Who would deal
with China on the international scene, if China repressed
thousands of the national bourgeoisie? Besides, world
capitalism Was expected to enter a major crisis in the near
<•
future, with no feasible solution other than socialism. There 
was thus no reason to push ahead, for the CCP had suffered from 
inexperience in the First United Front, without coming to grips 
with it; it had to avoid making this mistake again.75 The Party, 
with the defeat of Japanese imperialism, reassessed the overall 
situation and again the main contradiction had shifted and this 
meant that possible friends and foes had changed.
To an increasing extent, the problem after the civil war 
was that of restoring the economy to pre-war levels and then 
much later of building socialism in a Third World country. The
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concept of 'New Democracy' was first enunciated by Mao Zedong 
in early 1940 as a specifically Chinese route to socialism, and 
generally as an idea that might be applicable to societies 
placed similarly to China within the capitalist world system. 
This represents Mao's primary concern to integrate national 
considerations into a Marxist scheme of historical development. 
In On New Democracy (and also The Chinese Revolution and the 
Chinese Communist Party and Introducing 'The Communist') it had 
been argued in line with Comintern doctrine that a classic 
bourgeois-democratic revolution was not appropriate for China's 
situation at the time. Nor was a socialist one however. The 
theory and practice of wartime united front policies had been 
worked out from 1S37-1S40. The result was 'On New Democracy* 
(1940), which feeds into civil war united front policies in 
Mao's On Coalition Government (1945) and finally into On the 
People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949). 'New Democracy' was 
against foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism, but not
against capitalism - which as yet existed only on a small
<•
scale.76 In this context, emphasis was placed upon Mao's 
original concept of the 'united front' during the Revolution 
which would involve the Chinese 'national bourgeoisie' in a 
four-class coalition with workers, peasants and petty 
bourgeoisie.
This doctrine reflected the actual nationalist sentiments 
of much of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and the tactical use which 
Mao made of them.
(viii) Conclusion
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In the struggle against Japanese imperialism and the KMT, 
the United Front was immensely important, as it provided a 
framework for navigating the political minefield in China. The 
difficult decision concerned who should be included in the 
United Front. Mao gained his knowledge from experience of 
feudalism and imperialist interference. Japan did not merely 
occupy part of China; it established businesses in the occupied 
and unoccupied areas. The social and national questions were 
thus automatically closely interwoven. Class contradictions 
were between national bourgeoisie and peasantry/proletariat 
against compradors. Nevertheless, it had always to be 
remembered that the national bourgeoisie had a dual character - 
at one point there could be unity with it, but the possibility 
of a period of struggle was always there. The First United 
Front from 1923-27 was formed to overcome domestic feudalism. 
This could only be a temporary alliance, for with new
contradictions friends would change into foes.
<:
The alliance terminology was first developed after 1920, 
when the revolution failed to occur in Germany. At that time 
Lenin had looked for allies to bring the revolution about and 
to protect the newly established Soviet Union. In colonies the 
issue was different: socialist revolution appeared possible, in 
the mid- to long-term, but the proletariat was numerically 
small, and so it was necessary to have access to the 
bourgeoisie to defeat feudalism. In the Chinese case, the CCP 
had lost its independence in the First United Front, due to 
Comintern advice and its own inexperience. Consequently, the
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Party suffered a series of defeated insurrections in the 
cities. As a result of the defeat in 1927, Mao developed an 
alternative strategy: the peasantry became crucial for victory.
The foreign stimulus to rethink the situation came from 
Japan's further encroachment on Chinese territory. Johnson is 
of the opinion that the success of the CCP depended on 'peasant 
nationalism' only, stimulated by Japanese atrocities. Kataoka 
agrees with this, except that the locus of nationalism was 
placed in the cities. Selden in his earlier work discounts the 
importance of nationalism in the victory of the CCP,
emphasizing the attraction of the social revolution for
peasants, rejecting to a substantial degree the 'unity' aspect 
in the united front, and emphasising class struggle in it.77 In 
1964 Mao himself rejected Japanese apologies for the attack on 
China during the Second World War, on the grounds that this 
attack had created solidarity among the Chinese people and 
finally of the CCP.78
What Ii have established in this chapter is how central
imperialism was to the United Front, and how instrumental the 
United Front was in mobilizing anti-imperialist forces against 
the Japanese. However, it has not been considered whether the 
peasants would have maintained their anti-imperialist struggle 
without the promise of a social revolution. One should not 
overlook the revolutionary nature of Mao's nationalism, the 
importance he gave to considerations of class and class 
consciousness. The ultimate goal of his strategy was not the 
limited one of national liberation, it included social 
revolution. As a matter of fact, the social revolution could
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only succeed if the nationalist problem of Japanese 
imperialism, or imperialism in general, could be solved first. 
If the CCP continued to fight the KMT, this would strengthen 
imperialism in China and for Mao only a united front could 
mobilize the population against imperialism. The alternatives 
were clear: Either military alignment with the KMT and defeat 
of Japanese imperialism or continuous civil war against the KMT 
and probable victory for Japanese imperialism. An additional 
bonus of a united front with the KMT was the possibility of the 
Soviet Union's material support and an alliance with the Soviet 
Union against Japan. The Comintern, under Stalin's direction, 
had its own agenda as to why the United Front had to be created 
and Chiang's life to be spared in 1936. Stalin wanted to keep 
the KMT in the war against Japan. Chiang in respect of securing 
'socialism in one country* was the more important player and 
t.he CCP would anyway not turn away from its 'natural* ally - or 
so Stalin thought. However, as has been shown, the debates
concerning Qomintern directives on the United Front are one of
<
the instruments Mao used to impose his 'Thought' on the CCP.
That is why there is no contradiction in my writing that 
Mao was 'spontaneously' in favour of a Second United Front and 
that he disagreed with Comintern directives which also
advocated a Second United Front. Only with an anti-imperialist
Second United Front could imperialism be defeated, which would
open up the possibility of the socialist revolution being 
attempted - something which was not directly in the national 
interest of the Soviet Union and Comintern. For these anti­
imperialist struggle was a convenient way of putting pressure
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on imperialist states as well as serving to defend the Soviet 
Union.
With deeper Japanese penetration however, the principal 
contradiction changed into a struggle against foreign 
imperialism, not domestic feudalism. The Second United Front in 
1936/7-1945 resulted in a changed policy toward the domestic 
bourgeoisie, the KMT and pro-Western compradors, and less 
extreme land reform policies. The old danger of being absorbed 
in the KMT remained, but the CCP had learned from its mistakes. 
It now controlled territory, had a military force, remained 
independent, and demanded leadership in the United Front. In 
this alliance the CCP attracted large parts of the wavering 
middle forces and was successful in fighting Japan.
The formation of the First United Front had gone against 
Lenin's view of how and when to form an alliance. It was 
founded to weaken imperialism in China and Asia, help the 
survival of the Soviet Union and bring the revolution nearer, 
but it had led to increased power of the KMT. In the 1930s and 
the Second United Front Mao had in fact moved on beyond Lenin's 
concept. Lenin had broadened the Marxist term 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat' to include the peasants. In turn, his formula, 
'The Democratic Dictatorship of Workers and Peasants' was 
further broadened by Mao to include 'national capitalists' and 
'petty bourgeoisie' in a transitional stage known as 'New 
Democracy'. The 'new democratic revolution', therefore, was (in 
Marxist terms) a species of bourgeois democratic revolution. 
The socialist revolution would begin at some later stage.
Given the bourgeois-democratic character of China in 1949,
341
the situation was not ripe for socialism and the United Front 
was continued into the next phase of reconstructing China after 
decades of war. It had by then become a genuine element of a 
long-term strategy. As Mao pointed out: "Any talk about Marxism 
apart from China's specific characteristics is only Marxism in 
the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum."79 Thus he established 
China's right to a particular interpretation of Marxism- 
Leninism, and undermined the Stalinist monopoly of such 
interpretation.
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General theories of imperialism are about the 
relationship between nations-states. The crudest theories of 
imperialism find it unproblematical that nations-states are 
actors on the international political stage; they do not 
hesitate to think in terms of nations-states in and for 
themselves. Much of the study of international relations has 
traditionally been conducted in this way. The main concept 
used is the national interest. But any sophisticated theory of 
imperialism realizes that nations-states are not homogeneous. 
The specific contribution of orthodox Marxism is to say that 
the most important form of heterogeneity in nation-states is 
class. Others point to differences of gender and ethnicity 
within nation-states. In Marxist analysis, therefore, 
international relations have been analyzed also in terms of 
class and class interests. Thus the main question at issue in
Marxist theories of imperialism is the interrelation of
\
national and*class oppression and exploitation. This is the 
case whether or not international relations are analyzed with 
an explicit theory of imperialism. Hence, although Marx did 
not have an explicit theory of imperialism, his and Engels' 
writing on the relations of nations is, of course, full of 
references to class.
As stated, Marx and Engels did not develop a general 
theory of imperialist relationships. Nevertheless, their 
analysis of the working and inherent contradictions of the 
capitalist economy, contained largely in Capital but also in 
their journalistic writings, puts forward many important ideas 
on capitalist expansion into foreign markets and into backward
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and exploitable countries. It is clear that, in volume II of 
Capital, Marx's highly abstracted models of simple and 
expanded reproduction, do not assume that the very survival of 
the capitalist system is ultimately dependent upon its 
expansion into external markets; self-generating increases in 
consumer demand within a capitalist economy are possible, even 
if it is true that capitalists will want profits, irrespective 
where they are made. Their moves overseas, justified among 
others by the principle of Free Trade, would lead in Marx's 
and Engels' view to a world market and an international 
division of labour. The discussion in volume III of Capital 
also deals already with capital centralisation (oligopolic 
dominance of each market sector by a smaller number of firms) 
and capital concentration (mergers and amalgamations into 
larger capitalist firms) which would in turn lead to the 
structural form of capitalism which Lenin called monopoly 
capitalism.
The move to a world market was not seen as negative from 
a Marxist perspective: not only was it only a safety valve 
which would not bring a solution to the inherent crisis of 
capitalism, but it would also integrate overseas areas into 
the capitalist mode of production and bring them into line for 
a development toward communism. This is the double mission of 
capitalism, to destroy, usually in a brutal manner, the old 
feudal mode of production, and to generate industrialization. 
That is why they are negative about attempts in these colonies 
to resist this capitalist penetration. The evidence gathered 
shows that this penetration was not avoidable and that it was 
positive. In this view, even if this discussion, especially 
the published part of it, is open to interpretation, in the
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end even in Russia they believe that one has to go through 
this harsh development before reaching communism. Peasant 
socialism is not really an option, as the narodniki in Russia 
believed.
What becomes also clear in Marx's and Engels' discussion 
of the obshchina is their carefully worded response to 
Russians concerning a skipping of stages. This is because even 
though Marx was not in the first place involved in practically 
organising a social revolution, and was not that concerned 
with alliances to strengthen revolutionary developments, he 
does not reject narodniki out of hand.
What one can draw from the discussion of national 
resistance in overseas territories is Marx's negative view of 
nationalism. For Marx and Engels class analysis is prior to 
national identity. For them, nation is an afterthought which 
complicates class. Marx's and Engels' ideas about class and 
revolution were formulated without much reference to the fact 
that nations existed. Their model is really one of a world 
capitalist system divided into social classes, particularly 
workers and capitalists. Nations were to them in general 
obstacles to the actual realization of this model. Thus in 
general they, favoured the unification leading to the abolition 
of nations. The less nations the better. But as a practical 
matter the route to the one-nation/no-nation, only class ideal 
might take them through a certain amount of national struggle. 
When they point out that the English proletariat increasingly 
shares the imperialist outlook of its own bourgeoisie, this 
confirms the idea that nation for them does not mean very much 
except as the basis for an ideology which reduces class 
conflict. Even when they come out in favour of the Irish
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independence struggle it is usually only because it needs to 
be settled so as not to continue to divide the English working 
class. Their support for the Polish national struggle has to 
be seen in the same light: it is not in the first place 
support for a national liberation struggle, but is understood 
by them as a weakening of Tsarist reaction.
Marx's ideas of capital export and capital centralization 
and concentration were a starting point for a renewed 
discussion by Marxists of the post-1870 development of 
Capitalism. Lenin, in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism found the root of imperialism in the fierce 
competition for greater monopoly capitalist profits, resources 
and markets, a competition which integrally involved the 
capitalists' manipulation of state policy and military force. 
Lenin did not attempt an analysis of capitalism as such, nor 
does he repeat a discussion of the theoretical issues involved 
in Marx's reproduction schemes, as this had been done by Marx 
and Engels. (He analyzed the development of capitalism, since 
Marx's death, of a competitive capitalism which changed into 
monopoly capitalism. However this was not the only change 
Lenin observed.
One of Lenin's adjustments to Marx's and Engels' concepts 
of class is the invention of the labour aristocracy. This 
explains more fully, in his view, the imperialist attitudes of 
the working class because it attributes the ideology to 
material interest (of the working class leadership) but it 
exonerates the majority of the proletariat from enjoying any 
objective benefit from imperialism, something Marx and Engels 
did not argue. Hence this approach identifies the class and 
the national exploiters (the bourgeoisie in both cases with
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their lesser allies, the aristocracy of labour in the 
imperialist countries and parts of the oligarchy in the 
colonial and semi-colonial countries). Hence on a world scale 
the scene is set for thinking not in terms of 
bourgeoisie/proletariat as Marx and Engels did, with the 
concomitant of looking for moves towards an integrated world 
capitalism without nations as the path to world socialism, but 
in terms of the oppressors (bourgeoisie of some countries plus 
their allies) against the oppressed (workers, peasants etc.) 
This move is related to the other main issue of which Lenin's 
Imperialism diverges from Marx in the idea that the 
elimination of different capitalist nations is impossible so 
that the internalization of the economic part of the system is 
contradicted by the inevitable political separation of 
nations, especially of course the imperialist nations.
Another difference Lenin observed was that in Russia 
capitalist penetration and the Russian integration into the 
world market* was not entirely positive. It led, as a matter of 
fact, to an uneven industrialization in Russia. This led to a 
combination of different modes of production as well as the 
existence of a multitude of classes in Russia. Marx was 
concerned with his concept of class analysis, to analyze 
certain laws of social development and of the forces involved 
in this development, class analysis was a tool for the 
explanation of changes in societies. So if Marx and Engels 
largely subsumed national struggles within class struggles, 
Lenin and Marxists after him have a wide range of views in 
relation to the connection of class and nation. But Marx did 
not address himself to the question of,the internal relations 
between classes in a situation where a country was engaged in
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repelling foreign domination and control.
It was left to Lenin to elaborate upon the nature of 
revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries where pre­
capitalist mode of production was dominant. As regards this, 
one can make two observations. Firstly, he introduced what has 
been called a ’voluntarist' element by assigning to the
/
Communist Party the task of raising class consciousness among 
the proletariat where this was latent or not fully developed. 
Where Marx seemed to lay emphasis on the largely spontaneous 
development of class awareness emerging from the objective 
class situation and from interaction with other classes, Lenin 
stressed the deliberate fostering of this consciousness by a 
more or less external agent. In doing so he somewhat shifted 
the focus on class to the ideological level, hence Lenin's 
emphasis on educational and organisational work by the Party. 
But it was not only the proletariat whose class consciousness 
had to be developed. Other classes could become targets of 
this drive. (Revolutionary consciousness could be aroused in 
the peasantry and he assigned it a positive, albeit 
subordinate, role, something with which Marx and Engels 
disagreed.
To what extent if any, Lenin's view of the revolutionary 
capacity of the peasantry influenced Mao in arriving at a 
similar conclusion is not clear. Yet there is little doubt 
that Mao's thinking followed the same direction and, by virtue 
of his own experiences over the years, Mao came to direct the 
overwhelming focus of his attention to the peasantry, which in 
the process developed, for him, and by reason of the 
circumstances, into the leading class Qf the Chinese 
revolution. After all one can argue that Mao did not choose
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rural revolution. It chose him. He and some of his colleagues 
were forced into the countryside in 1927. In 1922-23, before 
the collapse of the First United Front, he had been a labour 
organizer.
Secondly, it must be stressed that, in line with Marx's 
thinking, Lenin saw classes as occupying specific positions in 
the socio-economic structure and then of having distinct 
economic bases. Even though Lenin introduced much more 
emphasis on national differences, national oppression and the 
national struggle, he is still concerned to maintain the 
orthodox Marxist importance of class.
By way of background to Mao's analysis, it should be 
mentioned that, by the turn of the century, significant 
changes were generally acknowledged to have taken place in 
Chinese society. There are two major approaches to China's 
failure to modernise: the domestic-limitation school and the 
foreign-intervention school. The foreign-intervention approach 
pinpoints imperialist intervention commencing with the Opium 
War of 1839-42, as the main obstacle to China's development.
Sun Yatsen, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong were among those who 
shared the view that however they defined imperialism - Mao 
saw imperialism as the combination of foreign power and the 
domestic comprador class and Chiang attributed imperialism to 
unequal treaties between China and foreign powers - 
imperialism was the overriding factor retarding and distorting 
China's twentieth-century development.
The domestic-limitation approach holds that China's 
development has been inhibited primarily by limitations 
derived from or associated with its-traditional institutions 
and values. Most of these writers believe that foreign
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intervention, however painful or humiliating, was either 
benign or a necessary challenge to traditional values or 
systems, and a way to open a path toward industrialization. 
Marx's Eurocentric linear-developmental approach should also 
be placed in this school.
During the changes taking place in China the old classes 
were changing and new classes emerged. The largest numerical 
class, of course, remained the peasantry. Thus while 
capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production existed 
side by side, the latter was clearly more pervasive and 
enveloped the overwhelming proportion of the population of all 
the classes and the working class and the peasantry (or
elements of it) were deemed to be the most radical in that
they were the most inclined towards violent protest action. Of 
significant political consequence was the condition of
imperialist domination to which China was subjected, and as a
result Mao claimed that China suffered continued humiliations 
at the hands of the foreign powers.
This general situation gave rise to a strong feeling of 
nationalism among the intellectuals and other groups in the 
society. How was one to cope with all of this? For Mao, the 
only way to overcome this dire situation was to develop a 
strategy of anti-imperialism. We have not found any major 
explicit theoretical change, for example, on the question of 
nation and class made by Mao, to equal those which Lenin made. 
But his detailed observations, especially about class and also 
about alliance policy, do go to a certain degree beyond Lenin, 
and definitely beyond Marx and Engels. What is interesting 
about Mao are the implicit theories of,the interrelation of 
class and nation behind his analytical writings and his
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tactical positions. This is also the context in which one can 
place the debate about whether 'sinification' of Marxism- 
Leninism meant tactical adjustment to Chinese reality or 
simply nationalism disguised as Marxism.
Again there are two schools. One contends that Mao's 
thought is to be understood by referring to the context Mao 
found himself in because Mao's thought developed through his 
experience of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution and 
much less through the medium of Marxist theory. The belief is 
that Maofs roots in his indigenous culture influenced not only 
his mode of expression but his pattern of thought, hence the 
structure of beliefs that he held as well as his personal 
relations. However much he might rebel, the traditional 
Chinese element never lost its prior claim on this 
extraordinary complex man, the story goes.
This approach is rejected in this thesis. Not only does 
it underestimate the influence of the Soviet texts on the 
Marxist philosophy Mao studied in considerable detail in 
1936/7, and that Mao's own philosophy is really 
unexceptionally orthodox by the standards of the international 
communist movement at the time. But in addition this school's 
emphasis on Mao's stress on subjective factors, the human — 
will, and the superstructure at the expense of orthodox 
Marxism's emphasis on the causal significance of economic 
factors neglects Mao's repeated statements that the economic 
base generally plays the principal and decisive role. Lastly, 
this approach does not explain why Mao, who did flirt with 
anarchism and liberalism at one time or another, chose Marxism 
in its Bolshevik version to comprehend ±he Chinese reality and
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develop his strategy of anti-imperialism based on a Marxist- 
Leninist framework. The adaptation Mao did make cannot be 
explained as being made by a Confucian under a red veneer, but 
'seeking truth from facts' (shishi qiu shi) fits very well 
into a Marxist approach. Mao took a universal theory and 
provided it with a national form without detracting from its 
universal status. The specific manifestation of general 
principles or laws led Mao to perceive in Marxism a 
methodology capable of facilitating his quest for 
comprehension of the Chinese particular.
Mao's confidence in Marxism had nothing to do with the 
content of Marx's analysis. Such content was necessarily 
specific to a particular mode of production ( Western European 
capitalism) at a particular historical moment (the mid­
nineteenth century). The historical characteristics of that 
particular conjuncture described by Marx, such as its class 
structure and the nature of its class struggle, were perceived 
by Mao as the historically specific content of Marx's 
analysis, something which had to be differentiated from the 
general principles or laws which Marx formulated. It is 
important to note that Mao regarded such principles and laws 
of Marxism and Leninism as 'abstract' and not necessarily of 
immediate relevance or utility in the Chinese context. 
Therefore, the universal law which asserted the ubiquity of 
class struggle in all societies except the most primitive 
would direct attention to the centrality of classes and class 
struggle within society, but could not suggest how class 
structure or struggle would be manifest in any particular 
society at any point in time. The disclosure of the nature of 
class structure and struggle within such a specific context
359
could result only from an empirical analysis to disclose the 
specific 'laws' of that context.
From this perspective, the sinification of Marxism was 
not a question of the elevation of Chinese realities at the 
expense of ideology, but the development of Marxism as an 
ideological system. Thus, although the sinification of Marxism 
is a culturally charged term, it does not claim cultural 
privilege over Marxism. Within a different cultural or 
historical context the same process would have to be made 
again. Only then can (sinified) Marxism become a guide to 
action.
It will be recalled that Mao described himself as a 
Marxist by the summer of 1920. When the communist movement 
took concrete shape in the 1920's, nationalism, which had as 
its major objective the liberalization of China from 
imperialist domination, was a potent force. However, the 
Communists and Mao realised that the achievement of this 
objective necessitated as well a social revolution. The 
perceived relationships between these two revolutions and the 
various emphases periodically placed on them was significant 
for the analysis of classes and class analysis. One of Mao's 
first observations of his class categories is that they were 
conceived primarily in their relationship to the problems of 
national revolution to overthrow the militarists and foreign 
imperialism. His class categories are not rigorously 
identified at the level of relation of production.
When Mao retires to Shaoshan and observes the militancy 
of parts of the peasantry, this shows up in an emphasis on the 
revolutionary role of the peasantry. The landlord and 
comprador classes are characterized as depending upon
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imperialism for their survival and growth and the peasantry is 
revolutionary because it suffers under imperialist distortions 
of the Chinese economy. As regards the petty bourgeoisie, it 
is useful to note that, in addition to owner-peasants, master 
handicraftsmen and small traders, Mao includes in this 
category students, primary and secondary school teachers, 
lower government functionaries and small lawyers. It is well 
to bear in mind that Mao himself was quite ambiguous about the 
place of these occupations in the socio-economic structure.
The designation is nevertheless in line with Lenin's 
categorization in the Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question.
In suggesting the evolution of alliances, in identifying the 
peasantry and its potential for a positive role in the 
revolution and in using (however haphazardly) the concept of 
relations of production, Mao is operating largely within the 
Marxist-Leninist paradigm. After all even Marx and Engels do 
talk about all sorts of alliances in their Communist Manifesto 
and Mao never repudiates working class leadership. In the 
Gutian Revolution of 1929, Mao expressed his concern with the 
prominence of the peasantry. For the purpose of my thesis one 
other point is important. Mao constantly analyzes class in 
terms of national revolution. It is anti-imperialism which is 
the guiding thread through the multitude of classes in China. 
Claiming that the peasantry could be the main force of the 
revolution goes undoubtedly beyond even Lenin. Intensifying 
political training of the lumpenproletariat to effect a 
qualitative change in these elements with its emphasis on the 
human will as against objective factors does represent a 
shift, indeed a new direction in Marxist thought. What is 
clear from the above is that class struggle is part and parcel
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of China's liberation from imperialism. Mao's theory of 
contradiction in a China with a bewildering variety of social 
strata gives guidance on the crucial issue as to who the 
friends or foes are in the struggle against Japanese 
imperialism. This leads to the last part of the Conclusion.
Mao used the word imperialism and imperialists a lot but 
did not attach equivalent importance to imperialism as a 
concept. This had been done by Lenin and did not need to be 
repeated. For Mao the crucial issue was to find a strategy to 
counter imperialism. He uses 'imperialism' in the way it was 
done commonly in orthodox communist circles, i.e. to mean 
capitalism.
This leaves three possibilities concerning Mao as a 
theorist of imperialism.
1 Mao really had no theoretical ideas about imperialism at 
all, but found it politically convenient to use anti- 
imperialist rhetoric.
2 He had (a worked-out theory of imperialism which he never 
wrote down.
3 He had a number of theoretical ideas about imperialism, 
not amounting to a worked theory, something which practically 
remained fairly eclectic with some loose debt to Lenin and 
within a broad framework of Marx's laws, which informed his 
political tactics and which can be to some extent imputed from 
examining those tactics and his justification of them.
The evidence of this thesis points to the third of these 
alternatives. This means that this thesis is not only held 
together by the class/nation theoretical question but also by 
a second theme: what has also been explained is the 
development of revolutionary political tactics to theories
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about the relation of nations.
Mao, acting broadly in a Marxist-Leninist framework, has 
to be credited for developing an anti-imperialist strategy 
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